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Automatic Attention to Aggression Cues and Alcohol Cues Using
a Dichotic Listening Task and a Parafoveal Visual Task
Michelle Edington LeVasseur
ABSTRACT
Ongoing investigations of drunken aggression tend to focus on 1) situational cues,
and 2) individual variables such as personality traits. This study investigated the
hypothesis that an undergraduate’s attention would be pulled toward a nonconscious
presentation of aggression stimuli, especially in the presence of alcohol cues, and
especially if he or she was high on trait anger [as measured using the State Trait Anger
Expression Inventory (STAXI); Spielberger, 1988] and had high expectancies for
behaving aggressively while drinking alcohol [as measured using the Expectancy
Questionnaire for Alcohol and Aggression – Lo Dose (EQAAL); Epps, Hunter,
LeVasseur, Steinberg, & Hancock, unpublished manuscript].
Seventy-nine of the participants who completed questionnaires also completed
one of the two computer tasks (adapted from John Bargh and associates) weeks later in
either the Barroom or the Cleanroom. Attention to HiAggression words (as measured by
reaction time or error rate difference scores) was significantly higher than attention to
NonAggression words using the parafoveal visual task, with observed power at 1. No
significant differences were found using the dichotic listening task. Additionally, there
was a significant three-way interaction (Word Type X Setting X Angry Temperament)
when participants where blocked according to high vs. low angry temperament scores.
Follow-up analyses as well as regression analyses for the specific hypothesis provided
mixed results. Individuals lower on angry temperament tended to demonstrate higher
levels of attentional interference for aggression words, but only in the presence of alcohol
cues. Conversely, individuals higher on angry temperament evidenced higher levels of
attentional interference, but only in the absence of alcohol cues.

vi

It appears that the relationships among these variables are by no means
straightforward. Studies that include an opportunity to aggress behaviorally may shed
more light on whether one’s level of attentional interference and self-reported personality
traits can be combined to predict aggression in the presence of alcohol cues. The
parafoveal visual task is recommended as the methodology of choice for these future
studies.

vii

Introduction
Aggression represents a global health problem of enormous dimensions and
involves behaviors such as homicide, suicide, domestic violence, and sexual violence
(World Health Organization, WHO, 2001). WHO identified alcohol abuse as one of the
primary individual risk factors for these types of aggression. Various data substantiate an
alarming association between alcohol use and aggression. The U.S. Department of Justice
Bureau of Justice Statistics (1997) reported that the following percentages of state
prisoners were under the influence of alcohol at the time the offense was committed:
murder - 45%, negligent manslaughter - 52%, assault - 45%, sexual assault – 40%, and
robbery – 37%. Additionally, alcohol has been reported to be involved in about 70% of
fatal automobile accidents, 88% of knifings, and 65% of spouse battering (Steele &
Josephs, 1990).
Consumption of alcohol appears to be associated with the severity of aggressive
behavior. Koss (1988) investigated this hypothesize using a national college sample of
nearly 3,000 men, some of whom were perpetrators of sexually aggressive crimes. Male
perpetrators reported that alcohol or substance use was involved 74% of the time during
rape, 67% of the time during attempted rape, 35% of the time during sexual coercion, and
33% of the time during unwanted sexual contact (Koss, 1988 as cited in Testa, 2002).
Although the majority of us do not become aggressive after consuming alcohol, the
regrettable consequences of the interaction exact a heavy toll against our society,
rendering the relationship between alcohol and aggression worthy of intense scrutiny.
Ongoing investigations of this relationship attempt to identify variables that precipitate,
mediate, or moderate drunken aggression, including 1) external socio-cultural or
situational cues and 2) individual variables such as cognitions, mood, or personality
traits. Researchers, governmental agencies, and various funding sources continue to
invest extensive resources on research that will increase our understanding of this
sometimes deleterious interaction. It is hoped that a more precise understanding of this
interaction will facilitate the development of more effective intervention programs for
those who drink and become aggressive.
1

Overview
The current study focused primarily with the cognitive aspects of the alcoholaggression relationship—attention to salient internal and external cues related to alcohol
and aggression. More specifically, this study was designed to find out if a person’s
attention is more likely to be pulled toward aggression stimuli, especially in the presence
of alcohol cues and/or in the presence of high self-reported expectations for acting
aggressive while consuming alcohol. To this end, a brief summary of the literature
regarding aggression, selective attention theory, alcohol and cognition, and alcohol and
aggression is provided below. This is followed by a description of two methods of
presenting stimuli that hold promise for enhancing our understanding of the confluence of
aggressive stimuli, alcohol cues and personality variables upon attention. Finally, the
specific hypotheses and methodology for the current study are presented.
Aggression
Definitional Issues
The definitions of the words violence and aggression are similar in their emphasis
on the delivery of punishment to another organism. Of the two, “aggression” has been
operationally defined with greater precision. Therefore, the term aggression will be used
throughout this study.
Many definitions of aggression have been offered in the literature. Baron’s (1977)
definition of aggression is “any form of behavior directed toward the goal of harming or
injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment” (p. 7). This
definition excludes cases in which 1) hurtful behavior is intended to help another person
and 2) is acceptable to the target (e.g., the harm received by a surgical or dental patient).
It also implies that the essential feature of aggression is behavior that reflects intention to
harm.
Renfrew (1997) proposed that “aggression is a behavior that is directed by an
organism toward a target, resulting in damage” (p. 6). Renfrew argued that this definition
is broad enough to cover a wide range of aggressive situations such as aggression toward
animals or objects, and self-injurious behaviors. However, the emphasis on “resulting in
damage” excludes unsuccessful attempts to hurt the target. Also, for many researchers,
2

the impact of aggression toward animals or objects is not as interesting or relevant as
aggression toward other people.
Buss (1961) defined aggression as “a response that delivers noxious stimuli to
another organism” (p. 1). This definition ignores intent or goal to cause damage or injury
because Buss insisted that intent is unnecessary in the analysis of aggressive behavior. In
his view, “the relationship between reinforcement history of an aggressive response and
the immediate situation eliciting the response” (p. 2) is the critical relationship because it
is most likely to predict the occurrence and strength of aggressive responses. Buss’
definition fits well within a behavioral approach that circumvents unobservable
cognitions such as intent. However, cognitions (e.g., intentions, expectancies, etc.), such
as those implied by Baron’s definition, are central to an attentional approach, such as the
one taken in this study.
Intention to harm another person whether damage is caused or not, appears to be
an important aspect of aggression. Therefore, Baron’s definition of aggression will serve
as the backdrop for the following discussion of the origins of aggression.
In addition to various definitional issues concerning aggression, researchers have
struggled to distinguish among definitions of aggression, anger and hostility. One
distinction recognizes that these terms are different facets of the same global construct:
anger is the affective component; hostility is the complex cognitive, thought, or
attitudinal component; and aggression is the behavioral component (e.g., Buss, 1961;
Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983; Epps & Kendall, 1995). Unfortunately,
some investigators continue to use anger, hostility and aggression interchangeably,
contributing to ongoing definitional ambiguities. One method of minimizing this
ambiguity has been to distinguish between angry or hostile aggression on the one hand
and instrumental aggression on the other. These distinctions are generally made using
Buss’s (1961) definitions. Buss characterized all aggressive responses as involving an
interpersonal context and either being reinforced by the victim’s pain (which is
considered angry/hostile aggression) or by extrinsic rewards (which is considered
instrumental aggression). Angry or hostile aggression, then, is reinforced by the victim’s
emotional suffering, physiological reaction, or physical injury, whereas with instrumental
3

aggression “the acquisition of some extrinsic reinforcer or the cessation of aversive
stimuli are the crucial consequences, not the victim’s discomfort” (p. 3).
Recently, however, the dichotomy between hostile and instrumental aggression
has come under attack. Bushman and Anderson (2001) recommended “pulling the plug”
(p. 273) on this dichotomy claiming that it has outlived its usefulness. The authors made
a cogent argument that too many acts of aggression serve multiple purposes and include
both impulsive anger and a premeditated, instrumental component. For example, when a
boy shoves his brother out of a bus seat his intention might be to get the seat for himself,
to raise his power status in front of other students, to get revenge because his brother
called him a name earlier, or a combination of all three. The relative influence of each
type of aggression is often incalculable. In fact, Bushman and Anderson expressed
appreciation for the past utility of the hostile vs. instrumental aggression dichotomy, but
suggested that psychologists will realize future advances in the study of human
aggression by utilizing a knowledge structure (information-processing) approach, which
will be discussed shortly.
Research related to the current study has centered on aggression that is performed
concurrently with or secondary to anger arousal. While there may be an instrumental
component to such aggression, the presence of anger arousal as a common theme makes
it appropriate to focus primarily on literature related to angry aggression. However,
instrumental aggression will be mentioned where appropriate.
Salience or salient are concepts encountered frequently within the alcohol,
aggression, and selective attention literature. Generally, stimuli (e.g., thoughts, attitudes,
and environmental objects or events) are regarded as salient when they stand out and
enter conscious thought more readily because their conditions of activation are more
easily satisfied (Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). Higgins (1996) has provided convincing
arguments that the common view of salience is better described by the concept of
“accessibility” which he defined as the activation potential of available knowledge. These
distinctions will be elaborated upon later (in the section on Selective Attention).
However, in order to be concordant with the extant literature, the term salience will be
used throughout the current study.
4

The Origins of Angry Aggression
To understand the variables that may be most fruitful for investigating the
alcohol-aggression relationship, it is helpful to understand how angry aggression is
assumed to develop. Many models have been proposed to explain the development of
aggressive behavior including the original frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard,
Miller, Doob, Mowrer & Sears, 1939), social learning theory (Bandura, 1973), a
cognitive neo-associationistic conception (Berkowitz, 1990), two social information
processing models (Huesmann, 1988; Crick and Dodge, 1994) and an explication of
knowledge structures (Bushman and Anderson, 2001). Each of these models will be
discussed briefly followed by a summary of the important themes.
Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis.
Originally aggression was theorized to result as a direct consequence of
frustration brought on by an undesirable interruption (thwarting) of goal-directed
behavior (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). The theory specified that once
frustration is experienced, the innate drive is to strike out at a target. If aggressive
behavior is inhibited, the natural response toward aggression is thwarted and more
frustration is produced. On the other hand, if aggression is exhibited, relief from the
instigation to aggress occurs. This relief has been referred to as “aggression catharsis.”
However, several studies have provided evidence against the cathartic effect. Under
conditions in which one would be expected to produce less aggression (e.g., after already
having the opportunity to aggress as investigated by Geen, Stonner, & Shope, 1975, or
over time as investigated by Favata, LeVasseur, Koenig, Ciarcia, Epps, & Roberts, 2003),
participants actually produce more aggression (Lewis and Bucher, 1990).
The original frustration-aggression hypothesis also implied that frustration is
always followed by aggression. However, participants who perceive their frustration as
resulting from a legitimate reason are less likely to display aggression (Pastore, 1952;
Cohen; 1955) Also, Bandura (1973) argued that awareness of likely punishers may cause
a person’s aggressive response to be inhibited or even extinguished. Both of these
arguments suggest a mediational effect of cognition regarding the frustrating event, an
effect that is not addressed by the original model. Therefore, variables such as prior
5

learning (i.e., expectations) are likely to influence one’s interpretation of cues in the
environment, mediating whether one considers an event to be frustrating in the first place,
and whether a frustrating event even warrants an aggressive response.
Both the lack of support for aggression catharsis and research indicating that
frustration is not always followed by aggression cast doubt upon the tenability of the
frustration-aggression hypothesis to explain the origins of aggression. Models of learning
were instrumental in increasing our understanding of how aggression develops.
Social Learning Theory.
Social learning theory, as explicated by Bandura (1973), was the next notable
model to describe the origins of aggression. Unlike the frustration-aggression hypothesis,
social learning theory views frustration as merely one example of an emotional state that
can lead to aggression. Here aggression is considered to result from learning—learning in
a social context which feelings to label as “anger” and which behaviors are likely to
punish another person or lead to reinforcers.
According to Bandura (1973), aggressive behavior sequences are learned via
direct experience or observation. Through direct experience, a child may learn by
interacting with others behaviors for which he or she is likely to be punished or rewarded.
The frequency of aggressive behavior will be a direct function of how often the behavior
was rewarded or punished as it was being learned. Through observation, a child may
learn which behaviors exhibited by influential others (such as role-models) generate
reward or punishment. Once an individual uses the modeled behavioral sequence and it is
rewarded, this will increase the likelihood that the behavior will be repeated. Conversely,
punishment for using the behavioral sequence will result in its extinction. Whether the
behavior originated through vicarious learning or direct experience, after more successes
than failures in obtaining the desired results, the behavioral sequence (e.g., aggression)
will become part of that individual’s repertoire for controlling his or her environment.
It is tenable that frustration gives rise to a variety of negative emotions which may
instigate the drive to aggress (as in the original frustration-aggression hypothesis). It has
also been suggested that the experience of negative affect, in general, produces emotional
arousal (Sandoval, 1997). When this arousal is paired with the right reinforcement
6

contingencies, aggression is produced. However, Bandura believed emotional arousal is
not even necessary in the production of aggression (Sandoval, 1997). Awareness that an
event is aversive may lead directly to aggression if the reinforcement contingencies are
sufficiently rewarding.
Although social learning theory began to specify the role of emotional arousal in
the mediation of aggressive behaviors, it did not address the role of cognition in the
mediation of these behaviors (Sandoval, 1997). Bandura (1973) suggested that one’s
cognitive representations of reinforcement contingencies would mediate the interaction
between behaviors and the environment. The more specific processes of cognition, such
as how an individual assesses a situation and selects an appropriate response, were left to
be explicated by information processing theorists (discussed later). But prior to this,
negative affect was elegantly incorporated into a new model by Berkowitz (1983).
Cognitive Neo-Associationism.
In Berkowitz’s modification of the original frustration-aggression hypothesis,
negative affect arising from a range of aversive conditions is considered the basic source
of anger and angry aggression (1983, 1989, 1990). Berkowitz continued to expand this
model and suggested that aversive conditions produce both flight and fight tendencies
(1993). He considered these tendencies to be networks of associatively linked
physiological, motoric, and cognitive components (Berkowitz, 1998) and suggested that
the associative linkage is relatively primitive, automatic, and can occur in the absence of
reportable cognitions. A variety of factors—genetic, learned, and situational—influence
which of the flight or fight networks are most strongly activated. If fight networks are
activated, these factors (e.g., situational) will also influence whether the aggressive
response is inhibited or exhibited.
One situational factor of interest for the current study was attentional focus.
Berkowitz found in a series of studies (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) that when attention
is focused upon one’s negative affect, emotional self-regulation is promoted, the link
between negative affect and hostility (e.g., negative judgments about others) is
diminished, and aggression is inhibited. However, not all evidence supports an inhibiting
effect of attentional focus. Berkowitz (1998) reported that “highly aroused people are apt
7

to focus on the main features of the situation confronting them to the neglect of matters
that are relatively peripheral…. Thus, persons who are emotionally aroused because of an
aversive event might well focus their attention narrowly on those they blame for the
unpleasant occurrence” (p. 68), disregarding inhibiting cues such as possible punishment.
Berkowitz’ speculation parallels the theory of alcohol myopia which asserts that the
range of attentional focus may be restricted after the consumption of alcohol, increasing
the likelihood of aggression during volatile situations (Steele & Josephs, 1990).
Regardless of whether attentional focus is eventually concluded to inhibit or increase the
likelihood of an aggressive response, it is reasonable to assume that attentional focus is
an important moderating variable.
In some cases, those who are highly aroused or have overlearned aggressive
responses to certain situations (to the point of automaticity), may go from anger (an
affect) directly to aggression (a behavior), without any reportable intervening cognitions
(Berkowitz, 1990). However, once individuals engage in a higher order level of cognitive
processing, “they consider the perceived causes of their arousal, the possible
consequences of any action they might undertake, the goals they would like to attain, and
also what sensation they are feeling and what ideas and memories have just occurred to
them” (Berkowitz, 1990, p. 497). This indicates that processes (e.g., appraisals of rules
and consequences, and attributions) not used in its production can mediate aggression.
Further, this implies that understanding which types of internal and external cues render
behavioral responses more automatic, and understanding which types of cues facilitate
higher order cognitive processing, are worthy goals of aggression research.
Berkowitz’s (1990) cognitive-neoassociationistic conception of anger and
aggression improves upon prior models by offering a cognitive bridge between negative
affect and aggression. The strength of his model is that it accounts for the original
evidence linking frustration to aggression while also linking a variety of aversive events
(pain, extreme temperatures, noxious odors, stress, provocation, or viewing disgusting or
aggressive images) to negative affect, which then leads to aggression, sometimes
depending upon the outcome of higher level cognitive processing and sometimes
independently of those processes (for research related to aversive events the interested
8

reader is referred to Berkowitz, 1983, 1989; Anderson, 1989; Hearold, 1986; Liebert &
Spratkin, 1988; and, Geen 1998). One limitation of Berkowitz’s model is that it does not
address what causes the higher order cognitive processing or how the appraisals and
attributions control reactions to the aversive events. Fortunately, the task of explaining
the origins and consequences of cognitive processing has been undertaken by information
processing theorists.
Social Information Processing Models.
In information processing theories, a schema is a representation in memory about
a general set of facts, and how these facts are related (Medin, 2001). A script is a type of
schema that contains information about sequences of ordered actions that occur in a
stereotyped situation. Scripts help us understand events and make predictions about
future events (Medin, 2001). Scripts are learned and augmented by children (and adults
as well) through vicarious and direct social experience and are accessed in order to
interpret the social environment and guide behavior.
According to Huesmann’s (1988) information processing model of childhood
aggression, the conditions most conducive to the learning of aggressive scripts appear to
be those in which the child is reinforced for displaying aggression, often observes
aggression, and is the object of aggression (Eron, 1994). Salient environmental cues will
then activate those aggressive scripts. Salience is affected by one’s familiarity with those
cues as well as one’s current emotional state (Sandoval, 1997). Once the relevant script is
activated, the child evaluates 1) the appropriateness of the script with regards to
internalized social norms, and 2) the likelihood that the script will obtain the desired
results (Eron, 1994). Aggression is more likely to occur when salient cues activate an
aggressive script, when the script has been repeatedly associated with the perception of a
desired result (e.g., injury to another or a reward), and when the child feels confident that
he or she can enact the activated script (Huesmann, 1988). Conversely, if salient,
activating cues are not present, if there is a perception of negative results such as
punishment, or if the child lacks self-confidence in enacting the script, aggression is less
likely.
9

More recently, Huesmann and his colleagues (Guerra, Nucci, & Huesmann, 1994)
proposed that aggressive actions are directed by “moral judgment” memory systems or
knowledge structures. Guerra, et al. (1994) suggested that which knowledge structures
direct aggressive actions depends upon several factors including 1) an individual’s
evaluative beliefs (i.e., right or wrong) and informational beliefs (i.e., potential
consequences), 2) salience of situational cues (e.g., cues that focus attention on a
particular aspect of a situation and activate relevant moral judgments), and 3) interpretive
biases that influence whether the cue is perceived at all or distorted upon perception.
They offered two sources of interpretive biases: interpersonal factors (e.g., mood states,
personality, and attributional style) and sociocultural influences (e.g., family and peers,
and social contexts such as school and religion). They also suggested that judgments
become routinized, leading to behaviors that appear insensitive to the unique features of a
given situation. That is, the behaviors become relatively automatic as a result of the
moral judgment knowledge structures. It seems reasonable to conclude that automatic
moral judgments and often-used or well-rehearsed behavioral scripts may represent an
unfavorable combination in the production of aggression.
A major strength of information processing theories is that they can be used to
describe how aggressive behavioral scripts become represented in memory (Sandoval,
1997). Early on, direct and observational learning facilitate the creation of knowledge
structures (to be discussed in greater detail later) that link social cues to aggressive
responses. These primitive structures are elaborated upon over time. When a child
encounters a social problem, attention is directed toward the most salient cues (internal
cues such as emotional state or external cues in the environment) and a comparison is
made with scripts already in memory. Salient cues that are most similar to those present
when the script was first encoded will increase the probability that the previous script will
be retrieved. The retrieved behavioral script will then be evaluated for its appropriateness
in the current situation.
Huesmann (1988) capitalized on an information processing approach to account
for how a behavioral sequence is maintained in memory once it is encoded. He postulated
that rehearsal is the primary method by which the behavioral sequence is maintained in
10

memory for later accessibility. Rehearsal includes such behaviors as recalling the original
script, fantasizing, or role-playing.
Another social information processing theory (Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey, &
Brown, 1986) also postulated aggression as a function of a child’s processing of
environmental cues (external and internal) in social situations (Sandoval, 1997). The
Dodge et al. paradigm is noteworthy for its elaboration of how scripts are developed and
activated. A variety of labels have been applied to what were originally described as the
five sequential steps undertaken for skillful social information processing. In general,
these five steps consist of 1) cue encoding, 2) cue interpretation, 3) response generation,
4) response decision, and 5) response enactment (Dodge & Crick, 1990).
More specifically, in the first step of Dodge and Crick’s model, relevant cues are
selected from the environment. Attention to particular cues (e.g., a person, a situation, or
an object in the environment) is mediated and moderated by heuristic rules and cognitive
schemata that have developed over time. During the second step, cues are mentally
represented in long-term memory and given meaning. Meaning is related to one’s past
experience with that particular person, situation, or object, as well as one’s past
experience with those general types of stimuli. The third step involves accessing possible
behavioral responses to the cues through associative networks of related long-term
information. Behavioral responses that have been accessed recently or frequently over
time, may be quickly accessed and appear to be relatively automatic. However, the
evaluation of that response’s probability of achieving a certain outcome or be skillfully
enacted (carried out in the fourth step), may lead to an inhibition of the selected response.
Whichever response is chosen, during the final step the selected response is enacted using
information from relevant scripts “to transform the selected response into verbal and
motor behaviors” (p. 14). Monitoring of the response’s effectiveness for achieving a
particular outcome leads to further encoding of social cues, which is hypothesized to alter
the response or start the sequence of social information processing all over again (Dodge
& Crick, 1990).
Crick and Dodge reformulated their model in 1994 and proposed that the
processing steps are not executed in a sequential fashion and numerous cycles through
11

the steps (possibly in a different order each time) may be performed depending on
environmental cues, such as social exchanges with others. Thus, the steps are viewed as
more cyclical and transactional than linear or sequential as others become involved in the
enactment of a script or other cues become more salient.
Skillful execution of these cycles is considered necessary for competent
behavioral responding, whereas failure at any point may lead to inappropriate behaviors
such as aggression. Empirical studies have provided some evidence that children’s
aggressive behaviors are related to biased or deficient processing during any cycle.
Reviews of the research related to the specific “steps” can be found in Sandoval (1997).
A review of the evidence for interventions based on the social information processing
models discussed above can be found in Huesmann and Reynolds (2001).
Both of the social information processing models emphasize the impact of
information in memory on the perception of new information. That is, a child’s existing
memories of situations and possible behavioral responses will influence which cues in a
new situation are attended to and encoded (Sandoval, 1997). For example, a cue that has
preceded punishment in the past may be especially salient for the child, and may inhibit
an aggressive response. Both models also assume that if an aggressive behavioral script
seems appropriate for the goal of hurting the victim or obtaining an extrinsic reward, an
aggressive act will be chosen as the suitable response. In addition to describing how an
aggressive response may be selected, both models imply that inefficient processing of
social cues can produce inappropriate responses such as aggression.
Knowledge Structures and Network Models.
The above theories imply that there is an automatic nature to the cognitive
elements of aggression. Bushman and Anderson (2001) relied heavily upon the
assumption of automaticity to describe how aggression develops and used the construct
of knowledge structures as a framework for appreciating the relevance of automaticity.
First of all, they describe knowledge structures as organized networks of interrelated
information (both schemas and scripts) that result from frequent activation of bits of
related information (p. 276-277). Knowledge structures are compiled and augmented
during childhood in order to guide behavior. They are activated by external cues
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(environmental) and by internal cues (e.g., emotional arousal and goal attainment). In
turn, some cues become more salient than others. The most salient cue(s) will prime
relevant schemas or activate relevant scripts, which will then influence which behavioral
response is finally chosen. “The person first selects a script to represent the situation and
then assumes a role in the script” (p. 277). Knowledge structures that are accessed with
greater frequency will become overlearned and hence automatic, exerting a fast and
efficient influence on incoming information and the behavioral response that is selected.
That is, once a behavioral sequence becomes activated, it is more likely to be carried out
whether the person is aware of a decision to act a certain way or not.
Salient cues are assumed to activate knowledge structures, which serve to bias
some internal and external stimuli. Although salience of stimuli is difficult to establish a
priori, research with children shows some progress. In one study (Dodge & Tomlin,
1987), groups of aggressive and nonaggressive children were to interpret the intentions of
a provocateur in a hypothetical situation. Aggressive children were more likely than
nonaggressive children to base their interpretations on schemata rather than information
presented in a story. That is, aggressive children were more likely than their
nonaggressive peers to rely upon previous experience rather than immediate social cues.
In another study (Gouze, 1987), aggressive participants were more likely than their
nonaggressive peers to focus their attention on aggressive social interactions in the
environment. They also provided more aggressive solutions to hypothetical interpersonal
conflict situations. This finding suggests that aggressive children may pay greater
attention to aggressive cues in social situations—presumably because these cues are selfrelevant.
Another study of children (Rabiner, Lenhart, and Lochman, 1990) provided some
evidence for the role of automaticity. Children were given the task of solving a social
problem under conditions that elicited reflective processing or under conditions that
elicited automatic processing. Socially maladjusted children had difficulty processing
social information adequately only under automatic conditions. Crick and Dodge (1994)
suggested that most studies were not designed to evaluate processing deficits under
automatic responding conditions. They also suggested that techniques that measure
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response time and evaluate priming effects would be valuable for future research on
automatic processes.
A major advantage of the knowledge structure approach is that it avoids
confounding the hostile-instrumental aggression dichotomy with the automatic-controlled
information processing distinction (Bushman and Anderson, 2001). As Bushman and
Anderson noted, “hostile aggression is, by definition, automatic—it is unreasoned,
impulsive, uncontrollable, and spontaneous. By contrast, instrumental aggression is, by
definition, controlled—it is reasoned, calculated, and premeditated” (p. 276). The
confound exists because both complex decisions and affect-laden decisions can be made
automatically or with careful thought. Bushman and Anderson argued that the knowledge
structure approach suggests that the more frequently a knowledge structure is activated,
the more automatic it becomes, regardless of whether it originated from impulsive anger
or calculated, conscious intent. Additionally, assuming that hostile and instrumental
forms of aggression are dichotomous presumes that these knowledge structures are
somehow separate in the brain, when it seems more plausible that they interact or are part
of the same knowledge structure. The knowledge structure approach facilitates the
investigation of conditions that mediate or moderate aggression and avoids reliance upon
distinctions that create more ambiguity and questions than clarity and answers.
Knowledge structures are conceptually similar to neural network models,
especially major network models of semantic memory (Bushman and Anderson, 2001).
Neural network models are considered to be analogous to the structure and function of
neurons in the brain. Over the last six decades, neural network models have been revised
and extended to a variety of research domains including computer science, economics
and finance, and psychology. Within psychology, Anderson’s latest revision of his
adaptive control of thought model (ACT-R) represents an attempt to describe a variety of
phenomena and data related to memory and learning (Medin, 2001). According to the
ACT-R model, as information is processed in working memory, networks of nodes
(concepts) are activated. Activation then spreads to neighboring concepts through links in
the network—a process called spreading activation. Activation of any one node “is a
function of both the number of activated concepts it is linked to and also the strength of
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the links to those nodes” (Medin, 2001, p. 224). The strength of a link is directly related
to how frequently that link is used. However, even if the link is strong, activation
dissipates from node to node and activation of a particular node may disappear altogether
(fall out of working memory) as neighboring nodes become less active.
The ACT-R model provides a reasonable hypothesis for how information is
brought to bear in a situation. First, external and internal cues that are salient for an
individual will become activated in working memory. Then, related information (which is
most likely to be information that was related to it in the past, Medin, 2001) will be
activated through spreading activation. Concepts (or behavioral scripts) with the most
activation (i.e., that have been most frequently used) will influence which behavioral
response is selected.
In many ways the knowledge structures approach is similar to the ACT-R model.
Aggression cues or stimuli that are salient for an individual will activate aggressionrelated knowledge structures or networks. If an individual has often enacted aggressive
behavioral scripts in the past, he or she is more likely to enact them in the future,
compared to other individuals who have been less aggressive. It follows, then, that
measuring trait anger of an individual may offer some predictive utility in determining
whether someone is more likely to aggress as compared to others. Although the current
study will investigate two methodologies for predicting aggression cue activation related
to trait anger, studies that use one of these methodologies and give participants
opportunities to aggress would be needed to test this last assumption.
Assumptions Generated from Models of Aggression
Like definitions of aggression, models of aggression have evolved and have
successfully accounted for instrumental and angry aggression, the effect of a variety of
aversive events on subsequent aggression, and the initiation and maintenance of
aggressive behaviors. Several testable assumptions have emerged from these models. One
is that negative emotional reactions (such as frustration or anger) or goal-attainment, or
both together, when paired with the right reinforcement contingencies, will produce
aggression. Another assumption is that engaging in complex thinking will reduce
aggression. Conversely, factors that limit or interfere with complex thinking are assumed
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to increase aggression. These factors include 1) automaticity, 2) distraction, which
promotes superficial processing of relevant social information, 3) individual differences
in social reasoning ability, which may be due to poor role models, or inconsistent rewards
or punishments for aggressive behavior; 4) individual differences on a variety of
personality dimensions, such as impulsivity and trait aggression, 5) intense emotions,
which have been shown to interfere with the processing of incoming information, and 6)
anything that would interfere with one’s capacity to process a wide range of cues,
including alcohol consumption (Smith & Mackie, 2000). Some of these factors can be
manipulated (e.g., distraction) while others can be measured (e.g., trait aggression).
Another assumption generated by aggression models is the reciprocal nature by
which salient cues and existing networks of social information (knowledge structures)
interact to produce behavior. Cues that are salient for an individual will activate
knowledge structures, which will in turn guide behavior. Conversely, existing knowledge
structures will bias individuals toward some social cues, especially those that are selfrelevant, while other cues are disregarded or ignored. That is, existing knowledge
structures will differentially influence the processing of available information.
Determining which cues someone is likely to attend to, whether attention is intentionally
focused or not, may help us predict behavior a priori. Methods that help clarify the
relationship between knowledge structure activation and aggressive behavior and can
produce automatic effects may also increase our understanding of the alcohol-aggression
relationship.
Selective Attention
In order to investigate assumptions related to cognitive mediators of aggression, it
is important to consider what is known about selective attention and automaticity. There
is no universally accepted definition of attention in the psychological literature. It has
been viewed as mental effort, concentration, focalization, or selective processing.
Although there is considerable overlap among these concepts, attention appears to
represent a variety of situations/processes. Johnston and Dark (1986) in their review of
the literature, defined selective attention as “the differential processing of simultaneous
sources of information” (p. 44). Although they did not define “processing,” it may be
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regarded as the series of steps, sequential or simultaneous, taken to detect and analyze a
stimulus and to decide upon a course of action based upon that analysis. Johnston and
Dark further specified that simultaneous sources of information consist of internal events
(memory and knowledge) and external events (environmental objects and situations) and
that the information is analyzed perceptually, semantically, or both. Selective attention,
then, implies that we select some information for further processing (because it is
relevant in some way) while ignoring or filtering out other information (because it is
irrelevant).
Salience vs. Accessibility
Salience is another concept that has been defined in various ways throughout the
literature on selective attention and knowledge activation. As discussed earlier, salient
stimuli have been viewed as those that stand out and enter thought more readily because
their conditions of activation are more easily satisfied (Krech & Crutchfield, 1948).
Others use the concept of salience to describe anything that commands one’s attention
(see Higgins, 1996). However, this view implies that any variable that influences
attention is salient. Many other factors clearly influence which stimuli we attend to (such
as effort, the difficulty of the current task, alertness, mood, etc.). Furthermore, such a
broad definition does not allow distinctions to be made between salience and selective
attention, salience and accessibility, or salience and knowledge activation (Higgins,
1996).
Higgins (1996) argued that salience is more appropriately viewed as “something
about a stimulus event that occurs on exposure, without a prior set for a particular kind of
stimulus, that draws attention selectively to a specific aspect of the event” (p. 135).
Higgins further restricts salience to the properties of the stimulus event only, which may
include features of the particular stimulus, properties of the immediate context in which
the stimulus appears, and the relations among these properties. That is, a stimulus can be
considered salient because of something about its absolute properties or because of
something about its properties relative to those of other objects in the immediate
situation.
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Higgins’ (1996) definition of salience does not include properties of the perceiver,
such as expectancies or goals. These properties fall under the rubric of accessibility,
which Higgins defined as the activation potential of available knowledge. However,
salience and accessibility can interact to increase the likelihood that knowledge structures
will be activated (p. 134). That is, the perceptual system is biased toward some internal or
external stimuli because of 1) prior experience with that stimuli, 2) chronic or habitual
expectancies or attitudes that have developed over time, and 3) recent thought or
experience. Any of these biases may render one stimulus property as more distinctive
when compared to nonbiased stimuli or stimulus properties that are available for further
processing. Even for stimulus information that is impoverished, vaguely related, or fits
into other knowledge categories better, its activation in the perceptual system will be
easier and swifter than other cues. Thus, nonbiased stimuli that would normally serve to
guide one’s behavior in a social situation may be minimally or not at all processed
(Bruner, 1957a, 1957b as cited in Higgins, 1996).
Although the above distinctions between salience and accessibility are important
for future research intended to parse apart their relative effects on knowledge structure
activation, the earlier definition of salience is still in common use. It is expected that
Higgins’ concise treatise on knowledge activation will facilitate an associated precision
in future research endeavors. For the current study, stimuli that are considered salient are
best viewed as those stimuli that have higher potential to activate knowledge structures.
However, the term salient will continue to be used instead of accessibility.
Early vs. Late Selection
The idea that information is differentially attended has been well accepted by
researchers. However, agreeing upon the precise point at which salient information
becomes selected for further analysis has been the basis of the decades-long early
selection versus late selection debate (see Pashler, 1998 for a review). Briefly, Johnston
and Dark (1986) summarized the debate as to whether selection of stimuli for further
processing takes place after sensory analysis but before semantic analysis, or if it always
takes place after semantic analysis. In support for early selection they concluded,
“selection based on sensory cues is usually superior to selection based on semantic cues”
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(p. 48). However, they also recognized that early selection of relevant stimuli assumes
early rejection of irrelevant stimuli. This assumption does not seem tenable since
considerable evidence exists that irrelevant stimuli sometimes undergo semantic analysis
(e.g., see Lewis, 1970; Treisman, 1960; MacKay, 1973; Corteen & Wood, 1972; and,
Moray, 1959). Thus, the evidence supports both early and late selection models.
Automatic vs. Controlled Attention
Within selective attention a distinction was proposed to more fully explicate how
environmental stimuli are chosen for further analysis. One way is via controlled attention,
which has been described as a conscious, active, voluntary, effortful, flexible, or
intentional cognitive process. The other way is via automatic attention, or automaticity,
which has been described as a nonconscious, passive, involuntary, effortless, or
unintentional cognitive process (see Bargh, 1992 and Johnston & Dark, 1986 for reviews
of controlled and automatic attention).
Bargh (1992) described controlled attention as flexible but resource-limited. That
is, controlled attention is a resource that can be allocated toward a task. The degree to
which a stimulus is processed relates directly to how much attention is directed toward
that stimulus, which in turn relates to how demanding the associated task is. Bargh’s
description mirrors that of capacity models. According to capacity theories, simple tasks
do not interfere with each other. However, a difficult (or resource-demanding) task
interferes with the processing of a simpler task. There are also multiple resource theories
(as discussed in Medin, Ross, & Markman, 2001), which suggest that there are multiple
pools of attentional resources that can be allocated to various tasks. The degree to which
two tasks interfere with each other depends on the degree of overlap between the resource
pools. For example, the resource pool for auditory tasks should not be the same as the
resource pool for visual tasks. Therefore, attention could be directed toward auditory and
visual tasks at the same time with minimal interference.
Johnston and Dark (1986) reviewed studies that investigated spatial attention and
likened spatial attention to an attentional spotlight with an adjustable beam. However,
adjustment capabilities are limited. The beam can be adjusted to include information
directly outside of the foveal region (the parafoveal region), but the processing of
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information is most efficient for stimuli within the attentional spotlight (i.e., aligned with
the center of the fovea and directed toward specific regions of space). The beam of the
attentional spotlight can be adjusted in order to complete a task and can even be “split.”
For stimuli outside of the spotlight, processing is most likely (albeit minimal) for
nonsemantic stimuli but still at a considerable cost to processing speed and accuracy.
Regarding semantic information that is presented visually, nonattended information that
is more than about 3º from the visual angle of attended stimuli is unlikely to be processed
(Rayner, 1978). For information that is presented aurally, nonattended information is
intrusive when it is relevant. For example, in dichotic listening tasks, controlled attention
to one channel can be interrupted by information in the other channel if the nonattended
information conforms to active schema (i.e., is self-relevant).
This tendency to be attracted toward information that is not being directly
attended but is self-relevant is described by the other selection process, the automatic
process (Bargh, 1992). This process directs one’s attention to environmental stimuli
without conscious intent. In the strictest sense, a process is regarded as automatic if it
requires no cognitive resources to initiate it (i.e., attention is not intentionally focused)
and if the process runs to completion once it has begun. One possible cause of the
automatic process is top-down processing, which refers to the effect that old information
(i.e., internal representations or expectations about the stimuli) has on the selection of
new information. According to Broadbent (as cited in Johnston & Dark, 1986), as an
individual learns associations among stimuli, the individual develops internal biases
toward those stimuli. Therefore, even if stimuli are not relevant for a particular task,
those stimuli may be relevant to the individual. These biases direct attention away from
the stimuli that should be processed quickly and accurately for successful execution of a
given task.
Johnston and Dark (1986) presented results from studies on the intrusiveness of
irrelevant (nonattended) stimuli and concluded that selective attention can be guided by
active schemata and that this process can be controlled or automatic. Selective attention is
more likely to be categorized as controlled when the stimuli are purposefully attended to,
but categorized as automatic when the stimuli are attended to because of an internal bias.
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The internal bias may exist because schemata have been primed (activated) by recent
thought or experience, or because those stimuli are self-relevant (chronically accessible)
to the individual.
Bargh (1992) came to a similar conclusion but assigned this internal bias to one of
two types of automaticity: preconscious or postconscious. Preconscious automaticity
refers to the nonconscious selection of stimuli based upon stereotypical constructs held
by the individual (i.e., chronic expectancies assembled over years of interacting with the
environment). That is, stimuli are processed based upon their mere presence.
Postconscious automaticity, on the other hand, is essentially the same except that the
nonconscious selection of stimuli is based upon constructs, expectancies, or schemata
that have been primed (preactivated ) by recent conscious thought or experience. That is,
the stimuli would not be salient, or processed, based on their mere presence except that
they have been recently activated in memory. The recent activation results in a lower
threshold of accessibility for those stimuli.
Priming, in a research context, generally refers to procedures that activate
knowledge structures. Priming can occur at any level of stimulus analysis (Rabbitt &
Vyas, 1979 as cited in Johnston & Dark, 1986), ranging from low-level sensory analysis
(e.g., find something green) to high-level semantic analysis (e.g., presenting the test word
BREAD speeds up the recognition of the test word BUTTER). Considerable evidence for
priming effects led Johnston and Dark (1986) to propose that the processing of low-level
sensory or high-level semantic information can be primed toward sensory characteristics
of stimuli (e.g., auditory vs. visual), toward identity of stimuli (i.e., physical codes in
memory), toward semantic representations of stimuli (e.g. word meaning and synonyms),
and toward schematic representations of stimuli (e.g., knowledge structures). Thus, “all
levels of stimulus analysis can be biased simultaneously toward the characteristics of
most of the relevant stimuli and some of the irrelevant stimuli. In some instances, these
biases can be sufficiently strong that attention to the relevant or irrelevant stimuli appears
to be automatic” (p. 65).
The interaction between controlled attention and automatic attention, and the
effect of preconscious automaticity were elegantly investigated by Bargh (1982). He
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demonstrated that even when one is intentionally focusing on stimuli related to a primary
task, stimuli that are unattended (and considered irrelevant to the primary task) can pull
one’s attention away from the relevant stimuli. In a focused-attention dichotic listening
task participants were directed to attend to and shadow (repeat) the stimuli presented to
one ear and to ignore the stimuli presented to the other ear. Bargh manipulated the
relevance of stimuli by measuring participant levels on particular personality traits and
then presenting traits that the participants were high on to either the attended or
unattended channel. For example, a person that self-reported a high level of independence
was presented with words like assertive and nonconformist to either the attended or
unattended channel. Bargh hypothesized that self-relevant stimuli in the attended channel
would facilitate attention (i.e., the stimuli would require less attentional effort) but that
self-relevant information in the ignored channel would inhibit attention to the attended
channel (i.e., the stimuli would require more attentional effort for the participants to stay
focused). Although the participants demonstrated no awareness of the words in the
unattended ear (as judged later by a momentary awareness test) the self-relevant words
facilitated attention if they were in the attended channel and inhibited attention if they
were in the unattended channel. Thus, according to Bargh (1982), automatic processes
can either facilitate or inhibit the control process, requiring either more or less attentional
effort depending on the self relevance of the stimuli that is presented.
Bargh (1992) also proposed that primed constructs, while they remain active in
memory, are equivalent to the effects of preconscious automaticity on the selection of
stimuli from the environment. In fact, Bargh (1996) claimed that “pre- and postconscious
automaticity are functionally identical and the processing effects are the same; the only
difference is in how the necessary level of accessibility is achieved (i.e., via chronic or
temporary means)” (p. 174). Therefore, it is important for researchers to consider the
biases that are created by primed constructs as they design their studies. In order to rule
out the possibility of postconscious automaticity in his experiment, Bargh (1982) was
careful to measure personality traits a month before the dichotic listening task was given.
He was then more confident in his conclusion that attention to the contents of the
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unattended channel reflected a preconscious automatic process because those items
tapped chronic expectancies.
After reviewing a plethora of studies related to central constructs and assumptions
of selective attention, Johnston and Dark (1986) derived a set of empirical generalizations
(eleven to be exact; several of which have been presented here) to explain attentional
phenomena. They concluded that theories that view selective attention as the natural
priming effects of prior processing on subsequent processing are able to accommodate all
eleven empirical generalizations with relative ease. In addition, the view of selective
attention as an effect of chronically active schemata precludes any reliance upon an
active mental agent (or homunculus) to describe how stimuli are selected from the
environment. This view of attention as a by-product of one’s prior experience with
stimuli is the view taken for the purposes of the current study. This view and the
associated methods used for this area of research (notably dichotic listening tasks and
parafoveal vision tasks, to be discussed next) provide a framework for investigating the
activation of aggression-related knowledge structures and their effect upon the selection
of information from the environment. Ultimately, one of these methods may provide an
index of knowledge structure strength that is independent of self-report.
Dichotic Listening Tasks for the Measurement of Attention
Dichotic listening is a procedure that was originally developed by Broadbent in
1954 to study the impact of receiving multiple flight bearings, at the same time, on traffic
controllers’ attention (Bryden, 1988). Since then the basic procedure has been used for
studying short-term memory, lateralization and ear advantage. Dichotic listening tasks
were also essential in increasing our understanding of how people are able to focus their
attention on one stimulus, but automatically attend to another stimulus that is particularly
relevant for them (e.g., the cocktail party phenomenon). Research using the dichotic
listening task spawned evidence for both early selection (e.g., Treisman & Geffen 1967)
and late selection theories (e.g., MacKay, 1973; Corteen & Wood, 1972; and Moray,
1959; and, Lewis, 1970) and the procedure continues to be used to explore the sequential
and simultaneous processing of information.
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The basic procedure has been adapted in several ways and more recently has
proliferated into a variety of psychological contexts such as attention and depression
(Ingram, Bernet, & McLaughlin, 1994), attention and schizophrenia (Hugdahl, Rund,
Lund, Asbjornsen, Egeland, Landro, Roness, Stordal, & Sundet, 2003), and attention and
psychopathy (Hare & Leslie, 1984). In the study of information processing, the procedure
has been used to understand when selection of stimuli takes place for further processing
and whether selective attention can be guided by active schemata (Johnston & Dark,
1986). More recently, dichotic listening tasks have been used in electrophysiological
studies to investigate the influence of attended and unattended auditory stimuli on eventrelated potentials in the brain (e.g., Bentin, Kutas, & Hillyard, 1995; and Holcomb, &
Neville, 1990).
The general procedure for dichotic listening tasks is to present verbal stimuli or
nonverbal stimuli (e.g., tones, car horns, flushing toilets or music) to the left auditory
channel, the right channel, or both at the same time. Instructions to attend to one channel
while ignoring the other are given in focused attention tasks. Bryden (1988) reported that
the right ear (which activates the left auditory cortex) processes verbal stimuli more
quickly and the left ear (which involves the right auditory cortex) processes nonverbal
stimuli more quickly. However, there are inconsistencies across studies as well as
variability among study participants. Thus, when lateralization effects are not under
investigation, it is prudent to balance presentation of stimuli between the left and right ear
by balancing the number of participants that are instructed to focus on each channel.
Results from dichotic listening tasks have also revealed that stimuli that are presented to
the unattended channel are more easily ignored when they are physically different (e.g.,
the voice in one channel is female while the other is male; Cherry, 1953). Therefore, the
gender generating stimuli (e.g., word pairs or passages of text) is generally the same for
both auditory channels when semantic level processing is under investigation.
Dependent measures of the allocation of attention to one channel vs. the other
have included intrusions (i.e., responding with information presented to the unattended
channel), and error rates (e.g., incorrect shadowing of stimuli presented to the attended
channel). Intrusions and error rates are expected to be higher when attention is drawn
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away from the attended channel. Another method for measuring the allocation of
controlled attention was developed by Bargh in 1982. He used a secondary task—
reaction time (RT) to a probe stimulus—to index attention. Study participants were
instructed to focus their attention on a primary shadowing task and to use any remaining
attention to press a button to turn a light stimulus off as quickly as possible once it came
on. Bargh’s rationale was that latency to respond to the secondary task should be directly
related to the amount of controlled attention being given to the primary task. If response
latency were greater, then more effort, and thus more attention, was being used to stay
focused on the primary task. He sought to validate this method of assessing spare
processing capacity by including a no probe condition. When there were no differences in
shadowing errors (the primary task) between the light probe and no probe conditions and
no better than chance recognition of target items on a memory test, he concluded that RT
to a probe was a valid measure of attentional capacity being used by the primary task.
Bargh (1982) used this method of dichotic listening, shadowing, and reaction time to a
probe to test his main hypothesis that self-relevant information in the attended ear should
facilitate faster RTs to the probe and that self-relevant information in the unattended ear
would interfere with RTs to the probe as the participant struggled to maintain attention on
the primary task. As discussed earlier, his data supported his hypotheses.
Other researchers have turned to this methodology to help them study cognitive
factors that might affect behavior. McCabe and Gotlib (1993) looked at attentional
processing in clinically depressed people by having participants complete a focusedattention dichotic listening task and a concurrent light-probe task. They concluded that
depressed people had attentional biases (what Bargh would call postconscious
automaticity) for negative-content information fed into the unattended ear because their
RTs to a stimulus probe were longer on the primary task than those of non-depressed
people. Interestingly, the researchers found that when the participants were retested three
months later and were no longer depressed, they no longer demonstrated attentional
biases. It is reasonable to conclude that negative-content words were no longer salient for
the formerly depressed participants because this information was no longer self-relevant.
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Although McCabe and Gotlib’s (1993) study focused on depression, it does seem
clear that self-relevant information must be considered when attentional processes are
being studied. When the effects of alcohol are considered in the light of theories of
selective attention, it follows that a drinker’s attention to stimuli in the internal or
external environment is directed by recent thoughts or experiences or by chronic beliefs
or expectancies that he or she may hold regarding the effects of alcohol on behavior when
particular cues are present. Bargh’s model shows promise as a method of measuring the
salience of internal and external cues. Therefore, his method will be used to demonstrate
an automatic attentional effect of aggression cues for those who report higher
propensities to aggress, especially after the consumption of alcohol.
Although the reaction-time methodology has been helpful for understanding the
influence of unattended verbal information on attention to a primary task, Bargh has more
recently turned his interest toward understanding the influence of automatic attention on
goal-directed behavior (e.g., see Bargh, 1992; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bargh &
Ferguson, 2000; and Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). This methodology utilizes a parafoveal
vision task to demonstrate that information presented outside of conscious awareness can
influence various behaviors. Before this study, a direct comparison of the dichotic
listening task and the parafoveal vision task had not been made.
Parafoveal Visual Tasks for the Measurement of Attention
In memory and learning, both auditory and visual perception play a crucial role in
the selection of stimuli, the conversion of stimuli to long-term memory, and the selection
of responses for behavior. Parafoveal vision tasks are a more recent methodological
choice for studying the selection of visual stimuli from one’s environment for encoding
and retrieval.
Parafoveal visual tasks require the participant to attend to information presented
in the center of a computer screen (also the fixation point), while relevant or irrelevant
information is presented to the parafoveal (peripheral) region of vision on the computer
screen. The foveal region extends from 0° to 2° from the fixation point, whereas the
parafoveal region extends from about 2° to 6° from the fixation point. Although
parafoveal stimuli theoretically could be presented anywhere between 2° and 6° from the
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fixation point on any point along the circumference of the circle, usually the stimuli are
presented equidistant from the fixation point to one of the four quadrants encompassed by
that circle (e.g., at 45°, 135°, 225°, and 315° as in Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). To
determine where the stimuli should be presented, Bargh and Chartrand (2000) provided
the formula Y = X/tan(2º), where X = the distance between the fixation point and the
parafoveally presented stimulus, and Y = the distance between the participant’s eyes and
the fixation point at the center of the computer monitor. Another method is to use Bargh
et al.’s (1986) existing calculations. That is, each word should be placed in one of the
quadrants such that the center of the word is 7.6 cm from the fixation point. This will
ensure presentation of the stimuli to the parafoveal region as long as the participant’s
eyes are 99 cm away from (in front of) the monitor. Controlling the placement of the
chair and monitor and instructing the participant to sit erect at all times further ensures
that the stimuli are presented outside of the participant’s foveal visual field.
It is wise to follow parafoveal stimuli with a masking stimulus at the same
location for two reasons (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). The first is that refresh rates on
computer monitors often vary and a stimulus that has not decayed from the monitor is
more likely to be perceived by the participant. The second reason is that a visual iconic
memory trace of a stimulus may increase the likelihood of perceiving that stimulus. If a
masking stimulus quickly replaces the parafoveal stimulus of interest, the participant is
more likely to perceive only the jumble of letters that comprises the masking stimulus
(e.g., Bargh generally uses the masking string “XQFBZRMQWGBX”).
Another issue of concern involving parafoveal presentation of stimuli is the
duration that the stimuli are presented. Rayner (1978) found that participants took at least
140 ms to move their eyes from the fixation point to the parafoveal word when they were
explicitly instructed to do so. Bargh (2001) recommended using parafoveal presentations
of 60 ms to 90 ms to avoid even “express saccades” (fast saccadic jumps of 100 ms;
Fischer & Weber, 1993 as cited in Bargh, 2000).
Bargh and Chartrand (2000) have also varied the quadrant that the parafoveal
stimulus is presented to as well as the onset of stimulus (between 2 and 7 seconds) so that
the participant is unlikely to “predict” the location of the next parafoveal stimulus. To
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provide additional reassurance that the participant’s attention is at the fixation point when
parafoveal stimuli are presented, it is prudent to provide a task that involves the fixation
point (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Since Bargh’s (1982) dichotic listening task involves a
primary task that is presented to the center of the screen, utilizing the same task for both
methodologies will allow a direct test of the ability of each methodology to provide an
index of selective attention to self-relevant stimuli that is presented outside of conscious
awareness.
Parafoveal visual tasks (or subliminal priming tasks as it is referred to by Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000) have been used in a variety of research endeavors. In the context of
reading, researchers have used these tasks to investigate whether a semantic priming
effect occurs for words in sentences that are outside of the foveal visual region. For
example, research by Altarriba, Kambe, Pollatsek, & Rayner (2001) did not support a
semantic priming effect. However, when words were presented individually, there did
appear to be a semantic priming effect as far as 3° from central fixation (Rayner, 1978).
There is other evidence to suggest that parafoveal words are processed at a
semantic level. In a parafoveal priming condition (Di Pace, Longoni, & Zoccolotti, 1991;
Experiment 1), participants were presented with nonwords at the fixation point
concurrently with a lateral parafoveal stimulus, which consisted of words that were
semantically related to the target words and, finally, the target word (e.g., mesod centrally
concurrently with flight laterally, followed by the target word eagle). Participants were
expected to show a facilitation effect when parafoveal words were related to target words
(i.e., faster reaction times to respond “yes” when the target word represented an animal)
as opposed to the negative priming and baseline conditions. The results supported their
hypothesis. Di Pace, et al. also found that the facilitation effect was smaller for
parafoveally presented words than for foveally presented words and only existed if the
inter-stimulus interval between parafoveal word and target word was short (200 ms vs.
2000 ms). They regarded this as evidence for the assumption that automatic processing
effects decay at a rapid rate. This is consistent with theories of selective attention.
Bargh and his associates have used subliminal priming tasks to investigate a
variety of automatic effects such as the increased likelihood for men to sexually aggress
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when their “power→sex association” is activated (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack,
1995); the effect of goal activation on impression formation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996);
and the effect of subliminal priming on negative mood (Chartrand, Bargh, & van Baaren,
2003). However, these tasks are generally conducted in order to prime a particular
construct or behavior of interest. For example, to investigate an effect of priming on
mood (Chartrand, et al., 2003) participants were exposed to strongly valenced negative or
positive stimuli in a subliminal priming task (i.e., a parafoveal vigilance task). The
stimuli were presented parafoveally concurrently with a brief flash to the left or right
visual field. Participants indicated whether they detected a flash on the left or right of the
screen by pressing the appropriate key as quickly as possible. They found that repeated
exposure to positive or negative stimuli produced a concurrent mood as self-reported on
mood scales.
Another study (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) successfully primed participants to
form impressions of a person described in a variety of behavioral phrases. Participants in
the study were subliminally primed with words like impression, judgment, personality,
and evaluate, (as opposed to a no-goal priming condition) and then read more phrases
indicating honest behaviors or more phrases indicating dishonest behaviors. If they had
been primed with an impression formation goal, subsequent trait ratings of a target person
were much more likely to coincide with either dishonest or honest ratings (depending on
which one they had been exposed to more often within the behavioral phrases). Chartrand
& Bargh (1996) concluded that the effect of nonconscious activation (subliminal
priming) of memory representations was as effective as explicit instructions for forming
an impression of a target person.
As with other studies conducted by Bargh and his associates, reaction times to the
vigilance task were not reported as being analyzed. It is likely that the authors would not
see these reaction times as an index of automatic attention to unattended stimuli.
However, in a recent review of automaticity research, Bargh and Chartrand (2000)
indicated that using a dual-task parafoveal visual paradigm, such as the one used in
Bargh’s (1982) dichotic listening task with a concurrent light-probe task, may index how
efficiently one is able to process attended information under conditions of scarce
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attentional resources. If a nonattended stimulus is self-relevant, it should interfere with
attention to the primary task, which will be reflected in fewer resources available for the
secondary task, hence slower reaction times.
Limitations of Dichotic Listening and Parafoveal Visual Tasks
The appeal of the dichotic listening task is in its potential to measure the effect of
attended versus unattended information on task performance. Ultimately, however, the
participant’s attentional focus is not under the experimenter’s direct control. Various
techniques have been used to measure attentional drift to irrelevant stimuli, such as
shadowing tasks (e.g., errors and intrusions typically indicate attentional shift), and posthoc recognition or recall tasks. One argument against using these techniques is that lack
of errors or intrusions or inability to report unattended stimuli does not equate lack of
attention to or nonprocessing of the stimuli.
Parafoveal visual tasks also suffer from lack of experimenter control over
intentional shifts to unattended stimuli. In addition to the visual masking procedure
described earlier, reassurance that the participant did not attend to irrelevant stimuli is
available by viewing eye movements (as with a video camera) and, again, recognition or
recall tasks. Unfortunately, the use of video cameras to track saccadic eye movement is
costly, cumbersome, and intrusive. Additionally, it is difficult to track saccades
concurrently with stimulus presentation.
Despite the limitations of using either the dichotic listening or parafoveal visual
dual-task methodologies, either task may be expected to demonstrate aggression-related
knowledge structure activation. That is, individuals that are higher on measures of trait
aggression will demonstrate a form of chronic (preconscious) activation when their
attention to a secondary task is made more effortful (response latencies are longer) in the
presence of unattended aggression cues. It was hypothesized that this effect would be
reliable for both the parafoveal and the dichotic listening methodologies as long as dual
primary and secondary tasks were used.
Alcohol and Cognition
A great deal of research in the last few decades has been devoted to exploring the
nature of alcohol’s cognitive impairment. Although cognitive theory borrows heavily
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from and is related to various aspects of learning theory and social psychology, implicit is
the understanding that without clarification of the cognitive domain, a comprehensive
model of alcohol’s influence on excessive social behaviors, such as aggression and risktaking, may never be achieved. Predicting when recently perceived information or
information represented in memory (e.g., expectancies) will have a disproportionate
influence upon behavior (over and above environmental cues, personality variables, or
the pharmacological properties of a drug), is a challenge that cognitive theorists face.
Predicting when an individual will be the life of the party on one occasion or commit a
violent crime the next is a challenge that alcohol researchers face.
Physiological and Expectancy Effects
The evidence clearly indicates that alcohol consumption is related to inappropriate
and excessive behaviors. Early models attributed these behaviors to the disinhibiting
effects of alcohol. That is, alcohol reduces one’s ability to refrain from acting upon
behavioral impulses (e.g., acting upon an impulse to be more sociable or aggressive when
one is generally shy or nonviolent). However, the earlier disinhibition models assumed a
more overall effect of alcohol that was not supported by the research. According to Steele
and Josephs (1990), alcohol itself does not directly cause excessive or inappropriate
behavior. They pointed out that an individual’s specific reactivity to the drug could not
account for a person’s behavior because his or her behavior may vary from one occasion
to the next.
Alcohol consumption has clearly been demonstrated to cause a slowing of motor
responses as it depresses the central nervous system. However, there is evidence to
suggest that even alcohol’s impairment of motor performance is not a pure effect of
ethanol on tissue. The degree of impairment on motor performance appears to be
mediated by the thoughts or expectancies that an individual holds about the drug.
Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott (1995), in their efforts to identify factors that might account
for alcohol’s variable effects on behavior, examined whether motor response varied with
expectations about how alcohol would affect their performance on a specific task. The
degree of impairment anticipated on a motor skill task after consuming alcohol accounted
for a significant proportion of impairment demonstrated—whether alcohol or placebo
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was consumed. In fact, expectancies for participants in the alcohol condition accounted
for 12.3% of the variance of a participant’s change in performance. Likewise,
expectancies for those in the placebo condition accounted for 17.2% of the variance.
These findings are not specific to alcohol. Expectations about task performance after the
consumption of caffeine have yielded a similar pattern of results. That is, increases in
actual task performance have been predicted by the strength of the participant’s
expectancies about their performance, regardless of whether they had consumed caffeine
or a placebo (Fillmore, Mulvihill, & Vogel-Sprott, 1994).
It is reasonable to hypothesize that understanding an individual’s expectancies is
an important precursor in predicting behavior because a drug’s physiological effects do
not occur independently of expectancies. This assumption prompted an explosion of
alcohol expectancy research in the past few decades. However, researchers have had only
partial success in using expectancy theory to predict the behavior of drinkers, and most of
that success applies to the initiation and maintenance of drinking behaviors (e.g., Carey,
1995; Chassin, & Molina, 1993; Goldman, Brown, & Christiansen, 1987; Reese, Jones &
McMahon, 1994; and, Zucker, Kincaid, Fitzgerald & Bingham, 1996). A potential
prevention strategy proposed by Darkes and Goldman (1993) focuses on the arousal and
sociability expectations of participants. When these expectancies are challenged in
comparison to a no-treatment control, alcohol consumption and expectancies show
reliable decreases at post-treatment and after a booster session six weeks later. Although
studies like this are encouraging, researchers have had little success in predicting most
other individual behavior, such as when aggression might occur. This lack of predictive
power has serious implications for the use of expectancy theory in the assessment and
treatment of alcohol-related problems such as aggression.
Why has it been so difficult for researchers to predict an individual’s behavior
after consuming alcohol? One reason is that researchers have struggled to define the term
“alcohol expectancy.” Very generally it refers to an intervening variable of a cognitive
nature (Goldman, et al., 1987) and is used in the literature to indicate the belief that one
has consumed alcohol and how one thinks it will affect his or her behavior. The use of the
word “belief” in association with “expectancy” has been criticized for its implication that
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expectancies are consciously accessible information (Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes,
1999). Instead, expectancies should be regarded as memory templates that organize
incoming information; expectancies do not require conscious awareness or focused
attention. In relation to alcohol, expectancies should be viewed as memory templates that
reflect “the reinforcement value of alcohol acquired as a function of biological,
psychological, and environmental risk variables” (Goldman, et al., p. 216). Further, these
memory templates or expectancies serve to anticipate which behaviors should be
performed under which circumstances depending upon what was learned about alcohol
and its contexts during previous encounters.
Measurement issues may also contribute to the inconsistency of results regarding
the relationship between expectancies and alcohol. A major difficulty in separating
alcohol expectancy effects from the pharmacological effects is that there appear to be
several different types of expectancies. For example, expectancies about how other
people behave after drinking alcohol are different from expectancies about how alcohol
will affect one’s own behavior. Scales used in the service of predicting an individual’s
behavior should consist of items that tap expectancies of one’s own behavior after
consuming alcohol (Leigh & Stacy, 1993). Negative expectancies (e.g., punishment)
regarding the outcome of alcohol consumption is considered as important as positive
expectancies (reinforcement) and attempts have been made to measure both types of
outcome expectancies (e.g., Leigh & Stacy, 1993).
The expectancy model clearly overlaps with the knowledge structures approach
offered by information-processing theory. Both approaches imply that networks of
memory templates bias the perception of incoming information and that behavioral
outputs are selected based upon the similarity of incoming information to the networks of
information already represented in memory. The value of expectancy theory is that it may
help clarify extant outcome expectancies and predict their relevant salience in a given
situation. Alcohol myopia is a theory that outlines the mechanisms by which more salient
information may have a disproportional influence upon behavior.
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Alcohol Myopia
One cognitive theory, developed in the late eighties (Steele and Southwick, 1985;
Steele and Josephs, 1990), suggested that alcohol causes behavioral disinhibition through
impaired cognitive processing of relevant cues. Thus, alcohol’s variable effects are due
to an interaction of the pharmacological and cognitive effects. In this theory, “alcohol
myopia” is defined as a state of shortsightedness in which drinkers process fewer cues
less well than non-drinkers. That is, alcohol intoxication causes a restriction in
information processing that influences the salience of both external cues (environmental
cues) and internal cues (expectancies, memories, and mood), increasing the likelihood of
socially excessive behaviors such as aggression. Even cues that are attended to are
assumed to be processed superficially and relevant information is not given due
consideration before a behavior is initiated and carried out.
The theory of alcohol myopia provides some predictive value. An example may
demonstrate the utility of alcohol myopia for predicting aggressive behavior. A man in a
bar may be drinking, with the expectation that he will become more relaxed. After
consuming a moderate amount of alcohol, he notices a large man staring at him in a
hostile way. Will there be a bar fight? According to alcohol myopia theory, the myopic
effects of alcohol consumption should increase with dosage. The more salient a cue is
(e.g., the hostile- looking male), and the drunker the person gets, the more likely it is that
an aggressive response would prevail over more distal yet more appropriate behavioral
responses. The likelihood of an aggressive response may also be mediated by attitudes or
beliefs that the inebriated person holds. For example, he may hold a chronic belief that
people who stare are rude and deserve to be “taught a lesson.” If the person holds this
belief, becomes intoxicated, and sees a hostile-looking male staring at him, alcohol
myopia theory would predict a bar fight.
The above scenario falls under a class of alcohol’s social effects that Steele and
Josephs (1990) termed drunken excess. They posited that whenever there is a conflict
between inhibiting and provoking cues (whether these cues are internal or external), the
most salient aspects of the event will have a disproportionate influence upon the
behavioral response that is selected. If relevant pressures that would normally inhibit
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inappropriate responses to salient cues are not allowed normal processing, the inebriated
person’s behavior will appear impulsive and excessive. As salience of cues change, the
strength of the competing responses will change, with the stronger cue saving or
wrecking the day. If the knowledge structure that includes information about rudeness
(the salient, instigating cue from the previous example) is activated frequently and a
behavioral sequence that includes aggression often follows, staring may be interpreted as
something worth fighting about. Other relevant yet more distal social cues (a bar fight
might lead to arrest) may be less likely to overcome the aggressive behavioral sequence
once it has been initiated. Thus the drinker’s perceptions appear myopic in that the focus
is on stimuli that are nearer in time or proximity.
Several research endeavors have utilized the response conflict component of the
drunken excess construct to investigate precursors to aggression and other socially
excessive behaviors such as sexual aggression (Testa, 2002); drinking and driving
(MacDonald, Zanna, & Fong, 1995); and, high-risk sexual behavior (Kaly, Heesacker, &
Frost, 2002; MacDonald, Zanna, & Fong, 1996; Morris & Albery, 2001). Unprotected
sex is one example of drunken excess that arguably includes an inherent response
conflict. MacDonald, Zanna, and Fong (1996) investigated cognitive precursors to
unprotected sex and provided strong evidence that alcohol myopia can explain the
relationship between alcohol consumption and decreased condom use. Alcohol myopia
theory would predict that in a conflicting situation where people express intentions to use
condoms but condoms are unavailable, intoxicated people will pay less attention to distal,
inhibiting cues (e.g., the risk of pregnancy or getting a sexually transmitted disease), and
more attention to immediate, provoking cues (e.g., the attractiveness of the partner, the
partner’s willingness to have sex). As a result of this cognitive process, intoxicated
people should endorse higher likelihood of intentions and justifications for having
unprotected sex.
The relationship between alcohol consumption and decreased condom use was
investigated by having intoxicated and sober participants watch a video showing a male
and female leaving a bar and going to the female’s apartment to have consensual sexual
intercourse. The couple in the video did not have access to condoms, indicating a risky
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situation, but the female was attractive and willing to have sexual intercourse. The video
was stopped at this point, representing a response conflict for the viewer. The researchers
asked students who indicated positive attitudes toward using condoms, and reported that
they regularly did use them, what they would do next. They found that intoxicated
participants were more likely than sober participants to endorse intentions and
justifications to have sexual intercourse. Further, intoxicated participants indicated more
awareness of the potential for condoms to protect them against sexually transmitted
diseases and that having intercourse without them in a situation similar to the one in the
video could be characterized as “extremely foolish” behavior. The authors interpreted the
results as compelling evidence for the alcohol myopia perspective.
The central assumptions of the alcohol myopia model with respect to drunken
excess include response conflict, salience of cues, and impaired cognitive processing.
Some findings provide evidence for these assumptions. For example, Mulvihill, Skilling,
and Vogel-Sprott (1997) provided evidence that alcohol impairs cognitive processes that
govern response inhibition. They demonstrated this effect using a “go-stop” task in which
go signals are considered to initiate an activating process and stop signals are considered
to initiate an inhibiting process (Logan, Cowan & Davis, 1984; Mulvihill, et al.). When
go and stop signals are presented simultaneously (response activation vs. response
inhibition), these processes compete. Depending on which process finishes first, the
response is either executed or inhibited. Mulvihill et al. showed that participants who
were given moderate doses of alcohol were less able than participants in a placebo or
control group to inhibit their responses to go signals when they were concurrently
provided with a stop signal. Since their measure of response activation (reaction time)
was unaffected for all three groups, they concluded that alcohol primarily affects
response inhibition—not response activation.
Zeichner, Allen, Petrie, Rasmussen, and Giancola (1993) examined the interaction
between alcohol drug effects and the salience of cues, specifically information regarding
threat. The drug condition included alcohol, placebo, and control. The salience condition
included low threat (positive trait) or high threat (negative trait) information that
described the participants themselves (salient condition) or described others (nonsalient
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condition). Intoxicated participants attended to threat information (negative traits) longer
than participants in the placebo or control group when the traits described themselves
(salient condition). “Presumably, in the salient negative information condition, alcohol
limited the subject’s attention to the most threatening or salient aspect of their situation”
(p. 731). The authors concluded that these findings were consistent with Steele and
Joseph’s (1990) attention-allocation model and that further research should focus on the
interactive effects of alcohol intoxication and salience of environmental cues in
emotionally charged situations such as aggressive situations.
Another study (Herzog, 1999) is unique in that it investigated the effects of
alcohol on the second stage of a two-stage social inference (attributional) process and
suggests a link between alcohol and automaticity. The first stage of social inference
involves identifying and classifying a person’s behavior into dispositional terms (the
degree to which the behavior is driven by the enduring personality traits of the person) or
situational terms (the degree to which the aspects of the person’s environment are
influencing his or her behavior). This stage is often regarded as a more automatic process
based upon heuristic methods of categorizing the vast array of available information (e.g.,
stereotypes, schemas, and behavioral scripts). The second stage involves a corrective
stage in which the opposite influences are taken into account. This stage is considered to
be a more deliberate, controlled process and requires a higher expenditure of cognitive
resources than the first stage.
Since alcohol is thought to impair the cognitive processing of information that is
more distal in time or place, Herzog (1999) hypothesized that intoxicated participants
would be less likely than sober participants to engage in the more effortful, corrective
stage of social inference. When both sober and intoxicated participants were asked to rate
how influential disposition was in the behavior of actors in a series of videos, intoxicated
participants rated dispositional influences as significantly higher than sober participants.
Similarly, when both groups were asked to rate how influential situational factors were
on the behavior of the actors in the videos, intoxicated participants exaggerated the
influence of situational factors. The author suggested that sober participants did not
exaggerate the relative influence of either dispositional or situational factors because they
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were able to consider both influences regardless of the condition they were assigned to,
and were able to adjust their ratings accordingly. The author concluded that these
findings were consistent with the alcohol myopia perspective.
Although the above studies provide evidence for the tenability of the alcohol
myopia model, direct evidence for the model is meager. This is partly due to the
relatively few studies that have been conducted and the abundance of alternative
hypotheses offered by the investigators and other authors. Sayette (1999) observed that
the alcohol myopia model, among other cognitive models, offers indirect evidence for the
alcohol-behavior relationship and that, ultimately, validity of models like this will rest on
studies that more directly test this relationship. The current study may provide a method
by which salience of a given construct (in this case, aggression and/or alcohol cues) can
be determined before a person is given the opportunity to aggress. Salience, of course, is
a central assumption of the alcohol myopia model.
Alcohol Cues
The current study is intended to demonstrate that aggression cues are chronically
salient to individuals who report higher levels of aggression/trait anger. In a similar
fashion, alcohol cues are expected to be chronically salient to individuals who report
higher levels of drinking experience. A plethora of evidence exists for this assumption
and is exemplified by several modified Stroop color-naming studies. Cox, Blount, and
Rozak (2000) used the Stroop paradigm to investigate the interference effects of neutral,
alcohol-related, and concern-related words on alcohol abusers’ and nonabusers’ attention.
Alcohol abusers responded more slowly to naming the color of stimuli that were related
to alcohol (e.g., beer, vodka) than to naming the color of stimuli that were related to
personal concerns (e.g., divorce, dog). Nonabusers showed no differential interference.
Another modified Stroop color naming study (Sharma, Albery and Cook, 2001)
also demonstrated attentional interference from alcohol-related words. The investigators
found that in-treatment abstinent problem drinkers were significantly slower to name
alcohol-related words than to name neutral words. Interference from alcohol-related
stimuli was also found for a “high-drinker” control group. Those in the “low drinker”
control group showed no differential interference for alcohol-related vs. neutral stimuli.
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Finally, in a more rigorous investigation of alcohol cue interference (Stormark,
Laberg, Nordby, & Hugdahl, 2000), alcoholics demonstrated longer reaction times to
both alcohol-related and emotion-related words than neutral words on a Stroop task. They
also evidenced significantly larger skin conductance responses to alcohol words than to
any other words. These effects were not duplicated in the nonalcoholic controls. The
researchers concluded that alcoholics’ attention is biased toward alcohol stimuli, and that
alcoholics have difficulty disengaging their attention from those stimuli. They further
suggested that alcoholics’ processing of these cues is automated.
Another investigation of alcohol-related cue salience (Townshend & Duka, 2001)
also revealed an attentional bias to alcohol-related stimuli. However, in this study a dot
probe detection task was used. Participants were instructed to look at a fixation cross
(presented for 500 ms.) when it appeared in the center of the computer monitor. Then two
pictures appeared (for 500 ms.), one on each side of the screen. One picture was related
to alcohol and one was related to stationery (e.g., a hand holding a glass of wine on one
side and a hand holding a stapler on the other). After the stimuli were presented, a dot
appeared on either the same side as the alcohol-related picture or on the opposite side. An
attentional bias score was calculated for each participant by taking the mean reaction time
for when the dot and alcohol-related word were presented in the same location and
subtracting it from the mean reaction time for when the dot and alcohol-related words
were presented on opposite sides of the screen. The researchers found that heavy social
drinkers responded significantly more quickly than occasional social drinkers to the dot
probe when it replaced the alcohol-related picture on the same side. They interpreted this
as evidence for an attentional bias toward those stimuli. However, the researchers
conducted the same task using words instead of pictures and found no differences
between the two groups. This may be partly explained by the nature of the stimuli. The
words represented a variety of concepts related to drinking (e.g., withdrawal-related
words, craving-related words, and concrete words like beer and wine). The variety of
stimuli but small number of words in each category may have reduced the sensitivity and
power of the task for detecting attentional biases.
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Another explanation for the lack of differences regarding alcohol word stimuli in
the aforementioned study (Townshend & Duka, 2001) is that an initial, automatic
orientation toward self-relevant word stimuli has been found only for shorter intervals
between onset of the cue word and onset of the target (interstimulus intervals; ISIs;
Posner & Snyder, 1975). At longer ISI’s (e.g., 500 ms.), participants have enough time to
direct their attention away from the stimuli. Slower RT’s at 100 ms. ISI’s are theorized to
represent difficulties in shifting attention, while faster RT’s at 500 ms. ISI’s are assumed
to reflect an avoidance of those stimuli and a more conscious effort at shifting attention
from those stimuli (Stormark, Field, Hugdahl, and Horowitz, 1997).
One study (Stormark, et al., 1997) investigated the influence of shorter vs. longer
ISIs directly and found that abstinent alcoholics showed longer reaction times when
alcohol-related words were presented at a 100 ms. ISI (automatic orientation) but faster
reaction times (avoidance) when alcohol-related words were invalidly cued at 500 ms.
ISI. In the study by Townshend and Duka (2001) words were presented at 500 ms ISI.
This may have given participants the opportunity to avoid some of the word stimuli,
especially the ones that were not an integral part of the heavy social drinkers’ knowledge
structures (e.g., withdrawal effects of drinking). This avoidance was likely to vary across
subjects and may have reduced differences between groups.
Although evidence is converging that alcohol-related stimuli interrupt attention
for participants with heavier drinking experience, it is less clear how the presentation of
alcohol cues and aggression cues simultaneously would impact attention and how these
stimuli would effect a nonalcoholic population. From the above discussion, it seems
reasonable to assume for the current study that college students who are presented with
aggression cues at a subliminal level of awareness in a room devoid of alcohol cues,
would show longer latencies to respond to those stimuli if they are high on trait
aggression. Those who also have a lot of drinking experience may be expected to
demonstrate the longest latencies of all. This is related to the assumption that alcohol and
aggression knowledge structures will be more tightly interwoven and more frequently
activated, resulting in a more automatic effect on the processing of aggression-related
stimuli.
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For students tested in a room full of alcohol cues (i.e., a barlab), it is reasonable to
assume that alcohol cues would be especially salient for those with more drinking
experience and higher levels of trait anger. Their levels of interference on attention
should be the highest. The current proposal will investigate this hypothesis.
Alcohol and Aggression
Although the theory of alcohol myopia may be useful for predicting alcohol’s
various social effects, when attempting to understand the alcohol-aggression link it is
useful to understand the more basic nature of the relationship between alcohol and
aggression. Bushman and Cooper (1990) conducted a meta-analysis of 30 experimental
studies with male confederates and male participants who were social drinkers. They
concluded “alcohol influences aggressive behavior as much or more than it influences
other social and nonsocial behaviors” (p. 350). They reported an average effect size for
alcohol vs. control to be d(+) = 0.25. The average effect size for alcohol vs. placebo was
calculated to be d(+) = 0.61. They speculated that the average effect size for the alcohol
vs. placebo condition is larger because there are methodological problems with the
alcohol vs. control condition. The most serious problem is that the control groups
generally see through the beverage deception. Sometimes the placebo groups see through
the deception as well. However, since the psychological and pharmacological effects of
alcohol occur together anyway, Bushman and Cooper recommended that the alcohol vs.
placebo comparison is the best estimate of the effects of alcohol on aggression.
Recent research continues to provide evidence for an alcohol-aggression
relationship. One study (Lange, 2002) demonstrated that participants with higher blood
alcohol levels (BACs; .05-.18) who associated alcohol with aggression were more likely
to identify ambiguous behavior (via vignettes) as more aggressive than those who
associated aggression with amiability. These authors concluded that alcohol affected the
perception of aggression.
Many studies have investigated the alcohol-aggression relationship using the
Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP; Taylor, 1993) or modifications of it. In these
competitive reaction time tasks, participants are generally provided with information
(e.g., using feedback lights) about the level of shock the opponent has selected for them if
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the participant is slower to respond (i.e., loses the “trial”). Participants are assumed to use
this information to set subsequent shock levels. Aggression, then, is operationally defined
in these tasks as the intensity and/or duration of shocks selected for a fictitious opponent
for each competitive trial. Since the amount of wins versus losses is predetermined and
distributed evenly in all conditions (Chermack & Giancola, 1997), direct comparisons
can be made between shock levels and durations set by participants who are intoxicated
and those set by participants who are not.
In general, investigators have found that intoxicated participants are reliably more
aggressive than participants who have received a placebo or a nonalcoholic beverage
(Chermack & Taylor, 1995; Laplace, Chermack, & Taylor, 1994; Giancola & Zeichner,
1997). This finding may not generalize beyond the college student population or the
laboratory. However, as noted by Chermack and Giancola (1997) a few studies have
attempted to address external validity and found that aggressive responses within the
laboratory correlate positively with peer and counselor rated aggression, with self-report
aggression inventories, and with histories of antisocial behavior (see also Anderson &
Bushman, 1997; Giancola & Chermack, 1998; and, Tedeschi & Quigley, 1996).
Situational Variables
A variety of situational factors have been found to intensify the alcoholaggression relationship. These include provocation, frustration, threat, social pressure (to
aggress), and response conflict (as operationalized in the alcohol myopia perspective of
drunken excess). On the other hand, social pressure (to avoid aggression) and selffocused attention can also decrease aggression. (See Chermack & Giancola, 1997;
Gustafson, 1993; and Ito, Miller, & Pollock, 1996 for reviews of the literature concerning
these variables.) Provocation appears to be one of the most important moderators of the
alcohol-aggression relationship. In fact, provocation has been claimed to be a more potent
elicitor of aggression than either gender or beverage condition (Giancola, Helton,
Osborne, Terry, Fuss, & Westerfield, 2002).
To date, studies directly investigating the interaction between aggression and
alcohol cues (without the consumption of alcoholic or nonalcoholic beverages) have not
been conducted. Based on the idea of knowledge structure activation, it may be that
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participants in a barlab would respond more aggressively than control participants in a
room devoid of alcohol cues if they self-report higher levels of aggressive states or traits
and they have more extensive drinking experience. Only one study investigated the
impact of drinking experience on alcohol-related aggression (Laplace, Chermack, &
Taylor, 1994). Surprisingly, of participants categorized with low-, moderate-, or highdrinking experience, only participants with low-drinking experience were more
aggressive (using the TAP) after consuming alcohol. Although the current study would
not investigate the interaction between intoxication and aggression, it may provide a
baseline measure of the influence of person variables. That is, a methodology that can
measure the influence of alcohol and aggression cues to automatically interfere with a
participant’s attention to a primary task would provide a useful baseline before the
participant is given the opportunity to aggress subsequent to provocation or frustration, or
before they are given alcohol.
Situational factors are clearly essential for understanding the alcohol-aggression
relationship. Additionally, attention (whether automatic or controlled) to situational cues
(e.g., provocation, threat, social pressure), as specified by the alcohol myopia perspective,
is arguably the most convincing mechanism by which these variables influence the
alcohol-aggression relationship (Gustafson, 1993). However, lack of attention to
individual differences (or person variables) limits the explanatory value of cognitive
theories. As research exploring individual differences has accumulated, investigators
have begun to incorporate these findings into their models (e.g., Chermack & Giancola,
1997).
Gender
The data regarding the willingness or tendency for men and women to aggressive
at equivalent levels is mixed. In the absence of alcohol, there is evidence that both
women and men experience anger but that women respond with less physical aggression
than men (Frost & Averill, 1982). Another study found that men were aggressive toward
other men when provoked but not toward women, and women were aggressive toward
men when provoked but not toward women (Taylor & Epstein, 1967). Interestingly, the
highest levels of aggression in the study were found for highly provoked women
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competing with men. However, this finding is in contrast to another study (Richardson,
Vandenberg, & Humphries, 1986) in which women were less likely than other men to set
extreme shock levels toward men.
In the presence of alcohol, the data are also mixed. Direct comparisons are often
difficult due to variations in the type and amount of alcohol administered, the choice of
aggression measures, and the type of noxious stimuli inflicted on or by the participants
(Dougherty, Bjork, Bennett and Moeller, 1999) as well as variations in gender of the
fictitious opponent, confederate or even experimenter. One study found that intoxicated
men were more aggressive than sober men toward a fictitious female opponent
(Richardson, 1981). Gustafson (1991) did not show an increase in aggression for women
as a function of alcohol when a nonaggressive response was available toward the
fictitious male opponent. Another study (Bond & Lader, 1986) demonstrated an increase
in aggression for both intoxicated men and women when provocation level was low but
only for men when provocation was high. However, a recent study (Giancola, et al.,
2002) demonstrated almost the opposite. Intoxicated men were more aggressive then
intoxicated women under low provocation, but men and women were equally aggressive
under high provocation. These authors (Giancola, et al. 2002) concluded that alcohol
increases aggression for men but that only provocation will lift aggression–related
inhibitions for women.
Some studies have focused more on gender differences related to direct and
indirect forms of aggression. In some cases, indirect aggression increased for intoxicated
women but not men (Rohsenow & Bachorowski, 1984). Giancola and Zeichner (1995)
operationalized direct aggression as shock intensity and indirect aggression as shock
duration and found that intoxicated men showed an increase in both forms of aggression,
while intoxicated women only showed increases in indirect aggression. However, the
authors recommended interpreting this finding with caution since shock duration fits
questionably with most definitions of indirect aggression.
There appears to be at least one plausible generalization that can be made
regarding gender differences for alcohol-related aggression: men show a consistent
increase in aggressive responding while drinking. Although this generalization cannot be
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applied to women, at least one study found that aggression increased equally for men and
women over cumulative doses of alcohol (Dougherty, Bjork, Bennett and Moeller, 1999).
In the Dougherty et al. study, participants who showed higher levels of aggressive
responding under placebo conditions (indicating baseline individual differences) also
showed the highest increases in aggression under alcohol conditions. This finding
suggests that variables beyond gender are critical for understanding the alcoholaggression relationship—specifically, individual difference variables.
Individual Difference Variables
The study of individual difference variables as moderators in the alcoholaggression relationship has gained momentum over the last two decades. Alcohol
expectancies would certainly vary by individual, but, as discussed earlier, alcohol
expectancies appear to play a negligible role in the alcohol-aggression relationship. The
role of alcohol-aggression expectancies may also be trivial but the jury is still out. Some
studies indicate that alcohol-aggression expectancies do not facilitate aggression beyond
dose. One such study (Chermack & Taylor, 1995) used a three-question scale to
determine whether participants had a high or low score on alcohol-aggression
expectancies (Effects of Drinking Questionnaire; EDQ; Dermen & George, 1989) and
then randomly assigned participants to a high-dose or placebo-dose condition in which
they all performed a competitive reaction time task with a fictitious opponent.
Participants in the high-dose condition set higher shock intensities for the opponents than
those in the placebo condition. The main effect of expectancy was not significant, nor
was there a significant interaction of dose X expectancy. On the other hand, participants
in the high-dose condition did select more severe shock intensity levels as “opponent”
shock levels increased. This finding appeared to be driven by participants who had scored
high on the alcohol-aggression scale of the EDQ. Thus, it appeared that intoxicated
participants with high expectancies for alcohol-related aggression were the most reactive
to increased levels of provocation. It is possible that high levels of alcohol consumption
and provocation are both necessary for expectancy effects to emerge (Chermack &
Taylor, 1995). However, it may also be the case that alcohol-aggression expectancies are
not adequately measured.
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A few other studies (Dermen & George, 1989; Leonard & Senchak, 1993; and
Quigley & Leonard, 1999) indicated that the belief that alcohol leads to aggression does
moderate the alcohol-aggression relationship. These studies are correlational and, in one
(Quigley & Leonard, 1999), the findings did not hold up over time. A recent study
(Leonard, Collins, & Quigley, 2003) investigated a host of variables (e.g., personality and
socio-cultural factors) related to alcohol consumption and aggression within bar
environments. With respect to alcohol-aggression expectancies (measured using the
Alcohol Effects Questionnaire; Rohsenow, 1983), the investigators hypothesized that
these expectancies would moderate the alcohol-aggression relationship, and that the
belief that alcohol causes aggression would be related to both the number of episodes
resulting in aggression and aggression severity. They found that a belief that alcohol
causes aggression was not necessary for an association between alcohol consumption and
aggression. They also found that participants were more likely to behave aggressively
during an episode when they held this belief, but that the opponent was less likely to be
harmed during the episode. The authors suggested that alcohol-aggression expectancies
might serve in the initiation of aggression, but not in the continuation, escalation, or
cessation of an aggressive episode. Further, the authors found that once aggression was
initiated, forces within the social environment (people instigating the participant and his
opponent during the aggressive episode, and no one trying to defuse the situation) were
predictive of more severe aggression and greater harm to the opponent. Interestingly,
angry temperament was not reliably associated with aggression in this study. But, again,
the authors suggested that individual differences may influence the initiation of
aggression, but other factors (i.e., eggers-on) may be more crucial in the escalation of
aggression (Leonard, Collins, & Quigley, 2003).
Findings from an earlier study offer some experimental support for this alternative
explanation. Bailey and Taylor (1991) found that when men self-reported moderate to
high levels of aggressive tendencies (as measured by the Assault subscale of the BussDurkee Hostility Inventory, Buss & Durkee, 1957), they were significantly more likely to
set higher shock levels at a faster rate toward their provokers in a reaction time task.
Although the level of shock intensity set by men who self-reported nonaggressive
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tendencies never reached the level set by men who self-reported aggressive tendencies,
the former clearly set higher shock levels when intoxicated. The authors speculated that
when the intentions of the target were ambiguous (during block one), a high dose of
alcohol appeared to have an instigative effect upon all of the individuals in the study,
regardless of whether they self-reported high, moderate, or low levels of aggression.
When the antagonist was clearly more provocative (blocks two and three), the effects of
alcohol appeared to depend more on disposition. That is, those who self-reported
moderate or high levels of aggression set increasingly higher shock intensities, whereas
those low on aggression were more restrained.
A more recent study (Parrott & Zeichner, 2002) partially replicated the above
results. Participants were categorized as low, moderate, or high trait anger according to
their responses on the Trait Anger Scale (TAS, Spielberger et al., 1980, 1983).
Participants completed a modified TAP in either an alcohol or a no-alcohol condition.
Shock intensity and duration, as well as the proportion of shocks set at the highest level,
served as indices of aggression. Regardless of beverage condition, men who were
categorized as moderate or high on trait anger displayed significantly higher aggression
on all of the indices of aggression. Unexpectedly, only intoxicated participants rated as
moderate trait anger selected higher shock intensities and a greater proportion of shocks
at the highest level than their sober counterparts. The authors suggested that the lack of
difference for low trait anger participants likely reflects an aggression-inhibiting effect.
For high trait anger participants, the lack of difference may reflect a ceiling effect. They
also suggested that a placebo condition and a measure of alcohol-aggression expectancies
might have enhanced the interpretation of the current findings.
As previously mentioned, Giancola et al. (2002) have concluded that provocation
is the most reliable predictor for alcohol-related aggression across gender. Even if this
conclusion is accurate, other factors clearly moderate the alcohol-aggression relationship.
In an earlier study, Giancola and Zeichner (1995) investigated the combined predictive
ability of subjective intoxication, BAC level, provocation, and aggressive personality
traits on physical aggression in men and women. They found that aggressive personality
traits and BAC level predicted physical aggression under both high and low provocation
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for men. None of the variables were predictive of aggression for intoxicated women, and
subjective intoxication was not predictive of aggression for men when provocation was
high.
In a more recent study, Giancola (2002) again found that provocation was the
strongest elicitor of aggression in a modified TAP. More importantly, alcohol was more
likely to increase aggression for men with higher levels of trait anger as measured by the
Spielberger Trait Anger Scale. The author suggested that research should continue “to
delineate a multivariable risk profile” in the effort to predict when aggression is likely to
occur subsequent to alcohol intoxication (Giancola, 2002, p. 1357). In an attempt to
specify additional factors within a “risk profile” Giancola used a similar methodology in
another study (2003) and measured self-reported levels of empathy (empathic concern for
others and the ability to see things from another person’s point of view as measured by
two subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index). Alcohol was found to increase
aggression for men who self-reported lower empathy on these two subscales.
Interestingly, for both of the above studies, alcohol had no effect on female aggression
regardless of trait anger or empathic concern (Giancola, 2002; Giancola, 2003).
The above studies highlight some variables that reliably influence the alcoholaggression relationship. Provocation appears to be a crucial situational variable for men
and women, and trait anger appears to be a crucial individual difference variable—
especially for men. For women, potential “risk” variables have proven harder to identify.
One study (as cited in Dougherty, et al., 1999) found that women who self-reported
menstrual symptoms were more aggressive than those who did not. The authors summed
up the current state of research well when they concluded that studies like this “clearly
underscore the need for taking into account individual characteristics that may help us
better understand why alcohol increases aggression in some persons but not in others” (p.
329).
Attentional Effects and Automaticity
Another aspect of the alcohol-aggression relationship involves attention.
Although alcohol intoxication does not appear to change attentional capacity (Lamb &
Robertson, 1987), it appears to influence the relative importance of the most salient
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information from the internal and external environment. In one study (Jeavons and
Taylor, 1985), the attention of half of the intoxicated participants and half of the sober
participants were directed toward a nonaggressive norm intended to reduce participant’s
aggression toward a bogus opponent. Mean shock settings by each group clearly
indicated that intoxicated participants whose attention was not directed toward the
nonaggressive norm were the most aggressive. For intoxicated participants whose
attention was directed toward the nonaggressive norm, their levels of aggression were
comparable to the sober participants, and lower than participants who were not provided
with a nonaggressive norm.
Zeichner, Pihl, Niaura, and Zacchia (1982) also attempted to evaluate the role of
attention in the production of alcohol-mediated aggression. Some intoxicated participants
were forced to attend to the consequences of their behavior (a tone indicating how much
pain an opponent felt after receiving shock), some were distracted from attending to those
consequences, and some did not receive any attentional instructions at all. Zeichner et al.
expected that participants in the forced-attention condition could not fail to attend to the
information about how much pain their opponent was experiencing and that this
processing of relevant information would lower aggressive responding. They were
surprised to find that those in the forced-attention condition actually increased the
duration of time that participants pressed the shock button. In contrast, for participants
who were distracted from the pain, shock durations were significantly shorter. The
authors concluded that an information-processing deficit interpretation was not
applicable. However, they also suggested that alcohol restricted attention to the shock
manipulation rather than the behavioral contingencies (which are more distal in nature).
In this case, their self-focused attention combined with alcohol may have been more
arousing (e.g., they become more aware of threat of harm). Those that were distracted
from the salient threat of harm were able to inhibit their aggressive responding. Of
course, an interpretation such as this awaits further investigation.
To date, there are no known alcohol studies that have investigated the interaction
between automaticity and aggression. The current study may validate a methodology that
can look at the automatic activation of knowledge structures related to aggression and
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alcohol cues for those who self-report higher levels of trait anger or higher alcoholaggression expectancies. Measurement of a chronic, automatic effect is considered
necessary for understanding the alcohol-aggression link.
The Current Study
The current study investigated whether high self-reported levels of aggression,
trait anger, or alcohol-aggression expectancies (which all reflect chronically accessible
knowledge structures) are related to the salience of aggression stimuli in the presence or
absence of alcohol cues (which both reflect external cues). This study assessed the
predictive utility of the parafoveal visual versus dichotic listening methods of
presentation to demonstrate the effects of self-relevant aggression cues upon two
behavioral measures of attention—reaction time and error rate.
Hypotheses
Three main hypotheses were formulated in regard to one’s performance when
aggression cues are presented via a computer task either dichotically or parafoveally:
1. Participants who self-report higher levels of trait anger will demonstrate longer
latencies and higher error rates (more attentional interference) when exposed to selfrelevant cues of aggression than those who report lower levels of trait anger. This
effect will hold whether participants are tested in the presence or absence of alcohol
cues.
2. Participants who self-report higher levels of alcohol-aggression expectancies will
demonstrate longer latencies and higher error rates when exposed to aggression cues
than those who report low levels of alcohol- aggression expectancies. Setting should
moderate this effect. That is, the effect should hold only for participants tested in the
presence of alcohol cues.
3. Higher alcohol-aggression expectancies will predict longer latencies to respond and
higher error rates on the computer tasks after the effects of trait anger are partialled
out. However, this effect will hold only for participants tested in the presence of
alcohol cues.
Although a specific hypothesis was not formulated in regard to the relative predictive
utility of the parafoveal visual computer task versus the dichotic listening computer task,
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patterns of significance and effect sizes were examined to suggest which methodology
may be most helpful for investigating attentional interference, trait characteristics, and
alcohol cues.
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Method
Design
This study included two dependent measures (error rate and reaction time) and
two independent variables (Word Type and Setting). Word Type had two within subject
(WS) levels (NonAggression and HiAggression) and Setting had two between subject
(BS) levels (Barroom and Cleanroom). Therefore, this study was a 3 (WS) X 2 (BS)
mixed design. Error rate and reaction time were analyzed separately, as were Dichotic
Listening Task (DLT) and Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT) data.
Condition Assignment
Participants were assigned to one of four conditions: Barroom Parafoveal,
Barroom Dichotic, Cleanroom Parafoveal, or Cleanroom Dichotic. The attended Channel
(Left vs. Right) was counterbalanced within the DLT condition. Setting and Task
assignments were decided by flipping a coin and filling the other cells by default as
necessary. Since there were constraints upon departmental availability of room space, if
the next Setting condition was not available, the participant was run in the same Setting
condition rather than being rescheduled.
Power
While effect sizes regarding error rate are theoretically related to the dependent
variables examined in this study, our experiences suggested that they would be quite
small (e.g., Edington, 1996). Although error rate was investigated in the current study,
sample size needed was based upon expected effects for reaction time. Similar
methodologies investigating reaction time and/or parafoveal presentation of stimuli
(Bargh, 1996; di Pace, Longoni, & Zoccolotti, 1991; Ortells & Tudela, 1996) indicated
that 100 participants (25 participants for each computer task and in the presence or
absence of alcohol cues) should provide ample power for detecting mean differences in
reaction times.
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Power analyses regarding reaction time means were conducted for N = 79.
Significant differences were found for Word Type on the PVT with power at 1.00.
Reaction time means across Word Type for the DLT were not significant, and power was
calculated to be .56. Participant recruitment was ended at N = 79 (Dichotic X Cleanroom
= 20; Dichotic X Barroom = 18; Parafoveal X Cleanroom = 19; and Parafoveal X
Barroom = 22).
Participants
Three hundred eighty five undergraduate students at the University of South
Florida completed questionnaire data for the first part of this study (Phase I). Eighty-five
of the 385 students who completed the Phase I questionnaires participated in Phase II of
the study. The data of six participants were not used in any analyses because examination
of error rate data revealed that these participants had error rates that were unacceptably
high. Since the other 79 participants were able to complete either task with error rates no
higher than 19%, it is more likely that the six participants with error rates in the range of
47% to 61% did not attend adequately to the instructions. Therefore, data for these six
participants was excluded from all reaction time (RT) and error rate (ER) data analyses
and demographics are reported for N = 791.
The mean age for the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT) sample (N = 38) was 22.95
years (SD = 4.06, range 19 to 35). For the Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT; N = 41) sample,
excluding one 63-year-old female, the mean age was 21.83 years (SD = 2.62, range 19 to
31). Mean ages were not significantly different for the two task types, t(62.75) = 1.44, p =
.15. Fourteen of the 79 participants were male (18%) and 65 were female (82%). This
overrepresentation of females is expected given the high number of female
undergraduates within undergraduate psychology classes at this university. To evaluate
the difference among the proportion of males vs. females completing the PVT vs. the
DLT, a contingency table analysis was conducted. Gender was not significantly different
across tasks, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 79) = .03, p = .88. The sample included 14 African
American (17.7%), 11 Hispanic (13.9%), 51 Caucasian (64.6%), 2 Asian American
(2.5%), and 1 Latino (1.3%) participant. Race/ethnicity was not significantly different
across tasks, Pearson χ2 (4, N = 79) = 5.72, p = .22.
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To evaluate whether students who never came in for Phase II were significantly
different on demographic characteristics or on the measures of interest for Phase I, a
comparison group of Phase II noncompleters was randomly selected from the 300
remaining participants. This resulted in a comparison of 79 Phase II completers and 79
Phase II noncompleters. No differences emerged for age, gender, race/ethnicity,
household income, the trait anger variables, or the alcohol-aggression expectancy
variables.
Phase I Materials
Participants were given a number of measures to complete during Phase I. These
measures were the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI; Appendix B), the
Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ; Appendix C), the Expectancy Questionnaire for
Alcohol and Aggression—Low Dose (EQAAL; Appendix D), a questionnaire made up of
other alcohol-aggression expectancy subscales (Appendix E), a demographics
questionnaire (Appendix F), and a request for further participation (Appendix A). Only
the psychometric properties of the STAXI and the EQAAL measures will be considered
below. The BPAQ and the questionnaire including other expectancy subscales were
included in Phase I for later study. The demographics questionnaire and request for
further participation will not be discussed further.
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory.
The State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI; Spielberger, 1988) was
used to measure participants’ levels of anger proneness (trait anger) as well as the manner
in which they typically express their anger. The STAXI evolved from earlier measures of
the experience and expression of anxiety and anger as important factors in the etiology of
hypertension and coronary heart disease in the late 1960’s (e.g., see Spielberger,
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, 1980). Spielberger has spent decades refining
the measurement of state anger (operationalized as a relatively short-lived emotional
state) and trait anger (operationalized as a longer-standing personality characteristic) to
assess individual differences in the experience of anger (State-Trait Anger Scale or
STAS; Spielberger, 1980; Spielberger, et al., 1983). Spielberger maintained that
individuals high in trait anger would more frequently perceive a wider range of situations
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as anger provoking than those low in trait anger and that they would experience more
frequent and more intense elevations in state anger over time.
Although the measurement of state and trait anger proved useful in some contexts,
Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen, and Marsh (1999) realized that understanding the
experience of anger is not enough to develop strategies and treatments for maladaptive
anger. They claimed that it is essential “not only to distinguish, both conceptually and
empirically, between the experience of anger as an emotional state (S-Anger) and
individual differences in anger proneness as a personality trait (T-Anger), but also to
identify and measure the characteristic ways in which people express their anger” (p.
1006). This led to the development of the Anger Expression scale or AX Scale, which
provided a distinction between anger-in (suppressed anger; AX/In) and anger-out
(verbally or physically expressed anger; AX/Out). Research with the AX scale indicated
an anger control factor, which was developed into the third subscale of the AX, the
anger-control (AX/Con) subscale. The STAS and the AX scales were combined to create
the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI; Spielberger, 1988).
The STAXI has continued the role of the STAS and AX in research on the
relationship between anger and health-related factors such as hypertension, as well as a
variety of other constructs (for examples of the use of the STAS, AX, and STAXI in
research the interested reader is referred to Spielberger, Reheiser, & Sydeman, 1995).
The STAXI has also been proposed and evaluated as a screening and outcome measure
with mixed but promising results (e.g., Foley, Hartman, Dunn, Smith, & Goldberg, 2002;
Mahon, Yarcheski, & Yarcheski, 2000; Cornell, Peterson, & Richards, 1999). The
STAXI’s ability to measure anger-related states, traits, and its expression (i.e.,
aggression) suggests that it can be useful for providing evidence that these constructs are
highly correlated with aggressive behavior in laboratories, and, more importantly, in
naturalistic settings.
The STAXI is comprised of: a 10-item trait anger (T-Anger) scale that measures
individual differences in anger proneness; a 10-item state anger (S-Anger) scale that
measures one’s current subjective feelings of anger; and a 24-item Anger Expression
(AX) scale that measures internalized, seething anger (AX/In—8 items), externalized
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aggressive behavioral tendencies (AX/Out—8 items), and effort expended controlling the
expression of anger (AX/Con—8 items). The AX/EX measure indexes the frequency that
anger is experienced and expressed and is calculated by combining items from other
STAXI scales. A factor structure analysis of the T-Anger and S-Anger scales
(Spielberger, 1988) indicated that the T-Anger Scale should be broken into two subscales.
Angry Temperament (T-Anger/T) is intended to measure one’s tendency to experience
and express anger without provocation. Angry Reaction (T-Anger/R) is intended to
measure one’s tendency to express anger when criticized or treated unfairly.
The STAXI has been found to have good psychometric properties (Fuqua, et al.,
1991; Moses, 1992; and, Spielberger, 1988). Factor analysis of the S-Anger scale yielded
high item-remainder correlations and alpha coefficients of .93 for both sexes. Internal
consistency of the T-Anger subscales was evaluated separately for males and females
using college and Navy samples (Spielberger, 1988, p. 8). Item-remainder correlations
were acceptably high for both subscales and alpha coefficients ranged from .84 to .89 for
the T-Anger/T subscale and from .70 to .75 for the T-Anger/R subscale. In the current
study, internal consistency estimates of reliability were calculated with both males and
females and yielded a somewhat lower, although still acceptable, result for S-Anger
(alpha = .85). For the T-Anger subscales, coefficients for males and females together
were comparable to previously obtained results with alpha = .85 for T-Ang/T but
somewhat lower for T-Ang/R with alpha = .68. Item-remainder correlations for the
AX/In and AX/Out subscales of the AX scale in Spielberger’s (1988) study were much
lower but still satisfactory and alpha coefficients for all three of the AX subscales ranged
from .73 to .85. Coefficients were highest for the AX/Con subscale (.84 for females and
.85 for males) and lowest for the AX/Out subscale (.75 for females and .73 for males)
with AX/In coefficients falling in between (.81 for females and .84 for males). In the
current study, AX/In coefficient alpha was .78, AX/Con alpha was .82, and AX/Out alpha
was .78.
Correlations among the STAXI scales in the Spielberger (1988) study were as
expected (e.g., essentially zero between AX/In and AX/Out). Test-retest stability
coefficients for the state and trait anger scales of the State-Trait Personality Inventory
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(STPI; Spielberger, Jacobs, Crane, Russell, Westberry, Barker, et al., 1979) and for the
AX subscales have been reported for males and females separately (Jacobs, Latham, &
Brown, 1988). As would be expected, coefficients for the state anger scale (.27 for males
and .21 for females) were much lower than for the trait anger scale (.70 for males and .77
for females). Additionally, coefficient values for the AX subscales (a range of .64 to .70
for males and .73 to .81 for females) were comparable to the trait scale values.
The T-Ang/T and T-Ang/R subscales were of most interest for the current study.
The mean T-Ang/T score reported by Spielberger (1991) for college students was 6.56
for males (SD = 2.67) and 6.71 for females (SD = 2.73). The mean T-Ang/R score
reported by Spielberger for college students was 9.84 for males (SD = 2.55) and 10.18 for
females (SD = 2.60). In the current sample, mean T-Ang/T scores for the Parafoveal
Visual Task (PVT) were 5.57 for males (SD = 1.81; N = 7) and 6.00 for females (SD =
1.71; N = 34). For the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT), mean T-Ang/T scores were 5.71
for males (SD = 1.89; N = 7) and 5.90 for females (SD = 2.34; N = 31). For the T-Ang/R
subscale, mean scores for the PVT were 8.71 for males (SD = 2.75) and 8.44 for females
(SD = 1.74). On the DLT, mean scores were 8.14 for males (SD = 2.12) and 8.19 for
females (SD = 2.56). The maximum obtainable score for each subscale is 16 and the
lowest is 4. This indicates that most respondents indicated having an angry temperament
somewhere between “almost never” and “somewhat.” For the T-Ang/R subscale, sample
means were somewhat higher than the means for T-Ang/T but they were still
considerably lower than the means that Spielberger reported.
Concurrent validity of the STAXI was provided using 270 naval recruits and 280
college undergraduates (Spielberger, 1988). T-Anger scale scores were compared with
scores from the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (BDHI) and the Hostility and Overt
Hostility scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). All
correlations were significant at <.01 for both males and females. Spielberger (1988) also
studied the correlations between the STAXI T-Anger and S-Anger scales and the
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) subscales and the Trait and State Anxiety and
Curiosity Scales of the State-Trait Personality Inventory (STPI). Moderate correlations
between the EPQ Neuroticism scales and the T-Anger scale as well as between the State
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and Trait Anxiety scales from the STPI and the T-Anger scale were significant and
interpreted by Spielberger (1988) as consistent with the theory that individuals high in
neuroticism and trait anxiety frequently experience angry feelings that they suppress (p.
12). Correlations of the T-Anger scale with the EPQ Extraversion scale and the STPI Sand T-Curiosity scales were essentially zero and suggested that T-Anger is not related to
those personality constructs.
Convergent and divergent validity for the AX/EX scale has also been provided
(Spielberger, Johnson, Russell, Crane, Jacobs, & Worden, 1985). Correlations of the AX
subscales with the STPI state and trait curiosity subscales were relatively nonexistent, but
significant correlations were found with trait anxiety for both males and females (ranging
from .24 to .34). Correlations between the AX/EX total anger expression scores and the
STPI anger measures were lower although still significant with the exception of the STPI
T-Anger/T and AX/EX correlation for females, which was essentially zero.
In an analysis of the 44-item STAXI (Fuqua, Leonard, Masters, Smith, Campbell
& Fischer, 1991), as well as a replication analysis (Forgays, Forgays, & Spielberger,
1997) the structure of the measure was examined to determine whether the use of the
different subscales is justified. The researchers concluded that the structural validity of
the STAXI was better than expected and that the scale structure they found was similar to
that claimed for this instrument.
Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and Aggression—Low Dose.
The current study views aggressive scripts as knowledge structures in memory
that represent information about when and why it might be appropriate to use aggression
in a given situation, and what will happen as a result. Alcohol scripts are viewed in a
similar fashion. It is reasonable to expect that knowledge structures about aggression
secondary to alcohol use will contain information about the circumstances under which
someone drinking alcohol would be aggressive and what the outcomes might be.
Therefore the Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and Aggression—Lo Dose version
(EQAAL; Epps, Hunter, LeVasseur, Steinberg, & Hancock, unpublished manuscript) was
used in the current study to measure expectancies that participants hold about behaving
aggressively following the consumption of low but behaviorally significant doses of
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alcohol. Questions from other measures that tap alcohol and aggression related
expectancies were also included for later study (i.e., the Alcohol Expectancy
Questionnaire, Brown, Goldman, Inn & Anderson, 1980; the Drinking Expectancy
Questionnaire, Young & Knight, 1989; the Comprehensive Effects of Alcohol
Questionnaire, Fromme, Stroot, & Kaplan, 1993; the Effects of Drinking Alcohol scale,
Leigh & Stacy, 1993; and, the Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire-3, George, Frone,
Cooper, Russell, Skinner, & Windle, 1995). The items taken from these measures are
provided in Appendix E but the psychometric properties of their respective scales will not
be discussed.
The EQAAL is a 23-item scale representing a cognitive-behavioral taxonomy of
alcohol-aggression expectancies divided into four factors. Factor analysis indicated two
affective factors labeled Unprovoked Anger Expectancies (UnpAng; 8 items) and
Reactive Anger Expectancies (AngReac; 7 items), one cognitive factor labeled
Expectancies of Hostile Cognitions (HostCog; 3 items), and one behavioral factor labeled
Expectancies to Maintain Control (ExpCon; 5 items). Confirmatory factor analysis
revealed the following factor loadings: UnpAng = .70; AngReac = .68; HostCog = .71;
and, ExpCon = .78. High internal consistency was demonstrated by computing
Chronbach’s alpha (UnpAng = .88, AngReac = .81, HostCog = .76, and ExpCon = .82).
Intercorrelations between the various scales ranged from -.014 to .53. The higher
intercorrelations were among the two anger factors and the hostile cognitions factor. Sixweek test-retest reliability with a separate group of students revealed the following
Pearson product-moment correlations: UnpAng = .80, AngReac = .57, HostCog = .56,
and ExpCon = .79. No significant differences were found on any of the subscales
according to gender or ethnicity. Although the EQAAL shows promise as a more precise
measure of alcohol-aggression expectancies, studies that provide evidence of
discriminant and convergent validity are lacking.
The current study provides additional evidence for internal consistency.
Coefficient alphas for three of the four factors were quite high and were as follows:
Unprovoked Anger Expectancies = .93, Expectancies of Hostile Cognitions = .77,
Reactive Anger Expectancies = .88, and Expectancies to Maintain Control = .90.
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Phase II Materials
During Phase II, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Appendix G). Then they completed either the Dichotic Listening
Task (DLT) or the Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT) in the presence or absence of alcoholrelated stimuli. During either task they were exposed to aggressive and nonaggressive
stimuli (word stimuli are included in Appendix H) while they responded to a reaction
time task. Upon completion of the computer task, they completed a recognition task
(Appendix I) followed by the PANAS again, and the Brief Drinker Profile (Appendix J;
for later study). Finally, participants were debriefed about the study (Appendix K) and
awarded their extra credit points.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule.
It was possible that exposure to aggression stimuli would induce or increase
negative affect. To investigate this possibility, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was given to participants before and after
they completed the computer task in Phase II. Both times the participants were instructed
to read the adjectives and “indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at
this very moment.”
The PANAS consists of 10 positive adjectives and 10 negative adjectives that are
assumed to represent two orthogonal dimensions of mood—positive affect and negative
affect. In order to develop these scales, a range of descriptors (60 adjectives taken from
Zevon and Tellegen, 1982) that loaded .40 or greater on the relevant positive or negative
factor and that did not load |.25| on the other factor, were selected. Of 12 positive
descriptors, two more items were dropped that had relatively high secondary loadings on
the negative affect factor for a final pool of 10 items. Of the 25 negative descriptors, two
content categories were dropped altogether leaving two items from each of five content
categories (distressed, angry, fearful, guilty, and jittery). For example, the items that
represent “angry” are hostile and irritable. The authors obtained PANAS ratings using
six time frames (moment, today, past few days, past few weeks, year, and in general) and
found acceptably high alpha reliabilities (ranging from .86 to .90 for positive affect and
from .84 to .87 for negative affect) and low correlations between the scales (ranging from
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-.12 to -.23, indicating about 1-5% shared variance). Test-retest reliability indicated
stability over a two-month time period, with greater stability over longer time frames.
Validity for the PANAS was also acceptable, based upon good factorial validity and
expected correlations with measures of related constructs (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988).
In the current study, coefficient alphas for the positive affect scale were .87 (Time
1) and .88 (Time 2). Coefficient alphas for the negative affect scale were .64 (Time 1)
and .72 (Time 2). When comparing the positive and negative affect scales at Time 1,
alpha was .22. At Time 2 alpha was .04. Overall, the scales appear to measure orthogonal
constructs as maintained by Watson, et al. (1988).
Dichotic Listening Task (DLT). The participants’ primary task was to attend to
one channel of a DLT while they simultaneously performed a computer task. The
computer program was created using Superlab Pro, Version 2, which presented word
pairs dichotically (through headphones) and number strings (on the monitor) using a Dell
PC.
During the computer task, participants indicated by the press of a button whether
the center number in a five-digit string of numbers was odd or even. Between number
strings, a capital X was placed in the center of the screen and served as the fixation point.
Two seconds later, the .wav file played and the number string appeared. After two
seconds, or as soon as the odd or even button was pressed, the X reappeared. The
computer program recorded, in milliseconds, the time between onset of the number string
to the pressing of the red (“odd”) key or the blue (“even”) key. If no key was pressed
within 2 seconds of stimulus presentation, RT was recorded as .00 seconds and the
response was marked as incorrect. All participants were presented with 10 Blank trials,
10 Practice Trials, 80 Word Type Trials mixed with 10 Blank Trials, and 10 final Practice
Trials. Within a type of trial, a different randomly generated order of stimuli was
presented to each participant to control for order effects.
Word Pairs. The words presented to the unattended channel consisted of words
rated as high aggressive, ambiguously aggressive, low aggressive or nonaggressive (as
used in Edington, 1997; see Appendix H). Two types of aggressive words (high and
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nonaggressive) were selected in order to examine whether these levels would be
predictive of differential cognitive interference. Low aggressive and ambiguous
aggressive words were also included. However, these two word types were included for
later study. All of the words presented simultaneously to the attended channel consisted
of additional nonaggressive words.
Twenty word pairs comprised each of the Word Type conditions—called
NonAgg, LoAgg, AmbAgg, and HiAgg—for a total of 80 word pairs. All four types of
words were selected from a normed database of over 5000 words and their associated
links compiled by Nelson, McEvoy and Schreiber (1999). Words in the HiAgg category
were associated with aggression-related concepts from 60-95% of the time. Examples
include brawl, stab and fight. Words in the AmbAgg category were related to aggression
concepts 35-50% of the time. Examples include tank, strike, and punch. LoAgg words
were associated with aggression-related concepts 10-20% of the time and included mask,
fray, and hide. The NonAgg words had no evident association with aggression-related
concepts. Examples included store, few, and desk. Additionally, both words in the word
pairs began with the same consonant sound. For example, stab was paired with store.
Ten words, without a paired word, were presented before the practice words
(Blanks). Ten NonAgg word pairs were presented at the beginning of the computer task
to investigate practice effects (Practice words) and another 10 Blanks were mixed in with
the 80 pairs of experimental words. This yielded 100 word pairs and 20 Blanks that were
presented at a rate of one pair approximately every four seconds.
Word pairs were recorded and saved as sound .wav files using the Adobe
Audition program. Detailed information about the word stimuli is provided in Appendix
H. All of the words were recorded using the same male voice. The Superlab program
accessed these files and used them for the Dichotic Listening Task. The audio
presentation typically lasted from .50 to .80 seconds.
Parafoveal Visual Task. The Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT) computer program
was also written with Superlab Pro, Version 2.14 and presented on a Dell PC.
Participants completed the same odd vs. even number decision-making task as in the
Dichotic Listening Task. However, the experimental words (Word Type) were presented
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as written words within the parafoveal visual field of the participant. Single
nonaggressive words played in stereo on the headphones. The PVT methodology
resembled that of Chartrand and Bargh (1996), Experiment 2. On a computer screen,
these researchers presented a word and a subsequent masking stimulus at an angle of 45°,
135°, 225°, or 315° from asterisks in the center of the screen (the fixation point). These
four quadrants coincided with an area approximately 7.6 cm from the fixation point.
Thus, stimuli were presented to the parafoveal visual field, which has been shown to be
from 2° to 6° of visual angle.
In order for the experimental word stimuli to appear within the parafoveal range,
participants in the current study were situated in front of the screen such that their eyes
were 65 cm from the fixation point. The center of the word stimulus appeared 2.6 cm
above, below, to the left, or to the right of the fixation point. Detailed information about
the parafoveal stimuli is provided in Appendix H. The distance of 65 cm from the
monitor insured that if the participant leaned forward 5 cm (approximately 2 inches) or
back 5 cm, the stimulus would still be presented within 2° to 6° of visual angle.
Chartrand and Bargh (1996) used brief prime word duration, immediate masking,
and parafoveal presentation of words to prevent conscious awareness of subliminally
primed stimuli. These precautionary measures were observed in the current study as well.
Experimental words were presented for a duration of 100 milliseconds, which is halfway
between the duration Bargh et al. (1995) used and the minimum that Rayner (1978)
suggested. The masking stimulus, “WQXQW,” replaced the experimental word for the
next 60 milliseconds. Response time to press the odd or even key after stimulus
presentation was recorded by the Cedrus RB-610 Response Pad. Cedrus has reported that
the response pad provides reaction time data that is accurate to within 1 millisecond.
Experimental Settings. The barroom is a room at the University of South Florida
created as an analogue drinking environment filled with typical drinking paraphernalia.
The “clean” room is another room in the same building that is devoid of any alcohol
related cues. Participants were assigned to one of the two settings in order to examine
whether alcohol cues would increase or decrease overall reaction times or error rates to
aggression stimuli.
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Recognition Task. Recognition tasks are often used to determine whether
awareness of stimuli has occurred (Bargh, 1982; Edington, 1996; Epps, Hunter,
LeVasseur, Steinberg, & Hancock, 1997). Usually, some words that were presented
during the relevant task are listed on a sheet of paper along with some words that the
participant had not been exposed to, and the participant is asked to check off words he or
she recognizes. Better than chance recognition of words to which participants were
exposed may indicate awareness of those stimuli. In the current study, minimal to no
awareness of the stimuli presented via the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT) or the
Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT) was expected to occur.
For this study, one recognition task was created to determine whether participants
were momentarily aware that alcohol or aggression related stimuli were presented to the
unattended channel in the DLT or parafoveally in the PVT. The recognition task that was
used is provided in Appendix I. The recognition task contained 14 “Control” words,
which were words that participants were instructed to listen to in the attended channel of
the DLT or in stereo for the PVT. The recognition task also contained eight Experimental
words that had been presented to the unattended channel or parafoveally. Eighteen New
words were selected that participants had not been exposed to during any task. These
words were similar in length and general meaning to words that they had been exposed
(e.g., hate and maim were selected as equivalent aggression words for shout and gun).
New words were selected from Nelson, et al. (1999) database. Participants were
instructed to check off words that they recognized seeing or hearing during their
respective task.
The additional questions on the recognition task were intended to provide
information about whether the participants had guessed the purpose of the computer task,
or if they were aware of a connection between completing the computer task and filling
out a variety of aggression and alcohol-aggression related questionnaires during a
previous, supposedly unrelated experiment (i.e., during Phase I).
Procedure
Phase I was conducted over Fall 2004 through Summer 2005. Students were
recruited via an online research data management program, Experimentrak, used by the
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University of South Florida’s Psychology Department. Participants completed the
questionnaires either online or in groups of 10 to 20 in small classrooms. Minor changes
were made to the questionnaires, Informed Consent, and the Debrief form in order to
accommodate an online format. Participants were asked to complete the AQ, the
EQAAL, the STAXI, and a demographic questionnaire (see Appendix F) for extra credit
toward their course grade. After completing the questionnaires, participants were asked to
indicate their willingness to be contacted at a later date for participation in a larger study
(see Appendix A) and were given a debrief form (see Appendix K). For the online
participants, the request for participation in another study was omitted. Whether
participants completed the Phase I questionnaires in classrooms or online, they were
contacted at least two later and asked to participate in Phase II. The time delay was
included to reduce the possibility that alcohol- or aggression-related concepts would be
active, or recently primed, during Phase II of the study.
Participants who had indicated interest in the larger study on the questionnaires;
who did not indicate motor, hearing, or visual impairments; and who indicated that
English was their native/first language were contacted at least two weeks later by phone
or e-mail and invited to participate in a computer task study (Phase II). Those completing
the questionnaires online had already passed a screener (which included similar questions
about impairments and first language) and were contacted at least two weeks later by email and invited to participate in Phase II. Whether recruited by phone, e-mail, or online,
some deception was necessary to increase the likelihood that participants were unaware
that the two phases of the study were related. All participants of Phase II were fully
debriefed about the connection between the two phases before leaving the lab.
Recruitment of participants to return for Phase II of the study was inadequate. A
few weeks after Phase II was initiated, a lottery was instituted. When participants were
contacted about participation in Phase II, they were told that when they arrived for the
study their participation identification number (IDN) would be entered into a lottery that
included three $20 drawings. They were told that if they then decided to participate, their
IDN would be entered into the drawing again. When recruitment did not appear to
improve, Informed Consent was changed to specify monetary remuneration and
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participants were paid $5 for their participation in addition to being included in the
lottery.
Before a participant arrived, he or she was assigned to one of the two tasks and
one of the two settings. Upon arrival, participants were asked if they had any impairment
that would prevent them from completing the computer tasks and if English had been
their primary language since birth. Those that were appropriate for the study were shown
to the designated area of the lab and seated in front of the computer. They were asked to
complete the PANAS before instructions were given regarding the computer task.
For the Dichotic Listening Task, participants were told that they would be doing
two tasks at one time. Their most important task was to listen to the word presented in the
ear they were instructed to attend and count the number of words that started with the
letter “L.” They were also told to ignore any words they might hear in the other channel.
Participants were told that if they could report the correct number of L words within plus
or minus two, their IDN would be entered into the lottery again. At the same time that
word pairs were presented, participants completed a decision-making task. Participants
were instructed to decide whether the center number of a five-digit stimulus appearing in
the center of the computer screen represented an even number or an odd number (e.g.,
04863). Participants were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible by
pressing a key to indicate that the number was odd, or a different key indicating that the
number was even. For example, for the word pair kill-key, participants would have
ignored the word kill and would not have counted the word key and, at the exact same
time, they would have pressed the EVEN button to indicate that the center number in the
string 04863 was even.
For the Parafoveal Visual Task, participants completed the same two tasks. There
were two fundamental differences: 1) all of the words presented on the headphones were
single nonaggressive control words presented in stereo, and 2) the experimental word of
the word pair was presented on the computer screen to the participant’s parafoveal region
(i.e., at 2˚ to 6˚ angle from the fixation point). For the word pair scream-lake, participants
would have heard the word lake in stereo on their headphones, they would have counted
it as an L word, they would not have been expected to notice the word scream flashed to
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their parafoveal region, and, at the same exact time, they would have pressed the ODD
button because the center number in the string 23501 is odd.
To insure that the experimental word stimuli were always presented to the
parafoveal region, a ruler was used to measure 65 centimeters between the participant’s
eyes and the center of the monitor. The chair was stationary and participants were
instructed to maintain this position during the computer task and told that the distance
between their eyes and the computer would be measured again after completion of the
task.
For either computer task, all 100 word-pairs (and 20 Blanks) took approximately
11 minutes to complete. Once instructions had been given, the participant donned the
headphones, the experimenter left the room, and the participant began the task. Upon
reentering the room, the experimenter asked all participants to report the number of L
words they heard and to complete the Recognition Task (Appendix I). Participants were
then given the PANAS to complete for a second time. Next, they were asked a number of
questions about their patterns of drinking in order to obtain an estimate of their standard
ethanol consumptions units over the last three months. This estimate was obtained using a
brief version of the Comprehensive Drinker Profile (Marlatt & Miller, 1986; Appendix J).
Finally, all participants were told about the purpose of the study and the minor deception
involving the connection between Phase I and Phase II. They were then given a debrief
form (Appendix K) to take with them.

67

Results
Descriptives
Visual inspection of histograms indicated that the Reaction Time (RT) sample
means for the two word types were normally distributed. Measures of kurtosis and
skewness were within acceptable ranges (all within ± 1). For Error Rate, sample means
were not normally distributed for the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT), with measures of
kurtosis and skewness as high as 5.31 and 2.27, respectively. Overall, ER means for the
DLT tended to bunch up around .00 (no errors) with relatively few means over .10 for
word type HiAgg. Therefore, any results using Error Rate means from the DLT should be
interpreted with appropriate caution.
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for RT HiAgg—NonAgg Difference
Scores and Trait Anger Predictor Variables for PVT Completed in the Presence of
Alcohol Cues (N = 22)
________________________________________________________________________
Variable
M
SD
1
2
________________________________________________________________________
RT HiAgg—NonAgg DS
52.76
64.67
-.68*
.01
Predictor Variable
1. Trait Anger/Angry Temperament

6.36

1.71

--

.30

2. Trait Anger/Angry Reaction
8.82
1.26
-________________________________________________________________________
Note. RT = Reaction Time; DS = Difference Scores; HiAgg = High Aggression Word
Type; NonAgg = Non Aggression Word Type; PVT = Parafoveal Visual Task
*p < .001
68

The possible bias that could exist in the data due to outliers for the RT data was
considered. Response latencies higher than 2000 milliseconds (2 seconds) were recorded
as missing data for RT and as an error. By design, this cutoff limited the potential for
extreme outliers to exist in the data. When considering the two Word Types of interest
(NonAgg and HiAgg) and a cutoff of three standard deviations, there were roughly 45
outliers out of 3,160 data points (approximately 1.4%). However, the data were fairly
evenly spread across the data and were not deleted from the analyses.
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for RT HiAgg—NonAgg Difference
Scores and EQAAL Predictor Variables for PVT Completed in the Presence of Alcohol
Cues (N=22)
________________________________________________________________________
Variable
M
SD
1
2
3
4
________________________________________________________________________
RT HiAgg—NonAgg DS
52.76
64.67
.01
-.29
-.47*
.06
Predictor Variable
1. EQAAL – AngReac

21.18

6.81

2. EQAAL – ExpCon

18.96

6.11

3. EQAAL – HostCog

6.86

2.27

--

.22
--

.48
.57**
--

.62**
-.19
.27

4. EQAAL – UnpAng
16.59
6.40
-________________________________________________________________________
Note. RT = Reaction Time; HiAgg = High Aggression Word Type; NonAgg = Non
Aggression Word Type; EQAAL = Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and
Aggression – Low Dose; DS = Difference Score; AngReac = Angry Reaction
Expectancies; ExpCon = Expectancies to Maintain Control; HostCog = Expectancies for
Hostile Cognitions; UnpAng = Unprovoked Anger Expectancies; PVT = Parafoveal
Visual Task
*p < .05, **p < .01
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Correlations among the trait anger measures and HiAgg—NonAgg difference score
means used in the regression analyses are presented in Table 1. Correlations among the
EQAAL subscales and HiAgg—NonAgg difference score means are presented in Table
2.
Preliminary Analyses
Reaction Time for Word Type. The first step in evaluating each of the hypotheses
for this study was to demonstrate differential responding across Word Type. Mean RTs
were calculated for each type of word and a Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) was used with two levels (NonAgg and HiAgg Word Type) of the withinsubject factor and two levels (Setting: Barroom vs. Cleanroom) of the between subject
factor. ANOVA was used in an attempt to control familywise error. DLT and PVT data
were analyzed separately.
Statistical analyses failed to indicate a significant interaction between Word Type
and Setting for the DLT [F(1, 36) = 3.05, p > .05] or the PVT [F(1, 39) = .46, p > .05].
Therefore, main effects were inspected. The main effect of Word Type for the DLT was
not significant [F(1, 36) = .76, p > .05] with low power (.14). The main effect of Word
Type for the PVT was significant [F(1, 39) = 25.87, p < .001] with power at 1.00.
RT means in milliseconds for the DLT were 696.32 (SD = 172.53; NonAgg), and
684.82 (SD = 154.97; HiAgg). RT means for the PVT for the two word types were
651.15 (SD = 211.42, NonAgg) and 698.17 (SD = 219.62; HiAgg). RT means as a
function of Task X Word Type are shown in Figure 1.
RT means in milliseconds for the DLT in the barroom setting were 665.24 (SD =
152.69; HiAgg) and 703.79 (SD = 176.95; NonAgg). In the cleanroom setting, RT means
were 702.44 (SD = 158.79; HiAgg) and 689.59 (SD = 172.77; NonAgg).
RT means in milliseconds for the PVT in the barroom setting were 730.15 (SD =
239.29; HiAgg) and 677.39 (SD = 219.48; NonAgg). For the PVT in the cleanroom
setting, RT means were 661.14 (SD = 194.12; HiAgg) and 620.76 (SD = 203.26;
NonAgg). RT means for the PVT as a function of Setting X Word Type are shown in
Figure 2.
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Figure 1. RT as a function of task type X word type.
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Figure 2. PVT RT Means as a function of setting X word type.
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Error Rate for Word Type. The number of errors (incorrectly selecting Odd vs
Even) made by each participant was summed and converted to a mean error rate
(percentage) for both Word Types (NonAgg and HiAgg). The analyses used for ER
mirrored those used for RT.
Statistical analyses indicated that the interaction between Word Type and Setting
for ER was not significant for the DLT [F(1, 36) = .31, p > .05] or the PVT [F(1, 39) =
.67, p > .05]. The main effect of Word Type for the DLT was not significant [F(1, 36) =
.31, p > .05] with low power (.08). The main effect of Word Type for the PVT was
significant [F(1, 39) = 28.94, p < .001] with power at 1.00.
ER mean percentages for the DLT for the two word types were 3% (SD = 4.7%;
NonAgg) and 2.6% (SD = 4.6%; HiAgg). ER means for the PVT were 4.5% (SD = 5%,
NonAgg) and 10.6% (SD = 6.1%; HiAgg). ER means are shown in Figure 3 as a function
of Task Type X Word Type.
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Figure 3. Error rate as a function of task type X word type.
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Main effects for Setting were not significant for the DLT when considering ER
means [F(1, 36) = .39, p > .05; power = .09]. Main effects for Setting also were not
significant for PVT ER means [F(1,39) = .63, p > .05; power = .12]. ER mean
percentages for the DLT in the cleanroom setting were 3% (SD = 4%; NonAgg) and 3%
(SD = 3%; HiAgg). In the barroom setting, ER mean percentages were 3% (SD = 6%;
NonAgg), 3% (SD = 6%; HiAgg). ER mean percentages for the PVT in the cleanroom
setting were 4% (SD = 5%; NonAgg) and 11% (SD = 4%; HiAgg) For the PVT in the
barroom setting, ER mean percentages were 10% (SD = 8%; HiAgg). It is apparent when
looking across task that the presence of alcohol cues did not appear to make a difference
in the distribution of error rates or reaction times.
Implications of Differential Responding Across Word Type. The significant main
effect of Word Type on Error Rate was unexpected. As previously noted, error rate was
not found useful for detecting mean differences in word type on a dichotic listening task
(Edington, 1996). The lack of mean differences for the DLT was replicated in the current
study. But, for the PVT, ER means differed significantly by Word Type. According to the
theory driving the current methodology, higher error rates for words that are more
aggressive in nature should reflect more attentional interference from (or the pulling of
attention toward) those words. The current results for the PVT supported this assumption
for ER and RT.
Both ER and RT appeared to measure the ability of aggression words presented
parafoveally to pull attention away from a decision making task. Although this finding is
important because it suggests that the PVT may be a useful methodology for
investigating automatic attention, the predictive value of the overall methodology was
central to this thesis. Therefore, regression analyses were necessary to better understand
the relationship between participant’s self-reported trait aggression or alcohol-aggression
expectancies and the attentional interference that could arise from aggression words.
Overall, ER means were higher and latencies to respond (RT means) were longer
when participants were exposed to high aggression stimuli presented parafoveally. This
finding made it possible to use the magnitude of the difference to reflect each individual’s
sensitivity to HiAgg words vs. NonAgg words. That is, the difference scores in the
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current study were regarded as a meaningful index of the magnitude of attentional
interference caused by HiAgg words for each participant. To investigate the potential
usefulness of such an index, a difference score was calculated by simply subtracting the
NonAgg mean from the HiAgg mean for both ER and RT data. This method of
calculating a difference score was comparable to that used by Townshend and Duka
(2001). To investigate Hypotheses 1 through 3, all of the regression analyses were
conducted using ER and RT HiAgg means as the criterion variables first and then the
analyses were repeated using the ER and RT HiAgg—NonAgg mean difference scores as
the criterion variables. The results of both approaches are provided.
Analyses of Alcohol Cue Moderation
For each hypothesis, Setting (and hence alcohol cues) was tested as a moderator
of the specified relationship. In the current study, moderation was considered to be the
combined influence of two variables after controlling for the effects of each variable
alone. If the interaction of the two variables successfully predicts the criterion variable,
moderation could be said to have occurred. If moderation occurs, it is reasonable to
disambiguate the combined effects by repeating the analyses at each level (e.g., Barroom
vs. Cleanroom) of the moderating variable. This method follows the approach suggested
by Pedhazur (1997). Therefore, in the current study, the moderating effect of Setting was
explored by entering a trait anger subscale or EQAAL subscale and Setting (coded as 1
for Cleanroom and 2 for Barroom) into the regression equation first, and the product of
those two variables second. Significant interaction terms were then parsed apart by
entering the relevant subscale in one step with either Barroom or Cleanroom cases
selected, and vice versa. Since the main effects for Word Type were not significant for
the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT) using RT or ER data, DLT data were not examined.
Hypothesis 1
Participants who self-report higher levels of trait anger will demonstrate longer
latencies and higher error rates (more attentional interference) when exposed to selfrelevant cues of aggression than those who report lower levels of trait anger. This effect
will hold whether participants are tested in the presence or absence of alcohol cues.
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HiAgg Word Type, Trait Characteristics, and Alcohol Cue Moderation.
To evaluate Hypothesis 1, multiple regression analyses using Parafoveal Visual
Task (PVT) data were conducted. Each trait anger subscale (representing the predictor
variable) from the STAXI was regressed on HiAgg word RT means and ER means
(representing the dependent variable). The subscales included the Trait-Anger/Angry
Temperament (T-Ang/T) subscale and the Trait-Anger/Angry Reaction (T-Ang/R)
subscale.
Neither T-Ang/T nor T-Ang/R with Setting as a moderator predicted responses to
HiAgg words presented parafoveally when using either ER data or RT data. Therefore,
difference scores were examined.
Difference Scores, Trait Characteristics, and Alcohol Cue Moderation.
Using HiAgg—NonAgg ER difference scores, the regression equation including
T-Ang/T, Setting, and the interaction term was significant [R2 = .22, adjusted R2 = .16,
∆F (1, 37) = 4.35, p < .05]. Examination of the bivariate correlations between T-Ang/T
and ER difference scores for participants tested in the Barroom revealed that T-Ang/T
was positively associated with ER difference scores [r(22) = .50, p < .01; t(22) = 2.55, p <
.05]. That is, angry temperament tended to increase as attentional interference (mean ER
differences) increased. The bivariate correlation in the Cleanroom was not significant
[r(19) = -.02, p > .05] indicating that alcohol cues (Setting) moderated the effect of trait
angry temperament on the magnitude of the difference for HiAgg vs NonAgg error rates.
Using HiAgg—NonAgg RT difference scores, a different pattern emerged. The
regression equation including T-Ang/T, Setting, and the interaction term was again
significant [R2 = .37, adjusted R2 = .31, ∆F (1, 37) = 16.86, p < .001. However,
examination of the bivariate correlations between T-Ang/T and RT difference scores for
participants tested in the Barroom revealed that T-Ang/T was negatively associated with
RT difference scores [r(22) = -68, p < .001, t(22) = -4.09, p < .01]. That is, angry
temperament tended to increase as the magnitude of attentional interference (mean RT
differences) decreased. This time, the bivariate correlation in the Cleanroom was also
significant [r(19) = .41, p < .05]. However, the model was not [R2 = .17, adjusted R2 =
.12, F(1, 18) = 3.44, p > .05]. This may be due to the instability of the regression
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coefficient [Beta = .41, t(19) = 1.86, p > .05]. For the Trait Anger/Angry Reaction (TAng/R) subscale of the STAXI, no main effects or interaction effects were observed.
In order to more fully investigate the relationship between trait angry
temperament and reaction time for participants in general (that is, between subjects), PVT
participants were blocked into high or low trait angry temperament. This yielded 20
participants with a score of 5 or lower (the Low T-Ang/T group) and 17 participants with
a score of 7 or higher (the High T-Ang/T group). Therefore, a 2 (Word Type: NonAgg vs.
HiAgg) X 2 (Setting: Barroom vs. Cleanroom) X 2 (Angry Temperament: High vs. Low)
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with RT as the dependent variable. As
expected, the main effect for Word Type was significant. However, there was also a
significant three-way interaction between Word Type, Setting, and Angry Temperament,
F(1, 34) = 11.86, p < .01 with power observed at .92.
Next, four follow-up paired t-tests were conducted to examine simple effects for
Word Type. For participants completing the PVT in the barroom, those who self-reported
lower trait anger had significantly longer RT means for HiAgg words (M = 704.52, SD =
297.18) than for NonAgg words [M = 621.35, SD = 248.31; t(8) = -3.37, p = .01]. For
those higher on T-Ang/T, no differences emerged in the barroom [t(10) = -1.20, p > .05]
for HiAgg words (M = 616.43, SD = 195.18) versus NonAgg words (M = 599.93, SD =
227.66). For participants completing the task in the cleanroom, the pattern of results was
reversed. That is, for participants who reported higher levels of angry temperament, RTs
to HiAgg words (M = 739.90, SD = 191.78) were significantly longer than RTs to
NonAgg words [M = 670.54, SD = 186.63; t(5) = -5.11, p = .004]. The RT means for
HiAgg words (M = 732.50, SD = 215.94) were not significantly different from NonAgg
words (M = 713.20, SD = 216.45) for participants lower on angry temperament when
tested in the cleanroom [t(10) = -1.48, p > .05)].
It is apparent that the ANOVA results and t-tests replicated the results produced
by examining the data using regression and interaction terms. Overall, support for
Hypothesis 1 using either method of analysis was mixed. Using ER difference scores, the
positive relationship between angry temperament and the magnitude of attentional
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interference in the Barroom was predicted. The negative association that resulted in the
Barroom when using RT difference scores was not predicted.
Hypothesis 2
Participants who self-report higher levels of alcohol-aggression expectancies will
demonstrate longer latencies and higher error rates when exposed to aggression cues than
those who report low levels of alcohol-aggression expectancies. Setting should moderate
this effect. That is, the effect should hold only for participants tested in the presence of
alcohol cues.
HiAgg Word Type, Alcohol-Aggression Expectancies, and Alcohol Cue
Moderation. To investigate Hypothesis 2, each alcohol-aggression subscale (representing
the predictor variable) from the EQAAL was regressed individually on HiAgg word
means (representing the dependent variable). The four subscales of the EQAAL include
Unprovoked Anger Expectancies (UnpAng), Angry Reaction (AngReac), Hostile
Cognitions (HostCog), and Expectancies for Maintaining Control (ExpCon). It is
important to keep in mind that participants reported likely alcohol-aggression
expectancies for when they were drinking a low dose of alcohol.
Using ER data, none of the regressions for the main effect of an EQAAL subscale
or Setting or the interaction term approached significance. Using RT data, the regression
equation including AngReac, Setting, and the interaction term approached significance in
relation to HiAgg RT means [R2 = .19, adjusted R2 = .12, ∆F (1, 37) = 4.03, p = .05].
Examination of the bivariate correlations for participants in the Barroom revealed that
AngReac was negatively associated with HiAgg RT means [r(22) = -.51, p < .05, t(22) =
-2.62, p < .05]. Overall, when participants reported that they were less likely to react
with anger after consuming a low dose of alcohol, they were more likely to show
attentional interference from aggression cues when in the presence of alcohol cues. This
effect did not hold in the absence of alcohol cues [r(19) = -.03, p > .05].
The regression equation including HostCog, Setting, and the interaction term was
significantly related to HiAgg RT means [R2 = .28, adjusted R2 = .22, ∆F (1, 37) = 7.97, p
< .01]. Examination of the bivariate correlations for participants in the Barroom revealed
that HostCog was negatively associated with HiAgg RT means [r(22) = -.64, p < .01,
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t(22) = -3.75, p < .01]. When participants reported that they were less likely to be
suspicious of others after consuming a low dose of alcohol, they were more likely to
show attentional interference from aggression cues when in the presence of alcohol cues.
Again, the relationship was not significant in the absence of alcohol cues [r(19) = .03, p >
.05].
Although the regression equation using the interaction term representing
Expectancies to Maintain Control (ExpCon) and Setting to predict HiAgg RT means was
not significant [R2 = .16, adjusted R2 = .09, ∆F (1, 37) = 2.33, p > .05], the moderate
bivariate correlation between HiAgg RT means and ExpCon was significant [r(41) = -.31,
p < .05]. Thus, the effect of Setting was examined. In the Barroom, ExpCon was
negatively associated with HiAgg RT means [R2 = .22, adjusted R2 = .18, ∆F (1, 37) =
5.47, p < .05]. In addition, the regression coefficient was significant [t(22) = -2.34, p <
.05]. Since lower scores on this scale reflect decreased expectancy to maintain behavioral
control while drinking a low dose of alcohol, the negative association suggested that
participants who reported fewer control expectancies were also likely to show greater
attentional interference to HiAgg stimuli. Additionally, the lack of an association
between these two variables for participants tested in the Cleanroom provides additional
evidence for the moderating effects of alcohol cues [r(19) = -.02, p > .05]. Regression
equations using Unprovoked Anger Expectancies and Setting were not significant.
Difference Scores, Alcohol-Aggression Expectancies, and Alcohol Cue
Moderation. As with trait variables, scores representing the difference between HiAgg—
NonAgg RT means and HiAgg—NonAgg ER means were used as the criterion variable
with EQAAL subscales as the predictor variables in multiple regression analyses. The
potential moderation effect of Setting was investigated as well. For ER difference scores
none of the regression equations were significant. When considering RT difference
scores, the regression equation including HostCog, Setting, and the interaction term was
significantly related to the magnitude of the difference between HiAgg vs. NonAgg RT
means [R2 = .19, adjusted R2 = .12, ∆F (1, 37) = 7.52, p < .01]. Examination of the
bivariate correlations for participants tested in the Barroom revealed that HostCog was
negatively associated with RT difference scores [r(22) = -.47, p = .05, t(22) = -2.39, p <
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.05]. This relationship suggested that when participants reported that they were less likely
to be suspicious of others after consuming a low dose of alcohol, the magnitude of
attentional interference was greater when in the presence of alcohol cues. An inverse
relationship approached but did not reach significance in the Cleanroom [r(19) = .31, p =
.10] probably due to the unstable regression coefficient [t(19) = 1.36, p > .05].There were
no significant regression equations for the other three EQAAL subscale predictors when
using ER or RT difference scores.
Although significant results were obtained in relation to the Angry Reaction and
Expectancies for Hostile Cognitions subscales of the EQAAL, the relationships with
HiAgg words were negative. Expectancies to Maintain Control were also negatively
associated with HiAgg RT means but lower scores on this subscale reflect fewer
expectancies to maintain control while drinking alcohol. Thus, in the presence of alcohol
cues, greater interference to aggression cues was also associated with higher expectancies
for losing control while drinking. Conversely, greater attentional interference to
aggression cues (using HiAgg means or RT difference scores) was associated with a
lower level of expectancies to react with anger or view others’ intentions suspiciously
when drinking a low dose of alcohol. Hence, support for this hypothesis was mixed.
Hypothesis 3
Higher alcohol-aggression expectancies will predict longer latencies to respond
and higher error rates on the computer tasks after the effects of trait anger are partialled
out. However, this effect will hold only for participants tested in the presence of alcohol
cues.
Alcohol-Aggression Expectancies After Controlling for Trait Anger.
In order to investigate whether the EQAAL measure could predict HiAgg means
beyond trait anger for participants tested in the Barroom, T-Ang/T was entered on step 1
and then the EQAAL subscale that demonstrated the highest correlation with HiAgg RT
means (HostCog) was entered on Step 2. The analysis was then repeated using RT
difference scores and then again using ExpCon since this variable had successfully
predicted HiAgg RT means in the expected direction. It was decided to use predictor
variables sparingly because the ratio of the number of predictors to the sample size was
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too small and inclusion of all four EQAAL subscale scores was likely to result in an
overestimation of R2 in addition to unstable regression coefficients (Pedhazur, 1997).
For participants tested in the Barroom, the regression equation was significant
when regressing HostCog onto HiAgg RT means after T-Ang/T [R2 = .41, adjusted R2 =
.35, ∆F (1, 19) = 13.00, p < .01]. The regression coefficient for HostCog was also
significant [Beta = -.65, t(22) = -3.31, p < .01]. When considering HiAgg RT means as
the criterion variable it appears that participants showed more attentional interference
from high aggression words when they reported fewer expectancies for thinking
suspiciously about others’ intentions if they had consumed a low dose of alcohol,
regardless of their standing on the trait anger construct. This finding held after trait anger
was partialled out but only in the presence of alcohol cues. That is, the bivariate
correlation between HostCog and HiAgg means was not significant in the Cleanroom
[r(19) = -.03, p > 05].
When predicting RT difference scores for participants in the Barroom, HostCog
was significantly predictive beyond trait anger [R2 = .57, adjusted R2 = .53, ∆R2 = .11, ∆F
(1, 19) = 5.04, p < .05]. Additionally, regression coefficients were significant for both TAng/T [Beta = -.60, t(22) = -9.92, p < .01] and HostCog [Beta = -.35, t(22) = -2.25, p <
.05]. In the Cleanroom, the bivariate correlation between T-Ang/T and the RT difference
score was significant and in a positive direction [r(19) = .41, p < .05]. However, the
bivariate correlation using HostCog was not significant [r(19) = .31, p = .10].
Additionally, neither regression equation was significant in the Cleanroom, probably due
to the instability of the regression coefficients [Beta of T-Ang/T = .36, t(19) = 1.21, p >
.05; Beta of HostCog = .09, t(19) = .29, p > .05].
When using ER difference scores instead of RT difference scores, regression
equations were not significant. Also, when considering ExpCon and HiAgg RT means,
ExpCon was not predictive after partialling out the effects of T-Ang/T [∆R2 = .03, ∆F (1,
19) = 1.25, p > .05].
For participants in a barroom environment, a consistent and significant
relationship was uncovered between a measure of alcohol-aggression expectancies
(HostCog) and attentional interference from aggression stimuli even after controlling for
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trait anger (see Table 3). Unfortunately, the direction of the associations between alcoholaggression expectancies and attentional interference were contrary to expectation.
Although the finding is intriguing, this hypothesis was not supported.

Table 3
Regression Model Predicting Attentional Interference (HiAgg—NonAgg Difference
Scores) from Aggression Stimuli Presented Parafoveally in the Presence of Alcohol Cues
________________________________________________________________________
Predictor Variable
B
ß
t
p
R2
Adj R2 ∆R2 ∆F
________________________________________________________________________
Step 1
STAXI T-Ang/T

-25.60

-.68

-4.09

.001

-22.85

-.60

-3.92

.001

.46

.43

.46

16.75*

Step 2
STAXI T-Ang/T

EQAAL HostCog
-9.83 -.35 -2.25 .037 .57
.53
.11
5.04*
________________________________________________________________________
Note. RT = HiAgg = High Aggression Word Type; NonAgg = Non Aggression Word
Type; STAXI T-Ang/T = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory Trait Anger/Angry
Temperament subscale; EQAAL = Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and
Aggression – Low Dose; HostCog = Expectancies for Hostile Cognitions
*p < .05.

Supplemental Results
PANAS scores at Time 1 and Time 2. For the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT), the
overall mean for the Positive Affect scale at Time 1 (M = 2.90, SD = .77) was
significantly higher than the mean at Time 2 [M = 2.69, SD = .84; t(36) = 2.76, p < .01].
For the Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT), Positive Affect means were equivalent from Time
1 (M = 2.85, SD = .62) to Time 2 [M = 2.75, SD = .66; t(38) = 1.71, p > .05. For the
Negative Affect scale, overall means were not significantly different between Time 1 and
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Time 2 for either computer task. DLT means for Negative Affect were 1.28 (SD = .30) at
Time 1 and 1.21 (SD = .32) at Time 2. PVT means for Negative Affect were 1.27 (SD =
.24) at Time 1 and 1.26 (SD = .27) at Time 2. Overall, participants experienced a slight
decrease in Positive Affect when completing only the DLT and did not experience a
change in Negative Affect when completing either task.
It is possible that feelings related to the construct of anger could change when a
person is exposed to words of an aggressive nature even if overall negative affect did not
change. Two negative affect adjectives were of special interest in the current study—
hostile and irritable—since they are considered to represent the construct of angry. When
these two adjectives were examined across computer task and time, no differences
emerged. Given the overall pattern of results for the PANAS, it was unlikely that, at least
subjectively, participants were experiencing a meaningful change in negative affect as a
result of their exposure to aggression related words.
Recognition Task. Participants were expected to check off a higher percentage of
Control Words (words that they were instructed to attend to) than Experimental words
(unattended and parafoveal) or New words (words they had never been exposed to). On
average, participants checked off 41% of the 14 Control words. On average, they also
checked off 20% of the eight Experimental words, and 19% of the New words. Thus, the
rate of endorsement for words participants had never seen or heard was equivalent to the
rate of endorsement for unattended words.
Regarding the words on the Recognition Task that had been chosen to represent
HiAgg (e.g., shout and gun), comparable distractor words were selected to represent this
category (e.g., hate and maim). Comparison of the average number of HiAgg vs. New
(HiAgg equivalent) words checked off revealed no difference (t < 1). In fact, a majority
of participants checked off none of these words. Additionally, there appeared to be no
discernible difference in the overall patterns of checked words for participants
completing either task. Although it cannot be unequivocally concluded that conscious
awareness of the experimental aggression-related words did not occur for a few
participants, overall the pattern suggests that participants were unable to meaningfully
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discriminate between unattended stimuli and new stimuli. So, results were generally not a
product of conscious awareness of unattended stimuli.
Participants were also asked to write down any other words they thought they
might have seen or heard that were not listed on the recognition task. It was not
surprising that most of the words participants recalled started with the letter “L.” Other
experimental words listed that participants had been exposed to (in the unattended
channel or parafoveally) included rape, kill, and shoot. All of these words were reported
by participants in the DLT condition. Other words that participants in the PVT condition
reported included wow, quick, yellow, and window. It is interesting to note that the
masking stimulus for the PVT was represented by the string “WQXQW.” It is reasonable
to consider that wow and quick are examples of words that someone might report when a
stimulus is only presented for 100 milliseconds outside of his or her foveal region.
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Discussion
Comparison of the Dichotic Listening Task vs. the Parafoveal Visual Task
A specific hypothesis was not formulated regarding whether the Parafoveal Visual
Task (PVT) methodology or Dichotic Listening Task (DLT) methodology would be most
helpful for investigating the confluence of trait characteristics, alcohol-aggression
expectancies, and aggression stimuli on attention. However, a comparison of the two
methodologies was the overarching purpose of the current investigation. Power estimates,
as discussed earlier, provided strong evidence that with an equal number of participants,
the PVT (observed power = 1) was a more sensitive and useful task for investigating
qualitative differences among Word Type Reaction Time and Error Rate means than the
DLT (observed power ranged from .10 to .56).
It is possible that, with more participants, differences would have emerged across
Word Type for the DLT. However, this still suggests that the PVT is a ore sensitive
procedure. Further, it would be difficult to explain a trend for which the data did not
conform to a relatively linear relationship (see Figures 1 and 2). The quantitative
difference between NonAgg and HiAgg words on the PVT made it possible to calculate
difference scores that may more meaningfully reflect within subject differences to such
an elusive “black-box” phenomenon as attentional interference.
Error Rate vs. Reaction Time
Error Rate (ER) means showed an equivalent trend to Reaction Time (RT) means
for PVT data. Overall, ERs were low indicating that most participants had no trouble
completing the primary “L-word” counting task as well as the secondary odd vs. even
decision-making task. ER data proved extremely useful for detecting a small group of
participants who were either unable to, or, more likely, did not choose to follow
directions to “respond as quickly and accurately as possible.” Poor compliance with the
directions was indicated by ERs no better than chance.
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ER means when used as the criterion variable in regression analyses were not as
useful as RT means. Given the frequency with which participants made no or relatively
few errors, it is reasonable to conclude that ER was not sensitive enough to detect minute
changes in attention.
HiAgg Means Vs. HiAgg—NonAgg Difference Scores
Although ER means differed significantly across Word Type in the expected
direction, individual ER means were not predicted by any of the trait anger or alcoholexpectancy measures. HiAgg RT means were predicted by three of the four alcoholexpectancy measures. Using a difference score that should reflect an individual’s level of
interference from HiAgg words as opposed to NonAgg words also uncovered significant
relationships among predictor and criterion variables. The nature of the relationships
were contrary to predictions with the exception of the positive association between
T/Ang-T and ER difference scores in the presence of alcohol cues.
Overall, it appears that ER means, RT means, and difference scores all had
something important to add in the investigation of differential responding to Word Type
for the Visual Task. That is, error rate means pointed out participants who may not have
attended to task directions, RT means provided information about how attentional
interference varied across participants, and difference scores provided information about
how attentional interference varied within participants.
Power for the Regression Analyses
In this study, ER and RT means reflected meaningful differences across Word
Type. However, for ER, only the regression equation used to predict ER difference scores
(HiAgg mean – NonAgg ER mean) in relation to Trait Anger/Angry Temperament was
significant. For HiAgg RT means and RT difference scores, several regression equations
were significant. A larger sample may clarify the relative usefulness of using an RT
difference score instead of an RT mean as the criterion variable in regression analyses.
Overall, effect sizes for the significant regression equations were medium (~ .30)
to large ~.50). Estimates of adjusted R2 ranged from .12 to .38. Although effect sizes
were encouraging and moderate to strong bivariate correlations were observed, some
regression coefficients were unstable. This is likely due to the small ratio between
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predictors and sample size. For example, if all of the EQAAL subscales had been used to
predict attentional interference above and beyond trait angry temperament, the ratio
would have been approximately 1: 4. This is far below the most liberal of
recommendations (i.e., 1:15; Pedhazur, 1997).
Overall, the data did not support the prediction hypotheses or the support was
mixed. Given the concerns about adequate sample size for the regressions, the following
conclusions are speculative.
Hypothesis 1
Support for the hypothesis that higher self-reported levels of trait anger would
predict higher levels of attentional interference from aggression stimuli was only
provided when using ER mean difference scores (mean HiAgg ER—mean NonAgg ER)
for participants tested in the presence of alcohol cues. The association between these two
variables was positive, as specified in the hypothesis, and the effect did not hold in the
absence of alcohol cues.
Since this is the only hypothesis for which ER mean difference scores were
successfully predicted, and the result does not fit with the pattern of the rest of the results,
it may be that this finding is spurious, especially given the sample size for the regressions
and the overall inability of the current methodology to predict error rate differences.
Reaction time difference scores (HiAgg RT mean – NonAgg RT mean), on the
other hand, appeared to be more meaningful and useful for uncovering relationships
among trait anger, alcohol-aggression expectancies, and attentional interference.
However, for Hypothesis 1, the association between trait angry temperament and the
magnitude of attentional interference was predicted to be positive and was, in fact,
negative. One possible explanation for this finding is that students who generally
experience fewer angry feelings may be more attentive to stimuli in their environment
that represents a potential threat. Since the negative association between trait angry
temperament was found only in the Barroom, it is likely that alcohol cues and aggression
cues combined to put lower angry temperament participants on the alert. Conversely,
those with relatively higher levels of trait angry temperament were able to ignore
aggression stimuli while in the presence of alcohol cues.
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It may be, for the current study, that lower trait anger participants in the Barroom
(which might be considered low stress environment when alcohol cues interact with
aggression cues), experienced a similar attentional bias while participants higher in trait
anger were able to ignore aggression stimuli in the Barroom. Literature on the
interference of threat words was reviewed in order to shed some light on this unexpected
finding. One study (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992) found an interaction between high vs.
low anxious participants under high vs. low stress and naming latencies to threatening
Stroop words. The authors used a difference score (color naming latencies to threat words
minus color naming latencies to nonthreatening words) to index individual susceptibility
to attentional interference (p. 486). Low trait anxious individuals under high stress
displayed a lower magnitude of interference from threatening Stroop words than high
trait anxious individuals. This effect was reversed when participants were under low
stress. That is, low trait anxious individuals under low stress showed greater interference
to threat words than high trait anxious individuals under low stress. However, it appears
that the findings of MacLeod and Rutherford do not support this alternative explanation.
Another explanation for the lack of findings in the predicted direction involves the
conditional compensatory responses (CCR) theory (Siegel, Baptista, Kim, McDonald, &
Weise-Kelly, 2000). CCRs are initiated by the central nervous system to counteract the
effects of a drug such as alcohol. Further, CCRs have been found to occur in the presence
of cues that had earlier been paired with the consumption of a particular drug. Examples
of these cues are drug-related paraphernalia and the context (environment) under which
the drug is consumed. It is possible that a classically conditioned response to alcohol cues
in the barroom prompted a compensatory emotional reaction.
Although the interaction between Word Type X Setting was found to be
nonsignificant, and follow-up analyses for Setting at each level of Word Type were not
significant, Barroom clearly showed a moderating effect in the regression analyses. Also,
the pattern of Reaction Time (RT) means, without exception, indicated that RT means in
the barroom for a given word type were always higher than RT means in the cleanroom
for the same word type. This does not suggest an overall compensatory effect. If a
compensatory effect were occurring, it would most likely occur for participants with
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heavier drinking experience since CCRs are presumed to represent the effects of drug
tolerance. Although drinker status could be calculated from the Comprehensive Drinker
Profile data collected during this study, the sample size was too small to investigate such
a hypothesis. The tenability of a conditional compensatory response must await further
investigation.
Hypothesis 2
It was predicted that alcohol-aggression expectancies would predict attentional
interference from aggression stimuli but that this effect would be moderated by the
presence of alcohol cues. When AngReac, HostCog, and ExpCon, were used as
predictors of HiAgg RT means, each regression equation was significant for participants
tested in the Barroom. However, the direction of the relationships for the AngReac and
HostCog variables were negative, and, thus, did not conform to our predictions. The
relationship between ExpCon and HiAgg RT means was also negative, but the scale is
scored such that lower scores reflect higher expectancies for losing control while drinking
a low dose of alcohol. This finding supported our predictions.
Higher scores on the AngReac scale would suggest higher expectancies to react
with anger while drinking a low dose of alcohol in response to a particular event. It is
possible that participants with higher AngReac expectancies more easily dismissed the
aggression cues since there was nothing obviously threatening about the Barroom
environment (i.e., nothing to which to react with anger). The same may be said for
HostCog scores. Higher scores on this scale would indicate a higher tendency for an
individual to have suspicious thoughts about the intentions of others while drinking a low
dose of alcohol. Again, those with higher scores may have more readily dismissed
aggression stimuli in a clearly nonhostile situation. That is, the activation of aggression
scripts would undoubtedly include information about the types of circumstances under
which internal tendencies to feel angry would manifest. Those with lower scores, on the
other hand, may have fewer or less strongly interconnected scripts for what would happen
in the presence of alcohol cues, and, consequently, their attentional system was more alert
to the relatively “novel” aggression stimuli. As with hypothesis 1, it could be illuminating
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to measure drinking experience with a larger sample to explore the relationship between
higher vs. lower drinking experience and attentional interference from aggression stimuli.
Regarding the capacity of Expectancies to Maintain Control (ExpCon) to predict
automatic attentional interference, the significant association was in the expected
direction. That is, participants who reported that they would be more likely to lose control
while drinking a low dose of alcohol were also more likely to show greater interference
to aggression stimuli. This result is encouraging in that expectancies to behave
aggressively should more clearly relate to actually behaving aggressively than to merely
having angry feelings that are not necessarily expressed behaviorally.
In fact, numerous studies are emerging in the literature in which distinctions are
being made about the qualitative differences among behavioral, affective, and cognitive
elements of aggression. For example, Giancola, Saucier, and Gussler-Burkhardt (2003)
found that self-reported affective aggression was not related to behavioral aggression
whether or not a low dose of alcohol was consumed. They suggested that the experience
of anger is causally unrelated to behavioral manifestations of anger (p. 1951). Although
the present study did not provide an opportunity for individuals to exhibit aggression and
no alcohol was consumed, it is important to understand the extent to which individuals
are biased toward aggression stimuli in the presence of alcohol cues. The tendency of
participants with a lower rate of expectancies to maintain control to demonstrate
attentional interference suggested a behavioral component that may not be tapped by trait
angry temperament alone. Unfortunately, the results in respect to Hypothesis 3 indicated
that expectancies to maintain control did not predict attentional interference beyond trait
angry temperament. Future research may eventually disambiguate the components of
aggression and determine which ones are causally related to attentional interference or
behavioral aggression.
Hypothesis 3
Overall, the use of T-Ang/T and HostCog provided the greatest explanatory
evidence for the relationship between trait anger, alcohol-expectancies, and attentional
interference. Not surprisingly, given the prior results, the direction of the relationships
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did not conform to our predictions and ExpCon did not predict attentional interference
beyond trait angry temperament.
The finding, that in the Barroom, T-Ang/T and HostCog contributed uniquely to
HiAgg RT means and HiAgg—NonAgg difference scores, and that HostCog contributed
beyond T-Ang/T, is indeed intriguing. The results suggested that after holding trait anger
constant, lower scores on negative hostile cognitions explained 53% of the variance in the
magnitude of attentional interference from aggression stimuli. This supports the
continued need to evaluate alcohol-aggression expectancy networks in addition to trait
characteristics.
Alcohol Cues
Repeated Measures ANOVA failed to reveal a main effect for Setting or an
interaction effect for Word Type X Setting. However, it was apparent from the regression
analyses that alcohol cues moderated the relationships among the variables. This was as
predicted. It is likely that alcohol cues served to activate aggression networks in some
fashion. Whether that knowledge structure activation will ultimately be found to
represent a suppression of attention toward aggression cues or not remains to be explored.
Depending upon the outcome, a next step could be to explore whether actual behavioral
aggression increases or decreases. Predicting the salience of internal cues (e.g.,
knowledge structures that include alcohol-aggression-related information) and external
cues (alcohol stimuli and aggression stimuli) is a goal implied by alcohol myopia theory.
Although the current methodology did not directly investigate assumptions of the alcohol
myopia model, the mixed results of this study support the contention that the salience of
cues is a highly complex matter. Studies such as this may eventually help identify and
predict relative cue salience.
Limitations of the Current Study and Future Directions
The most problematic concern for interpreting the results of this study is that the
sample size was not optimal for the regression analyses. It might be possible to increase
sample size for both the questionnaire and computer task data by collecting all of the data
over one session. Such a procedure would need to avoid a priming effect if nonconscious
processes are being investigated.
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The possibility was explored that the differences in reaction time between
NonAgg and HiAgg words could be due to the increase in reaction times caused by
responding to “L” words. Seven “L” words were presented during the DLT and eight “L”
words were presented during the Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT). For the DLT, none of the
“L” words were presented within the two word types of interest. For the PVT, two of the
“L” words were presented within word types of interest.
Within the NonAgg category, note-lamp was presented resulting in a mean
reaction time (RT) of 698.18 (SD = 321.92). The mean RT for the other 19 NonAgg
words was 631.71 (SD = 200.50). The NonAgg “L” word RT mean was not significantly
different from the mean RT of the other nineteen NonAgg words, t(38 ) = 1.70, p = .10.
Leaving the RTs for this word pair in the analyses accounted for an increase in total mean
RT by approximately 4 ms.
Within the HiAgg category, scream-lake was presented yielding a mean reaction
time of 853.49 (SD = 411.82). The mean RT for the other 19 HiAgg words was 689.88
(SD = 216.27). These two RT means were significantly different, t(40) = 3.32, p < .01.
Leaving the RTs for the word pair in the analyses resulted in an increase in total mean RT
by about 9 ms. When the data were reanalyzed, the same pattern of results emerged.
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the results of the current study were due to the
inclusion of RTs for two “L” words. Although it is unclear why the mean for the HiAgg
“L” word was significantly higher than the mean for the other 19 HiAgg words, in similar
future studies it would be prudent to delete words such as the “L” word that may
contribute to measurement error.
Another concern for the current study is that the sample was over represented by
females. It may be that females expect aggressiveness to increase for males who are
drinking, but not for themselves. The range restriction caused by endorsing items in a
manner consistent with this assumption (as noted in the section regarding the
psychometric properties of the STAXI) may have dampened the predictive ability of the
measures of interest. Since participants were aware that the questionnaires would include
questions about alcohol and aggression, perhaps this sample of college students wanted to
present themselves in a more positive light than samples that provide responses outside of
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an alcohol-aggression context. In the future, adding a measure of social desirability (e.g.,
the Marlowe-Crowne Desirability Scale; Reynolds, 1982) may shed light on this potential
threat to valid responses.
Using the current methodology, an indication of how often a participant may have
actually aggressed (with or without the consumption of alcohol) was not available. Future
research will need to index the occurrence of behavioral aggression in order to more fully
understand obtained differences in attentional interference for aggression stimuli. That is,
perhaps an individual that had self-reported higher levels of trait anger and had reported
prior instances of aggression would be biased toward aggression stimuli. Or perhaps he or
she would be more likely to ignore aggression stimuli. Further it may be possible to
predict behavioral aggression from attentional interference when the participant is then
given the opportunity to aggress. Validating a methodology to investigate these
hypotheses was the ultimate goal of this project. In the final estimation, the Parafoveal
Visual Task provides such a methodology.
The results of the current study suggested that the relationship between attentional
interference and trait anger or alcohol-aggression expectancies is not straightforward,
especially when research into these relationships relies upon self-report. One of the hopes
of this study was to develop a methodology that may someday augment or even replace
self-report. That is, if attentional interference (and therefore automatic attention to
external cues) can be indexed and then shown to relate to aggressive behavior, the need
for self-report would be obviated. This is a worthy goal of research since people are apt
to give reports about feelings, thoughts, and behaviors that include biases in how that
information was stored in memory, biases regarding how they want to be viewed, and
other biases that may serve any number of unknown or indeterminate goals. It is
concluded that the current methodology holds promise for further exploring attentional
interference to aggression stimuli beyond what an individual may report.
Another limitation of the current study is that the obtained results may not
generalize to other aggression stimuli or beyond this analog drinking environment.
Attentional interference is arguably a complex phenomenon that is challenging to study.
This study represents a small step toward a methodology that may help us understand the
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link between attentional interference from (or bias toward) aggression stimuli in the
presence of alcohol cues and how that interference relates to trait characteristics and
alcohol-aggression expectancies. Understanding these relationships may eventually guide
us toward new strategies and interventions for those who drink and become aggressive.
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Footnote
1

Since significant mean error rate differences were not found in an earlier study
(Edington, 1996), the potential effect of unreliable data on mean reaction time was
considered to be of primary importance in the current study. Analyses revealed that when
reaction time data from participants with chance-level error rates (N = 6) was compared
with data from those that made relatively few mistakes (N = 79), standard errors
calculated using Repeated Measures ANOVA were quite different. For low error rate
participants completing the Dichotic Listening Task the standard error was estimated at
24.77. For the Parafoveal Visual Task, standard error was 33.55. For high error rate
participants completing the Dichotic Listening Task, standard error was 153.58 and, for
the Parafoveal Visual Task, standard error was 162.10. Standard errors were roughly five
times higher for participants with an error rate at a level no better than chance, further
supporting the notion that the reaction time data from these six participants was
unreliable.
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Appendix A
Request for Further Participation
Our lab is conducting several other experiments at this time. These include the
completion of various computer tasks. Most of these tasks require from 45 minutes to 1
hour and 15 minutes. Individuals may receive up to 3 experimental points for
participating in any one of these experiments.

ARE YOU INTERESTED IN BEING CONTACTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN
ANY OF THESE STUDIES?
______ NO
______ YES (If YES, PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.)

Do you have any hearing, visual, or motor impairments, or any other impairment, that
would prevent you from completing various computer tasks?
_______ NO
_______ YES
_______ DON’T KNOW/UNSURE (Please describe_______________________________.)

Is English your first/native language?
_______ NO
_______ YES
NAME (please print) _____________________________________________________
PHONE NUMBER(S) (where you can be reached): (_____)_____________________
(_____)_____________________
E-MAIL ADDRESS: ____________________________________________________
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Appendix B
State Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI)
Part 1 Directions: A number of statements that people use to describe themselves are
given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to indicate how
you feel right now. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on
any one statement, but give the answer that seems to best describe your present feelings.
Not At All

Somewhat
2

Moderately
So
3

Very
Much So
4

1. I am furious

1

2. I feel irritated

1

2

3

4

3. I feel angry

1

2

3

4

4. I feel like yelling at somebody

1

2

3

4

5. I feel like breaking things

1

2

3

4

6. I am mad

1

2

3

4

7. I feel like banging on the table

1

2

3

4

8. I feel like hitting someone

1

2

3

4

9. I am burned up

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

10. I feel like swearing

Part 2 Directions: A number of statements that people use to describe themselves are
given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number on the answer
sheet to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not
spend too much time on any one statement, but give the answer that seems to best
describe how you generally feel.
Almost
Sometimes
Often
Almost
Never
Always
11. I am quick tempered
1
2
3
4
12. I have a fiery temper

1
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Appendix B (Continued)
Almost
Never
1

Sometimes

Often

2

3

Almost
Always
4

14. I get angry when I’m slowed
down by others/ mistakes.

1

2

3

4

15. I feel annoyed when I am not
given recognition for doing
good work

1

2

3

4

16. I fly off the handle

1

2

3

4

17. When I get mad, I say nasty
things
18. It makes me furious when I
am criticized in front of others

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

19. When I get frustrated, I feel
like hitting someone

1

2

3

4

20. I feel infuriated when I do a
good job and get a poor
evaluation

1

2

3

4

13. I am a hotheaded person

Part 3 Directions: Everyone feels angry or furious from time to time, but people differ in
the ways that they react when they are angry. A number of statements are listed below
which people use to describe their reactions when they feel angry or furious. Read each
statement and the circle the appropriate number on the answer sheet to indicate how often
you generally react or behave in the manner described when you are feeling angry or
furious. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one
statement.
Sometimes

Often

21. I control my temper

Almost
Never
1

2

3

Almost
Always
4

22. I express my anger

1

2

3

4

23. I keep things in

1

2

3

4

24. I am patient with others

1

2

3

4

25. I pout or sulk

1

2

3

4

WHEN ANGRY OR FURIOUS…
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Appendix B (Continued)
Almost
Never
1

Sometimes

Often

2

3

Almost
Always
4

27. I make sarcastic remarks to others

1

2

3

4

28. I keep my cool

1

2

3

4

29. I do things like slam doors

1

2

3

4

30. I boil inside, but I don’t show it

1

2

3

4

31. I control my behavior

1

2

3

4

32. I argue with others

1

2

3

4

33. I tend to harbor grudges that I don’t
tell anyone about

1

2

3

4

34. I strike out at whatever infuriates me

1

2

3

4

35. I can stop myself from losing my
temper

1

2

3

4

36. I am secretly quite critical of others

1

2

3

4

37. I am angrier than I am willing to
admit

1

2

3

4

38. I calm down faster than most other
people

1

2

3

4

39. I say nasty things

1

2

3

4

40. I try to be tolerant and understanding

1

2

3

4

41. I’m irritated a great deal more than
people are aware of

1

2

3

4

42. I lose my temper

1

2

3

4

43. If someone annoys me, I’m apt to
tell him or her how I feel

1

2

3

4

44. I control my angry feelings

1

2

3

4

WHEN ANGRY OR FURIOUS…
26. I withdraw from people
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Appendix C
Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire
Instructions: Following are some statements which may or may not describe YOU.
Beside each statement, circle the number representing the rating which best describes
YOU.
Extremely
Unlike Me
1

Mostly
Unlike Me
2

Somewhat
Like Me
3

Mostly
Like Me
4

Extremely
Like Me
5

Extremely
Unlike Me

Mostly
Unlike Me

Somewhat
Like Me

Mostly
Like Me

Extremely
Like Me

1. Once in a while I can’t
control the urge to strike
another person.

1

2

3

4

5

2. I tell my friends openly
when I disagree with
them.

1

2

3

4

5

3. I flare up quickly but get
over it quickly.

1

2

3

4

5

4. I am sometimes eaten up
with jealousy.

1

2

3

4

5

5. At times I feel I have
gotten a raw deal out of
life.

1

2

3

4

5

6. I often find myself
disagreeing with people.

1

2

3

4

5

7. When frustrated, I let my
irritation show.

1

2

3

4

5

8. Given enough
provocation, I may hit
another person.

1

2

3

4

5

9. Other people always seem
to get the breaks.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

10. I sometimes feel like a
powder keg ready to
explode.
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Extremely
Unlike Me

Mostly
Unlike Me

Somewhat
Like Me

Mostly
Like Me

Extremely
Like Me

11. If somebody hits me, I hit
back.

1

2

3

4

5

12. I wonder why sometimes I
feel so bitter about things.

1

2

3

4

5

13. I am an even-tempered
person.

1

2

3

4

5

14. Some of my friends think
I’m a hothead.

1

2

3

4

5

15. I get into fights a little
more than the average
person.

1

2

3

4

5

16. If I have to resort to
violence to protect my
rights, I will.

1

2

3

4

5

17. When people annoy me, I
may tell them what I think
of them.

1

2

3

4

5

18. I know that “friends” talk
about me behind my back.

1

2

3

4

5

19. Sometimes I fly off the
handle for no good reason.

1

2

3

4

5

20. There are people who
pushed me so far that we
came to blows.

1

2

3

4

5

21. I am suspicious of overly
friendly strangers.

1

2

3

4

5

22. I can’t help getting into
arguments when people
disagree with me.

1

2

3

4

5

23. I can think of no good
reason for ever hitting a
person.

1

2

3

4

5
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Extremely
Unlike Me

Mostly
Unlike Me

Somewhat
Like Me

Mostly
Like Me

Extremely
Like Me

24. I have become so mad that
I have broken things.

1

2

3

4

5

25. I sometimes feel that
people are laughing at me
behind my back.

1

2

3

4

5

26. My friends say that I’m
somewhat argumentative.

1

2

3

4

5

27. When people are
especially nice, I wonder
what they want.

1

2

3

4

5

28. I have threatened people I
know.

1

2

3

4

5

29. I have trouble controlling
my temper.

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix D
Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and Aggression—Low Dose (EQAAL)
version
Instructions: Many people believe that drinking alcohol can influence how angry
they feel and how aggressive they act. We would like to know how you think
having a few drinks of alcohol (enough to make you buzzed) affects you. Please
circle the number that best describes to what extent you agree or disagree with
each statement below. (If you do not drink at all, you can still fill this out. Just
answer the questions according to what you think you would feel like if you did
drink.)
When I have had a few drinks of alcohol I am more likely to: _____________________
Strongly
Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

4. keep my cool.

1

2

3

4

5

6

5. feel angry.

1

2

3

4

5

6

6. get angry if I am trying to
concentrate, but someone
keeps making noise.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7. get frustrated and feel
like hitting someone

1

2

3

4

5

6

8. get angry when I need to
get somewhere in a hurry,
but I get stuck in traffic.

1

2

3

4

5

6

9. wonder about the hidden
reasons if someone does
something nice for me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. get furious.
2. get angry when I am in
line to get something and
someone cuts in front of
me.
3. think that people who act
like they’re being honest
really have something to
hide
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Strongly
Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Agree

10. control my behavior.

1

2

3

4

5

6

11. fly off the handle.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

13. stop myself from losing
my temper.

1

2

3

4

5

6

14. feel like yelling at
somebody.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

16. feel that other people
always seem to get the
breaks.

1

2

3

4

5

6

17. get mad.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

19. try to be tolerant and
understanding.

1

2

3

4

5

6

20. have a fiery temper.

1

2

3

4

5

6

21. get angry with someone
who is always
contradicting me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

22. control my angry
feelings.

1

2

3

4

5

6

23. get burned up.

1

2

3

4

5

6

12. get angry when I am
singled out for correction,
while someone else who
is doing the same thing is
ignored.

15. get angry with someone
who looks through my
things without
permission.

18. get angry when I am
accused of something I
didn’t do.
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Appendix E
Alcohol-Aggression Items from Various Measures
Power and Aggression Subscale
(from the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (George, Frone, Cooper, Russell, Skinner, &
Windle, 1995; Rohsenow, 1983).
Instructions: Please respond to the following statements according to your own personal
thoughts, feelings and beliefs about alcohol. We are interested in what you think about
alcohol, regardless of what other people might think.

1. Drinking makes me
feel warm and
flushed.
5. I feel powerful when
I drink, as if I can
really make other
people do as I want.
9. If I have had a
couple of drinks, it
is easier for me to
tell someone off.
16. Drinking makes me
more aggressive.
32. I’m more likely to
get into an argument
if I’ve had some
alcohol.
37. After a few drinks it
is easier for me to
pick a fight.

Agree
Strongly

Agree
Moderately

Agree
Slightly

Disagree
Slightly

Disagree
Moderately

Disagree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6
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Appendix E (Continued)
Risk and Aggression Subscale
(from the Comprehensive Effects of Alcohol scale; Fromme, Stroot, & Kaplan, 1993)
Instructions: Please respond to the following statements by circling the number that best
completes the following sentence.
Disagree

Slightly Disagree

Slightly Agree

Agree

1

2

3

4

If I were under the influence from drinking alcohol….
Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

1. I would take risks.

1

2

3

4

2. I would act aggressively.

1

2

3

4

3. I would be loud, boisterous, or noisy.

1

2

3

4

4. I would act tough.

1

2

3

4

5. I would feel dominant.

1

2

3

4
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Appendix E (Continued)
Arousal/Aggression Subscale
(from the Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire; Brown, Goldman, Inn, & Anderson, 1980)
Instructions: Read each statement carefully and respond according to your own personal
thoughts, feelings and beliefs about alcohol now. We are interested in what you think
about alcohol, regardless of what other people might think. If you think that the statement
is true, or mostly true, or true some of the time, then circle "Agree" on the answer sheet.
If you think the statement is false, or mostly false, then circle "Disagree" on the answer
sheet. When the statements refer to drinking alcohol, you may think in terms of drinking
any alcoholic beverage, such as beer, wine, whiskey, liquor, rum, scotch, vodka, gin, or
various alcoholic mixed drinks. Whether or not you have had actual drinking experiences
yourself, you are to answer in terms of your beliefs about alcohol.
1.

Agree

Disagree

Drinking makes me feel flushed

2.

Agree

Disagree

After a few drinks, it is easier to pick a fight

3.

Agree

Disagree

I feel powerful when I drink, as if I can really
influence others to do as I want

4.

Agree

Disagree

Drinking increases male aggressiveness

5.

Agree

Disagree

At times, drinking is like permission to forget
problems
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Appendix E (Continued)
Aggression Subscale
(from the Drinking Expectancy Questionnaire; Young, & Knight, 1988)
Instructions: The following questions ask about the effects that drinking alcohol has on
you. There are no right or wrong answers to these items. We would like to know how you
feel about them. All that is required is that you circle the appropriate number beside each
statement, using the following key:

Strongly
Disagree
1

Disagree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree
3

2

Agree

Strongly
Agree
5

4

Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

2. Little things annoy me
less when I’m
drinking.

1

2

3

4

5

3. Drinking increases my
aggressiveness.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree
1. I control my temper
more easily when
drinking alcohol.

122

Appendix E (Continued)
Social Subscale
(from the Effects of Drinking Alcohol scale; Leigh & Stacy, 1993)
Instructions: Here are some effects or consequences that some people experience after
drinking alcohol. How likely is it that these things happen to you when you drink
alcohol? Please circle the number that best describes how drinkingalcohol would affect
you. (If you do not drink at all, you can still fill this out; just answer it according to what
you think would happen to you if you did drink.)
When I drink alcohol: ________________________________
No
Chance
1. I become
aggressive.
2. I get into fights.
3. I get mean

Very
Unlikely Unlikely

Likely

Very
Likely

Certain to
Happen

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6
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Appendix F
Demographics Questionnaire
Please provide the following background information:
Date of Birth: _____________
Gender: ____ Male
____ Female
Race/Ethnicity: ____ African American
____ Asian American
____ Caucasian
____ Hispanic
____ Latino
____ Native American
____ Other (Please specify:__________________________________)
Household yearly income (home that you were raised in):
____ Less than $10,000

____ $40,000 - $79,000

____ $10,000 – $24,999

____ More than $80,000

____ $25,000 -- $39,999

____ I do not know our yearly income.
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Appendix G
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next
to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW, THAT IS, AT
THIS VERY MOMENT. Use the following scale to record your answers:
1

2

3

4

5

very slightly

a little bit

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

or not at all
_____ guilty

_____ determined

_____ scared

_____ attentive

_____ hostile

_____ jittery

_____ enthusiastic

_____ active

_____ interested

_____ irritable

_____ distressed

_____ alert

_____ excited

_____ ashamed

_____ upset

_____ inspired

_____ strong

_____ proud

_____ nervous

_____ afraid
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Appendix H
PARAFOVEAL VISUAL TASK WORD PAIRS
Parafoveal
(Unattended; On the Computer)
Pixel Position
Word
(X/Y axis : range in cm)
(1st of Pair)
10 Blank

Type Digits

Odd 27935
Even 12476
Odd 71392
Even 49231
Odd 92758
Even 25879
Odd 84167
Even 51683
Odd 01589
Even 39615
1. Barn
2. Dull
3. Grace
4. Grin
5. Hall
6. Lend
7. More
8. Ranch
9. Truth
10. Yacht
1. Air
2. Bake
3. Blank
4. Chance
5. Chill
6. Crust
7. Find
8. Five
9. Flag
10. Groom
11. Note
12. Plot
13. Rain
14. Scoop
15. Scrap
16. Shop
17. Shrimp
18. Space
19. Stew
20.Year
21. Cage
22. Dare
23. Fray
24. Fraud
25. Free
26.Friend
27. Ghoul
28. Grief
29. Hide
30. Lie

10 Practice Words
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-124 : 6.3 – 2.6)
Rt (X110 : 2.6 – 5.1)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-115 : 5.6 – 2.6)
Rt (X127 : 2.6 – 6.3)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
20 NonAgg Words
Lf (X-97 : 4.4 – 2.6)
Rt (X115 : 2.6 – 5.3)
Up (Y87: 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-113 : 5.5 – 2.6)
Rt (X127 : 2.6 – 6.3)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-108 : 5.3 – 2.6)
Rt (X132 : 2.6 – 6.2)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X- 106 : 5 – 2.6)
Rt (X128 : 2.6 –6.4)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-130 : 6.6 – 2.6)
Rt (X124 : 2.6 – 6.1)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
20 LoAgg Words
Lf (X-112 : 5.5 – 2.6)
Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-111 : 5.4 – 2.6)
Rt (X129 : 2.6 – 6.5)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-106 : 5 – 2.6)
Rt (X96 : 2.6 - 4)

Odd 52146
Even 82651
Odd 32768
Even 60492
Even 46280
Odd 74325
Even 91847
Odd 08573
Odd 15904
Even 28469
Odd 62793
Even 17428
Even 90837
Odd 26180
Even 83219
Odd 50374
Odd 38516
Even 47632
Odd 71905
Even 08459
Even 81625
Odd 24730
Even 90238
Odd 17584
Odd 62103
Even 59472
Odd 32941
Even 43628
Even 71254
Odd 08396
Even 91426
Odd 68304
Odd 59712
Even 27830
Odd 14589
Even 73625
Even 30257
Odd 47152
Even 04863
Odd 83921

Auditory
(Attended; On the Headphones)
Word
Db
Word
Word
(2nd of Pair)
Begin
End
10 Blank Control (0 “L” words)
1. Bird
-1
1.01
1.80
2. Cone
-1
1.07
1.78
3. Dream
-1
1.02
1.83
4. Math
-1
1.05
1.65
5. Mint
-1
1.04
1.67
6. Porch
-1
1.09
1.67
7. Rhyme
-1
0.93
1.83
8. Sheep
-1
1.05
1.74
9. Shirt
-1
1.03
1.70
10. Well
-1
1.09
1.70
10 Practice Control (1 “L” word)
1. Calm
-1
1.00
1.82
2. Prune
-1
1.07
1.76
3. Spice
-1
0.84
1.82
4. Roof
-1
1.03
1.72
5. Lack
-1
1.04
1.75
6. Cough
-1
1.10
1.77
7. Pink
-1
1.08
1.81
8. Shade
-1
0.92
1.83
9. View
-1
1.08
1.78
10. Then
-1
1.04
1.68
20 NonAgg Control (1 “L” word)
1. Tent
-1
1.12
1.64
2. Tube
-1
1.02
1.77
3. Shine
-1
0.99
1.80
4. Fruit
-1
1.03
1.65
5. Truck
-1
1.07
1.74
6. Scarf
-1
1.00
1.79
7. Pump
-1
1.04
1.62
8. Hip
-1
1.07
1.65
9. Mop
-1
1.06
1.75
10. Up
-1
1.13
1.56
11. Lamp
-1
1.13
1.77
12. Frog
-1
1.17
1.71
13. Spoon
-1
0.98
1.86
14. Guide
-1
1.03
1.76
15. Teach
-1
1.04
1.76
16. Grape
-1
1.03
1.76
17. Stamp
-1
0.99
1.83
18. Desk
-1
1.05
1.78
19. Fresh
-1
0.99
1.80
20. Mom
-1
1.05
1.77
20 LoAgg Control (1 “L” word)
21. Reach
-1
1.06
1.77
22. Cup
-1
1.11
1.69
23. Blush
-1
1.02
1.78
24. Laugh
-1
1.00
1.81
25. Plum
-1
1.21
1.73
26. Youth
-1
1.06
1.80
27. Scale
-1
0.97
1.80
28. Flunk
-1
1.07
1.80
29. Fool
-1
1.19
1.75
30. Shrub
-1
1.10
1.81
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Length
of .wav
2.002
2.000
1.999
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.002
2.002
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.002
1.999
2.001
2.002
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.002
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.000

Appendix H (Continued)
31. Like
32. Make
33. March
34. Mask
35. Pat
36. Take
37. Tight
38. Toil
39. Trap
40. Urge
41. Bang
42. Beat
43. Bruise
44. Chop
45. Curse
46. Cut
47. Grab
48. Guard
49. Hit
50. Lash
51. Mad
52. Mob
53. Punch
54. Push
55. Rude
56. Stern
57. Strike
58. Tank
59. Tough
60. Whip
61. Brawl
62. Feud
63. Fight
64. Fist
65. Force
66. Gun
67. Harm
68. Hurt
69. Kill
70. Rage
71. Rape
72. Scold
73. Scream
74. Shoot
75. Shot
76. Shout
77.Shove
78. Spank
79. Stab
80. Yell

Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-125 : 6.3 – 2.6)
Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-117 : 5.8 – 2.6)
Rt (X108 : 2.6 – 4.9)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
20 AmbAgg
Lf (X-114 : 5.4 – 2.6)
Rt (X114 : 2.6 – 5.1)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-125 : 6.2 – 2.6)
Rt (X108 : 2.6 – 4.8)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-98 : 4.3 – 2.6)
Rt (X114 : 2.6 – 5.3)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-126 : 6.3 – 2.6)
Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-126 : 6.3 – 2.6)
Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
20 HiAgg Words
Lf (X-127 : 6.3 – 2.6)
Rt (X114 : 2.6 – 5.4)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-124 : 6.2 – 2.6)
Rt (X110 : 2.6 – 4.9)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-104 : 4.7 – 2.6)
Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-136 : 7 – 2.6)
Rt (X128 : 2.6 – 6.3)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Lf (X-124 : 6.2 – 2.6)
Rt (X125 : 2.6 – 6.1)
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
10 Random Blanks

Odd 34785
Even 71452
Odd 23501
Even 19238
Even 58614
Odd 48327
Even 60439
Odd 89106
Odd 05983
Even 92840

31. Need
32. Crave
33. Shed
34. Chew
35. Few
36. Age
37. Scroll
38. Beach
39. Cheese
40. Great

Odd 62793
Even 17428
Even 90837
Odd 26180
Even 83219
Odd 50374
Odd 38516
Even 47632
Odd 71905
Even 08459
Even 81625
Odd 24730
Even 90238
Odd 17584
Odd 62103
Even 59472
Odd 32941
Even 43628
Even 71254
Odd 08396

41. Key
42. Frost
43. Have
44. Film
45. Food
46. Feel
47. Boat
48. Yawn
49. Spell
50. Scrub
51. Hint
52. Guess
53. Store
54. Room
55. Mist
56. Brave
57. Broom
58. Share
59. Feed
60. Rose

Even 91426
Odd 68304
Odd 59712
Even 27830
Odd 14589
Even 73625
Even 30257
Odd 47152
Even 83921
Odd 04863
Odd 34785
Even 71452
Odd 23501
Even 19238
Even 58614
Odd 48327
Even 60439
Odd 89106
Odd 05983
Even 92840

61. Stream
62. Stock
63. Tape
64. Care
65. Chair
66. Mud
67. Moon
68. Shell
69. Shape
70. Pouch
71. Wheat
72. Race
73. Lake
74. Book
75. Touch
76. Cute
77. Green
78. Horse
79. Park
80. Gum

Odd 27935
Even 12476
Odd 71392
Even 49231
Odd 92758
Even 25879
Odd 84167
Even 51683

1. Cake
2. Dusk
3. List
4. Play
5. Short
6. Show
7. Spin
8. Train
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-1
1.00
1.82
-1
1.19
1.80
-1
1.00
1.80
-1
1.04
1.76
-1
1.09
1.80
-1
1.13
1.68
-1
0.92
1.85
-1
1.02
1.65
-1
1.02
1.76
-1
1.15
1.66
20 AmbAgg Control (0 “L” words)
-1
1.11
1.67
-1
0.93
1.86
-1
1.03
1.81
-1
1.04
1.70
-1
1.01
1.83
-1
1.04
1.77
-1
1.10
1.78
-1
0.99
1.83
-1
1.02
1.80
-1
1.01
1.80
-1
1.11
1.67
-1
1.05
1.66
-1
1.10
1.71
-1
1.11
1.79
-1
1.06
1.67
-1
1.18
1.79
-1
1.14
1.76
-1
1.09
1.81
-1
1.03
1.72
-1
1.09
1.74
20 HiAgg Control Words (1 “L” word)
-1
1.00
1.80
-1
1.00
1.80
-1
1.10
1.63
-1
1.22
1.67
-1
1.13
1.72
-1
1.15
1.75
-1
1.07
1.65
-1
1.08
1.78
-1
0.97
1.86
-1
1.22
1.75
-1
1.18
1.68
-1
1.11
1.74
-1
1.14
1.75
-1
1.05
1.75
-1
1.17
1.66
-1
1.21
1.71
-1
1.16
1.77
-1
1.12
1.80
-1
1.14
1.72
-1
1.22
1.70
10 Control Words (1 “L” word)
-1
1.21
1.69
-1
1.12
1.72
-1
1.11
1.80
-1
1.13
1.80
-1
1.10
1.74
-1
1.14
1.81
-1
0.95
1.84
-1
1.14
1.85

2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.001
2.000
1.999
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.003
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.000

Appendix H (Continued)
Odd 01589
Even 39615
1. Card
2. Dig
3. Dough
4. Droop
5. Kind
6. News
7. North
8. Please
9. Proud
10. Taste

10 Final Practice Words
Lf (X-115 : 5.5 – 2.6)
Odd 52146
Rt (X100 : 2.6 – 4.3)
Even 82651
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Odd 32768
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Even 60492
Lf (X-108 : 4 – 2.6)
Even 46280
Rt (X119 : 2.6 – 5.7)
Odd 74325
Up (Y87 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Even 91847
Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4)
Odd 08573
Lf (X-127 : 6.3 – 2.6)
Odd 15904
Rt (X124 : 2.6 – 5.9)
Even 28469
Total Parafoveal Words = 100

9. Turn
-2
1.19
1.78
2.000
10. Your
-1
1.07
1.83
2.000
10 Final Practice Control Words (3 “L” words)
1. Heart
-1
1.18
1.79
2.001
2. Lean
-1
1.16
1.77
2.000
3. Gloss
-1
1.14
1.82
2.000
4. Last
-1
1.08
1.81
2.001
5. Lunch
-1
1.13
1.82
1.999
6. Mile
-1
1.13
1.73
2.001
7. Wait
-1
1.12
1.85
2.001
8. Street
-1
1.15
1.84
2.000
9. Vast
-1
1.04
1.82
2.001
10. Shoe
-1
1.15
1.82
2.000
Total Auditory Words = 120; Total “L” words = 8

DICHOTIC LISTENING TASK WORD PAIRS
Unattended Channel
of Headphones
Db
Word
Word
Begin
(1st of Pair)
10 Blank

10 Practice
-19
1.03
-19
1.06
-19
1.19
-19
1.14
-19
1.12
-19
1.10
-19
1.00
-19
1.05
-19
1.08
-19
1.06
20 NonAgg Words
1. Air
-19
1.12
2. Bake
-19
1.16
3. Blank
-19
1.20
4. Chance
-19
1.16
5. Chill
-19
1.04
6. Crust
-19
1.13
7. Find
-19
1.00
8. Five
-19
1.03
9. Flag
-19
1.00
10. Groom
-19
1.11
11. Note
-19
1.15
12. Plot
-19
1.19
13. Rain
-19
1.16
14. Scoop
-19
1.03
15. Scrap
-19
1.03
16. Shop
-19
1.10
1. Barn
2. Kind
3. Dull
4. Grin
5. Heart
6. Last
7. Spin
8. Shade
9. Train
10. View

Word
End

1.84
1.88
1.78
1.66
1.77
1.84
1.88
1.87
1.83
1.80
1.77
1.66
1.78
1.80
1.77
1.76
1.85
1.83
1.87
1.66
1.76
1.76
1.83
1.71
1.80
1.85

Attended Channel
of Headphones
Word (2nd of
Db
Word
Word
Pair)
Begin
End
10 Blank Control (1 “L” words)
1. Cough
-1
1.18
1.69
2. Less
-1
1.20
1.75
3. Good
-1
1.10
1.70
4. Math
-1
1.18
1.77
5. News
-1
1.06
1.78
6. Please
-1
1.06
1.77
7. Rhyme
-1
1.06
1.75
8. Soft
-1
1.11
1.80
9. Stray
-1
1.08
1.80
10. Taste
-1
1.19
1.72
10 Practice Control (1 “L” words)
1. Bird
-1
1.03
1.71
2. Calm
-1
1.06
1.84
3. Dig
-1
1.20
1.78
4. Grace
-1
1.14
1.74
5. Hall
-1
1.14
1.84
6. Lunch
-1
1.10
1.73
7. Spice
-1
1.04
1.89
8. Short
-1
1.07
1.74
9. Truth
-1
1.08
1.71
10. Vast
-1
1.03
1.81
20 NonAgg Control (0 “L” words)
1. Age
-1
1.12
1.79
2. Beach
-1
1.16
1.73
3. Blush
-1
1.20
1.79
4. Chew
-1
1.19
1.73
5. Cheese
-1
1.04
1.81
6. Crave
-1
1.13
1.80
7. Few
-1
1.00
1.63
8. Fool
-1
1.03
1.70
9. Flunk
-1
1.00
1.87
10. Great
-1
1.12
1.82
11. Need
-1
1.15
1.84
12. Plum
-1
1.19
1.77
13. Reach
-1
1.19
1.80
14. Scale
-1
1.03
1.85
15. Scroll
-1
1.03
1.80
16. Shed
-1
1.13
1.80
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Length
of .wav

Type Digits

2.000
2.000
2.001
2.002
2.001
1.999
2.002
2.002
2.000
2.002

Odd 27935
Even 12476
Odd 71392
Even 49231
Odd 92758
Even 25879
Odd 84167
Even 51683
Odd 01589
Even 39615

2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
1.999
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.001

Odd 52146
Even 82651
Odd 32768
Even 60492
Even 46280
Odd 74325
Even 91847
Odd 08573
Odd 15904
Even 28469

2.000
1.999
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.002
2.000
2.001
1.999
2.000
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.001
2.000
1.999

Odd 62793
Even 17428
Even 90837
Odd 26180
Even 83219
Odd 50374
Odd 38516
Even 47632
Odd 71905
Even 08459
Even 81625
Odd 24730
Even 90238
Odd 17584
Odd 62103
Even 59472

Appendix H (Continued)
17. Shrimp
18. Space
19. Stew
20. Year
21. Cage
22. Dare
23. Fraud
24. Fray
25. Free
26. Friend
27. Ghoul
28. Grief
29. Hide
30. Lie
31. Like
32. Make
33. March
34. Mask
35. Pat
36. Take
37. Tight
38. Toil
39. Trap
40. Urge
41. Bang
42. Beat
43. Bruise
44. Chop
45. Curse
46. Cut
47. Grab
48. Guard
49. Hit
50. Lash
51. Mad
52. Mob
53. Punch
54. Push
55. Rude
56. Stern
57. Strike
58. Tank
59. Tough
60. Whip
61. Brawl
62. Feud
63. Fight
64. Fist
65. Force
66. Gun
67. Harm
68. Hurt
69. Kill
70. Rage
71. Rape
72. Scold
73. Scream

-19
-19
-19
-19

1.05
1.01
1.19
1.12

20 LoAgg Words
-19
1.08
-19
1.14
-19
1.02
-19
1.10
-19
0.99
-19
1.05
-19
1.00
-19
1.26
-19
0.97
-19
1.16
-19
1.10
-19
1.16
-19
1.10
-19
1.16
-19
1.17
-19
1.20
-19
1.20
-19
1.20
-19
1.22
-19
1.19
20 AmbAgg Words
-19
1.10
-19
1.16
-19
1.16
-19
1.10
-19
1.20
-19
1.19
-19
1.12
-19
1.19
-19
1.20
-19
1.07
-19
1.01
-19
1.08
-19
1.13
-19
1.11
-19
1.12
-19
1.01
-19
1.12
-19
1.20
-19
1.23
-19
1.28
20 HiAgg Words
-19
1.20
-19
1.07
-19
1.15
-19
1.20
-19
1.08
-19
1.11
-19
1.02
-19
1.18
-19
1.11
-19
1.12
-19
1.12
-19
1.00
-19
1.03

1.85
1.85
1.82
1.81
1.84
1.85
1.88
1.81
1.78
1.85
1.89
1.75
1.89
1.80
1.77
1.73
1.78
1.78
1.73
1.65
1.67
1.74
1.79
1.78
1.85
1.76
1.77
1.79
1.79
1.64
1.80
1.86
1.69
1.85
1.87
1.81
1.81
1.64
1.78
1.88
1.79
1.74
1.73
1.68
1.80
1.79
1.70
1.79
1.70
1.81
1.88
1.74
1.77
1.79
1.63
1.81
1.80

17. Shrub
18. Spoon
19. Stamp
20. Youth

-1
-1
-1
-1

1.07
1.01
1.18
1.18

1.85
1.76
1.79
1.73

20 LoAgg Control (2 “L” words)
21. Cup
-1
1.14
1.53
22. Desk
-1
1.14
1.81
23. Fresh
-1
1.05
1.83
24. Frost
-1
1.10
1.88
25. Frog
-1
1.02
1.88
26. Fruit
-1
1.08
1.68
27. Guide
-1
1.00
1.89
28. Grape
-1
1.27
1.71
29. Hip
-1
1.09
1.64
30. Laugh
-1
1.16
1.80
31. Lamp
-1
1.12
1.79
32. Mist
-1
1.17
1.75
33. Mop
-1
1.10
1.79
34. Mom
-1
1.08
1.69
35. Pump
-1
1.20
1.73
36. Tent
-1
1.20
1.68
37. Teach
-1
1.20
1.72
38. Tube
-1
1.20
1.79
39. Truck
-1
1.22
1.71
40. Up
-1
1.20
1.61
20 AmbAgg Control (1 “L” word)
41. Boat
-1
1.10
1.68
42. Book
-1
1.17
1.72
43. Brave
-1
1.15
1.80
44. Chair
-1
1.13
1.80
45. Cute
-1
1.20
1.68
46. Care
-1
1.19
1.75
47. Green
-1
1.15
1.78
48. Gum
-1
1.19
1.74
49. Horse
-1
1.20
1.78
50. Lake
-1
1.13
1.61
51. Moon
-1
1.00
1.81
52. Mud
-1
1.10
1.70
53. Park
-1
1.13
1.70
54. Pouch
-1
1.10
1.81
55. Race
-1
1.12
1.80
56. Stock
-1
1.05
1.72
57. Stream
-1
1.15
1.83
58. Touch
-1
1.21
1.71
59. Tape
-1
1.23
1.70
60. Wheat
-1
1.29
1.72
20 HiAgg Control (0 “L” words)
61. Broom
-1
1.20
1.77
62. Film
-1
1.08
1.80
63. Feed
-1
1.13
1.80
64. Feel
-1
1.20
1.76
65. Food
-1
1.08
1.84
66. Guess
-1
1.12
1.75
67. Hint
-1
1.02
1.64
68. Have
-1
1.18
1.80
69. Key
-1
1.11
1.84
70. Room
-1
1.12
1.68
71. Rose
-1
1.11
1.81
72. Scarf
-1
1.00
1.74
73. Scrub
-1
1.03
1.83
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2.000
2.000
2.001
2.002

Odd 32941
Even 43628
Even 71254
Odd 08396

2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000
1.999
2.002
2.000
1.999
1.999
2.002
1.998
1.999
2.002
1.999
2.001
1.999
2.002
2.000
2.000
1.999

Even 91426
Odd 68304
Odd 59712
Even 27830
Odd 14589
Even 73625
Even 30257
Odd 47152
Even 04863
Odd 83921
Odd 34785
Even 71452
Odd 23501
Even 19238
Even 58614
Odd 48327
Even 60439
Odd 89106
Odd 05983
Even 92840

2.002
2.002
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.002
2.002
1.999
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.000
2.001
2.000
2.000
2.002
2.000
2.000
1.999

Odd 62793
Even 17428
Even 90837
Odd 26180
Even 83219
Odd 50374
Odd 38516
Even 47632
Odd 71905
Even 08459
Even 81625
Odd 24730
Even 90238
Odd 17584
Odd 62103
Even 59472
Odd 32941
Even 43628
Even 71254
Odd 08396

1.999
1.999
2.000
2.000
1.999
2.000
2.001
2.001
2.002
2.001
2.002
1.999
2.000

Even 91426
Odd 68304
Odd 59712
Even 27830
Odd 14589
Even 73625
Even 30257
Odd 47152
Even 04863
Odd 83921
Odd 34785
Even 71452
Odd 23501

Appendix H (Continued)
74. Shoot
75. Shot
76. Shout
77. Shove
78. Spank
79. Stab
80. Yell

-19
1.06
-19
1.11
-19
1.00
-19
1.10
-19
1.05
-19
1.01
-19
1.13
10 Blank

1.60
1.74
1.75
1.78
1.85
1.88
1.79

10 Practice Words
1. Card
-19
1.10
1.85
2. Dream
-19
1.22
1.78
3. Lack
-19
1.16
1.71
4. Lend
-19
1.20
1.77
5. More
-19
1.19
1.75
6. Proud
-19
1.17
1.80
7. Shoe
-19
1.06
1.80
8. Show
-19
1.15
1.76
9. Wait
-19
1.20
1.78
10. Yacht
-19
1.18
1.80
Total Unattended Words = 100

74. Shine
75. Share
76. Shell
77. Shape
78. Spell
79. Store
80. Yawn

-1
1.06
1.80
2.002
-1
1.10
1.81
1.999
-1
1.01
1.81
2.001
-1
1.05
1.80
2.000
-1
1.06
1.81
2.000
-1
1.02
1.79
2.000
-1
1.12
1.80
1.999
10 Blank Control (0 “L” words)
1. Cake
-1
1.20
1.70
1.999
2. Dusk
-1
1.12
1.72
2.001
3. Mint
-1
1.17
1.74
2.001
4. Play
-1
1.19
1.77
2.000
5. Porch
-1
1.11
1.80
2.000
6. Read
-1
1.14
1.76
1.999
7. Slurp
-1
1.15
1.81
2.001
8. Snore
-1
1.05
1.79
2.000
9. Street
-1
1.13
1.78
2.003
10. Thumb
-2
1.18
1.77
2.000
10 Practice Control (2 “L” words)
1. Cone
-1
1.10
1.70
2.000
2. Droop
-1
1.22
1.70
1.999
3. Lean
-1
1.16
1.76
2.001
4. List
-1
1.20
1.77
2.001
5. Mile
-1
1.19
1.75
2.000
6. Prune
-1
1.18
1.80
2.002
7. Shirt
-1
1.06
1.78
2.000
8. Sheep
-1
1.15
1.75
2.001
9. Well
-1
1.20
1.77
2.001
10. Your
-1
1.19
1.81
1.999
Total Attended Words = 120; Total “L” Words = 7

Even 19238
Even 58614
Odd 48327
Even 60439
Odd 89106
Odd 05983
Even 92840
Odd 27935
Even 12476
Odd 71392
Even 49231
Odd 92758
Even 25879
Odd 84167
Even 51683
Odd 01589
Even 39615
Odd 52146
Even 82651
Odd 32768
Even 60492
Even 46280
Odd 74325
Even 91847
Odd 08573
Odd 15904
Even 28469

Note. NonAgg = NonAggressive Words; LoAgg = Low Aggressive Words; AmbAgg = Ambiguously
Aggressive Words; HiAgg = High Aggressive Words. Words obtained from Nelson, McEvoy, &
Schreiber’s (1999) normed database of words and their associated links.
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Appendix I
Recognition Task
Instructions: Some of the following words were presented to you on the computer task
that you just completed. Please check off any words that you think you heard.
_____ mop
_____ shop
_____ film
_____ arm
_____ beach
_____ shout
_____ play
_____ pump
_____ touch
_____ give
_____ patch
_____ crave
_____ march
_____ fun
_____ take
_____ find
_____ ram
_____ mean
_____ hard
_____ feast

[LoA Control]
[NonA]
[AmbA Control]
[New]
[NonA Control]
[HiA]
[BL Control]
[NonA Control]
[AmbA Control]
[New]
[New]
[NonA Control]
[LoA]
[New]
[LoA]
[NonA]
[New]
[New]
HiA Control]
[New]

_____ shine
_____ bench
_____ grab
_____ bend
_____ cute
_____ hate
_____ kind
_____ shave
_____ up
_____ trick
_____ harsh
_____ broom
_____ last
_____ gun
_____ screen
_____ rude
_____ please
_____ laugh
_____ maim
_____ gum

[HiA Control]
[New]
[AmbA]
[New]
[AmbA Control]
[New]
[New]
[New]
[LoA Control]
[New]
[New]
[HiA Control]
[New]
[HiA]
[New]
[AmbA]
[New]
[LoA Control]
[New]
[AmbA Control]

Also, please list any words you think you heard that are not on the above list.
__________

__________

__________

__________

__________

__________

__________

__________

__________

__________

What do you think the purpose of this experiment was?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Did this experiment remind you of any other experiments that you have participated in?
______ No, it did not remind me of any other experiments.
______ Yes, and the experiment was about ____________________________________
and it reminded me because _________________________________________
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Appendix J
Calculation of Standard Ethanol Consumption (SEC) units using part of the
Comprehensive Drinker Profile (Marlatt & Miller, 1986)
Steady Pattern Chart
If the client drinks at least once per week complete the Steady Pattern Chart, then
complete Q/F data summary. (If client does not drink at least once per week, proceed to
the Episodic Pattern Chart.) For each time period enter the type of beverage, % alcohol,
amount consumed, and approximate time span during which it was consumed.
Morning

Afternoon

Evening

Total for Day

Mon
___________
Total SECs
Monday
Tues
___________
Total SECs
Tuesday
Wed
___________
Total SECs
Wednesday
Thur
___________
Total SECs
Thursday
Fri

___________
Total SECs
Friday
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Appendix J (Continued)
Sat

___________
Total SECs
Saturday
Sun

___________
Total SECs
Sunday
Formula for calculating SECs: # oz. X % alcohol x 2 = SECs
A. TOTAL SECs per week

___________

B. TOTAL drinking (nonabstinent days) reported: ___________
C. AVERAGE SECs per drinking day (A/B):

___________

D. ESTIMATED Peak BAC for week:

___________

Quantity/Frequency Summary Data (Steady Drinking Pattern Only)
Total SECs per week from table:

[

Multiply by 13 weeks

] SECs per week
X 13

-----------Total SEC’s in past 3 months:

=

[

Chart Only)
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] SECs (From Steady Pattern

Appendix J (Continued)
Episodic Pattern Chart (Periodic and Combination Patterns Only; For Steady Drinkers,
skip to Pattern History.)
Type and Amount
of Beverage Consumed:

*Total SECs per episode: __________
*Hours: ______
*Peak BAC: ______ mg %

*Total SECs per episode: __________
*Hours: ______
*Peak BAC: ______ mg %

*Total SECs per episode: __________
*Hours: ______
*Peak BAC: ______ mg %

Number of
Episodes in past 3
months:

Multiply Quantity
(SECs per episode) by
Frequency (episodes per
3 months) for each
episode type:

X ___________
episodes per 3 mo

= ________________
SECs per 3 months

X ___________
episodes per 3 mo

= ________________
SECs per 3 months

X ___________
episodes per 3 mo

= ________________
SECs per 3 months

For COMBINATION PATTERN DRINKERS, subtract from this
total the number of SECs already accounted for in the Steady
Pattern Chart and record here only SECs in excess of the steady
drinking pattern. No drink should be counted on both charts. For
PERIODIC DRINKERS, however, record all drinks here (since for
these drinkers the Steady Pattern Chart is left blank).
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_______________
Grand Total SECs 3 mo.
from all episodic
drinking

Appendix J (Continued)
Total Q/F
Add the Total SECs from the
Quantity/Frequency Summary Data section ____________
to the Grand Total SECs
from the Episodic Pattern Chart
+ ____________
for Total Q/F SECs for past 3 mos

=

____________

Pattern History
What is the largest amount of alcohol that you have ever drunk in one day?
Beverage

Amount

___________________

_____________________

___________________

_____________________

___________________

_____________________

___________________

_____________________

___________________

_____________________

Over ____________ Hours
Total SECs: ______________ Estimated Peak BAC: ____________ mg%
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Appendix K
Debriefing Statement for Phase I
You were asked to respond to statements regarding personality characteristics and
expectations you may hold about a variety of behaviors. Research indicates that some of
our personality characteristics (such as being more or less aggressive) may be related to
the expectations we hold about certain behaviors (such as drinking). Today you filled out
some measures that may support or refute this research.
Thank you very much for participating. If you have questions or concerns please contact
Dr. James Epps at (813) 974-0388 or Michelle LeVasseur at (813) 974-1520.
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Appendix L
Debriefing Statement for Phase II
Today you completed a computer task designed to measure the interference of aggression
stimuli (and for some, alcohol stimuli) on attention. Research suggests that those who are
higher on certain personality characteristics may show more attentional interference to
certain types of information (in this case, some aggression-related stimuli) that are
presented on headphones (auditorily) or on a computer monitor (visually). During Phase I
(several weeks ago), we measured your expectancies (with a variety of questionnaires)
about how you would behave after drinking alcohol or how aggressive you consider
yourself typically to be. We then asked for volunteers to participate in another study
(Phase II) that was supposed to be unrelated to Phase I. The time delay and the deception
were both necessary so that you would not be more reactive to alcohol and aggression
stimuli simply because you had recently been asked many questions about those
constructs. The decisions you made on the computer task (odd vs. even numbers)
provided us with a measure of reaction time. Reaction times gave us an indication of
whether aggressive words interfered with your ability to attend to the computer task more
than nonaggressive words.
Thank you very much for participating. Please do not discuss this experiment with other
students until they have completed the experiment. If you have questions or concerns,
contact Dr. James Epps at (813) 974-0388 or Michelle LeVasseur at (813) 974-1520. If
you would like to learn more about these topics please refer to the following references:
1. Bargh, J. A., Bond, R. N., Lombardi, W. J., & Tota, M. E. (1986). The additive
nature of chronic and temporary sources of construct accessibility. Journal of
Personality & Social Psychology, 50(5), 869-878.
2. Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (2000). The mind in the middle: A practical
guide to priming and automaticity research. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd (Eds.),
Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology. (pp. 253285). New York City: Cambridge University Press.
3. Chermack, S. T. & Taylor, S. P. (1995). Alcohol and human physical aggression:
Pharmacological versus expectancy effects. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 56(4),
449-456.
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